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The idea of studying the history of the Navy's public information
specialty grew out of curiosity about its early days; however, I also
realized an understanding of the past can benefit the future. Simul-
taneously, it became clear that although the Navy was unique in estab-
lishing a specialist group to conduct public information activity,
many civilian public relations organizations, particularly those with
a conservative orientation, probably are faced with the same kinds of
problems. This thesis is not a broad investigation of an organization's
public relations program nor is it all inclusive, but hopefully this
small part of the whole will contribute to a greater understanding and
appreciation of the struggles involved in developing a positive public
relations program for any group in society.
Special thanks are due to the many active duty and retired public
information specialists who gave encouragement and assistance during
my research. I am indebted most to 12 individuals who discussed major
developments that affected the public information specialty in the
last 30 years. These men gave me as much time from their busy sched-
ules as I needed. So a grateful tip of the hat to: Ed Castillo,
Jim Dowdell, Bob Hartmann, Jim Jenkins, Bob Jones, Buzz Lloyd, Merle
MacBain, Frank Manson, Bob Mereness, Herschel Schooley, Ken Wade and
Buck Wilhide. During the writing phase of this thesis, two individuals,




Professors David G. Clark and Douglas C. Jones, my adviser,
guided me through the historical morass to help narrow the topic.
Both Professor Jones and Professor Steven Chaffee provided invaluable
assistance in improving the final draft. Professor Scott Cutlip, the
third member of my committee, also has my gratitude.
Much of the data came from the Federal Record Center, Washington,
D. C. Without the help of J. N. Duncan, this source would have posed
formidable problems. His cheerful and helpful attitude sped the
research process and I am deeply indebted to him.
Finally, a vote of thanks to my wife, Sarah, for her constant
encouragement, and to the three little Larsons for being quiet so
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No matter how efficiently organized on paper, the
practical effectiveness of a public information
program (public relations is actually the definitive
name) depends upon the performance of the personnel
assigned.
—The Karig Board
The introductory chapter provides an opportunity to review Navy
specialization and service attitudes toward public information, as
well as to explain my research method. A brief review of the history
of Navy specialization to the beginning of World War II and a sample
of service attitudes toward public information and the specialist,
will help provide background for discussing the purpose and method-
ology of the study and the Navy public information specialty. The
specialization history should add historical context for describing
later Navy attempts to abolish some specialist categories. An exam-
ination of Navy attitudes toward the function and the practitioner,
perceived by retired and active duty Navy information specialists should
reveal approaches to the public relations function that encourage or
discourage careers in Navy public information. The problem of dis-
associating the public relations function from the public relations
practitioners in this study is troublesome and difficult. Specializa-
tion within the Navy has been an "up-and-down" existence, with Navy
officials apparently never certain of the validity of the specialization

2concept. The study's objectives should aid in assessing the growth
of the specialty. Three main sources of primary evidence—reports,
correspondence and interviews—as well as secondary sources, are
described. In addition, terms peculiar to the Navy and to military
information arc defined to aid the civilian in understanding evidence.
Specialization in the Navy
A study of the public information specialty needs a context of
Navy specialization history to relate the role of the unrestricted
line officer to that of the specialist. Like most other current
specialty groups in the Navy, public information did not exist before
World War II.
The earliest recognized need for a specialist in the service was
engineering, as the Navy moved from sail to the era of steam. The
latter came just before the middle of the 19th century.
By 1841, the Navy possessed two steam men-of-war, and
in 1842 [the] first steel-hulled steam frigate was
launched. In response to this challenge, the Navy
by 1842 had shifted its character from a predominantly
personnel service . . . to a predominantly material




That same year, Congress authorized a corps of naval engineers. This
was followed in 1866 by a construction corps. There was some resent-
ment between the "snipes" (engineers) and the regular Navy line. As a
result, Congress, in 1899, abolished the engineering specialty and
4
returned officers to the line.
During the early 1900s, the Navy began a postgraduate program to
provide increased technical training for officers. Technical develop-

ments over the next several years accelerated the need for such
expertise.
By 1912, advances in ordnance and fire control,
and emergence of the submarine as a practical
weapon and, most of all, vast improvements in
communications had made naval warfare most com-
plex in terms of planning, training, and execu-
tion.
In 1916, Congress again abetted specialization with legislation
enabling the Navy to select and assign qualified officers as Engineer-
ing Duty Only (EDO) specialists. By 1921, aviation was developing,
and the Navy's bureau of aeronautics was established. The fledgling
aviators also felt a need for special training. Upon the 1930
Halligan Board recommendation, Congress established an additional
category: Aeronautical Engineering Duty Only (AEDO)
.
On the eve of World War II, Congress abolished the construction
corps and created an ED group including constructors, EDs and AEDs.
The group was established as "a Restricted Line group as opposed to a
corps." World War II, however, clearly demonstrated to the Navy the
need for a variety of specialists. During the war, many regular
officers, as well as reservists, were assigned to jobs requiring
specialized knowledge or ability. The Keith Board reported, "At the
close of the war, the Navy was faced with the problem of whether to
continue the specialties which had proven so necessary." Rapid
demobilization allowed the majority of specialist officers to leave
the Navy within months after the Japanese surrender. This exodus con-
cerned senior naval and civilian officials in the Navy department; the
demobilization problem became the root of many difficulties experienced
by information specialists in succeeding years.

Public Information and the Navy
Insight into the public information specialty over the 20-year
period of this study can be gained, to some extent, by reviewing Navy
attitudes toward public information as perceived by some specialists.
This attitude has been growing more favorable as more naval officers
comprehend the importance of the function, as well as the role of
the specialist. Captain E. L. Castillo, now retired, and director of
public affairs for Fairfax County, Virginia (the largest county in the
state) , believes the public information specialty program has been a
"step-child" because
. . . the Navy was never very sure it wanted the
public messing around in its business, and because
the Navy was never convinced that anybody whose
training was other than the training of a standard
Naval officer could ever amount to anything.'
Captain James S. Dowdell, now retired and director of corporate public
affairs for. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., adds that most naval
officers believe that actions speak for themselves and could "never
acknowledge the need for an officer to devote his full time to public
g
information, and only this." Captain Frank A. Manson, now retired,
and a consultant for Lulejian Associates—defense planning analysts
—
feels that the stumbling block to full acceptance of public information
is the unrestricted line officer's perception of what constitutes an
acceptable risk to his career. The unrestricted line officer, Manson
asserted, is perfectly willing to risk his career in the line of duty, but
... he is not willing to risk his career on
political matters because he doesn't believe he
should accept those kind of risks. So when it
comes to a controversial area, the chances are

high that he will decide it is not his job, nor
the job of any of his subordinates to make a
statement on some controversial subject. I know
very few Admirals who are willing to accept the
risk of keeping the public informed as part of
the responsibility of command.
°
On the other hand, Captain James E. Jenkins, who served for seven
years as the public information officer for five secretaries of the
navy, now retired and deputy director of the California state depart-
ment of finance, believes the service's attitude toward public informa-
tion and the use of specialists is undergoing positive change and that
there is increasing cooperation between the unrestricted line and the
public information specialist. Jenkins stated:
A lot of the increasing cooperation has to do with
present senior officers being exposed as junior
officers to some well qualified information spe-
cialists. The senior officers trust and understand
the specialist and they realize that each fellow has
to do his own thing. The Commanders in the early
days had never seen a public information specialist
before, and the only thing they could fall back on
was the age-old tradition that if the Commander
is a captain, and the public information officer
is a lieutenant, then he obviously knows more
than any lieutenant, everything else being equal.
But today, the Commander remembers the public infor-
mation specialist he has known as a sharp, capable,
trustworthy officer, and accepts his expertise as
he would from a lawyer, chaplain, doctor, etc. u
Jenkins' point was reinforced by a recent directive of Admiral E. R.
Zumwalt, Jr., chief of naval operations, who, in August, 1970, advised
the pentagon's admirals that they must "... keep the Chief of Infor-
mation and his . . . officers informed of operations, significant
[operations] . . . and events and to include him in the planning phases
of various programs."

6The chief of naval operations pointed out to the other admirals that
everything the Navy does "eventually gets into the public domain."
He continued:
Additionally, it is the CHINFO who is the principal
advisor to both the Secretary of the Navy and the
CNO on matters pertaining to public affairs and it
is he who is looked to for recommendations as to the
best course of action on these pertinent issues.
* * *
... I am depending on CHINFO [office of informa-
tion] to assist me in the important task of explain-
ing to the public and to our Navy family the actions
we are taking to reshape our Navy. I also expect
you to cooperate in this aspect of communications.
Public Affairs is a delicate and extremely important
tool of management and I expect to use it to the
best advantage of the Navy.
In conclusion, Zumwalt reminded all the admirals that, "... there
must, at all times, be a free exchange of information between all
officers . . . [and] the Office of Information so that I can be
properly advised ... on all matters of public interest."
The retired information specialists believe that the basis of the
Navy's attitude toward them lies in the service's overall view of naval
officers and its attitude toward the public relations function. Dowdell
12
asserted that the Navy has held that a naval officer can do anything.
Captain F. M. Lloyd, III, now retired, and lecturer, writer and
teacher of public relations at the University of Florida, argues that
the belief is a myth, and said that the basic problem is
. . . that not everyone aspires to be the Chief
of Naval Operations. But, because of this in
the case of the public information specialist,
this immediately marks them in the minds of many
line officers as being a little less than nothing.

Captain K. W. Wade, deputy chief of information until his retirement
in August, 1970, adds:
Even at this late date [1970] , there are a good
many people in the Navy who do not consider
public information specialists real Navy officers.
However, the supply people, the communications
specialists, the doctors, and lots of other groups,
also have to go through this prophet without honor
routine.-^
Dowdell added that he believed much of the problem exists at the senior
levels of the Navy.
The Navy at the top level doesn't give sufficient
emphasis to the need for good public relations
nor does it emphasize that good public relations
is not having a good public information officer;
good public relations is good performance. Good
performance is not worth a nickel unless some-
body knows about it. A silent service is not
possible. I-*
This study of the Navy public information specialty seeks, among other
objectives, to determine whether the specialty has been a success;
consideration of what constitutes success is a key factor. Captain
Dowdell concludes that the specialty has been a success simply because
it has survived. He believes that if the specialty had not proven
its value, the Navy would have abolished the specialist. Dowdell
elaborated,
I will say that success also can be measured by the
success of a few individuals who have been a public
information specialist. Certainly they have suc-
ceeded, and they have had the respect of not only
their peers in the Navy, their superiors in the Navy,
the news media, but officials in the defense depart-
ment as well. These people represent the success of
the corps. ... I think the record of the corps
under real rough conditions has been superb. When
the going gets tough, that's when the Commander will
be glad to get the problem off his back.-1- 6

Dowdell also discussed one reason why the specialty has problems.
He asserted
. . . when the chips are down, the Navy or any
other organization will turn to the public relations
specialist, but when things are going well, they
will think that public relations is just frosting
on the cake. Believe me, it is just as true in
business as it is in the Navy. '
Commander C. R. Wilhide, for six years the public information officer
for Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, now retired
and vice president of Chilton Publications, agreed with Dowdell that
specialists have the confidence of individuals to whom the specialists
have proven their value. However, Wilhide added:
The specialty has gained the confidence of individ-
uals, but it doesn't have the confidence of the
Navy. Until you obtain the confidence of the Navy,
there isn't going to be any effective public rela-
tions program, it will be a roller-coaster sort of
thing.-18
Purpose
The potential benefits of a 20-year assessment of Navy public
relations specialist history are many. Personnel selection is the
most basic and implicit question any organization faces in beginning
or building a public relations program. Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H.
Center wrote that "the specialty of public relations has emerged in
19
response to our changing environment. ' Because, as Cutlip and Center
20
assert, "this is the age of the specialist," quality personnel are
the sine qua non of effective public relations. An in-depth study of
Navy public relations specialization and Navy experience with, and
attitude toward, the public relations practitioner should be analogous

to the same operations in any industry, business or large organiza-
tion competing for attention in the arena of public opinion. The
study also will reflect the attitudes of a major government agency
over time toward the function of public relations.
The initiation of the public information specialist program by
the Navy in 1945 suggests there was a generally favorable attitude
toward the function at the highest management levels. The struggle
to retain or abolish the specialist program should reflect any atti-
tude change by the service. An attempt will be made to determine the
reasons for the Navy's decision to establish a cadre of public infor-
mation specialists and to train full-time practitioners.
A further objective of this study will be to indicate the atti-
tudes of one governmental authoritarian organization toward the use
of, and ratio between, part and full-time public relations practi-
tioners. The findings may have implications for other organizations
in determining the balance between full and part-time public relations
personnel.
Closely related to the question of establishing public informa-
tion as a specialty is the question of whether a specialist corps is
viable. Retired Navy information specialists disagree, although the
prevailing opinion favors the specialty. Most disagreement occurs in
the area of program and personnel management. Captain Lloyd believes
that subspecialization would have been best because, unless the public
information officer takes his turn at sea, he will lack the confidence
21
and trust of the sea-going naval officer. Lloyd's position is in
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general agreement with the findings of the 1959 Keith Board, one of
many Navy boards that have studied specialization. It reported:
The lack of Fleet experience has been one of the
most oft-repeated complaints concerning the spe-
cialist groups and therefore it is considered
mandatory that duty with the operating forces be
expanded to the greatest extent possible. 22
On the other hand, Captain Manson asserted that although establishing
a public information specialty was wise, some system should have been
detailed to keep specialists rotating between sea and shore. Manson,
however, did not believe extensive sea duty was necessary. This
retired officer stated:
A lack of understanding of the product, and the
feeling that the public information specialists
really don't know the Navy is a real criticism
over the years. In many cases, the specialists
have served the shore establishment better than
they have served the fleet, or know more about
the shore establishment. These are valid criti-
cisms. 23
Captain Castillo argued that "the 1650 concept is a valid one, just
mis-managed." He noted there had been too little effort and thought
given to developing a specialist career pattern and career patterns
in general. Captain Jenkins argued that "there is better public
relations in the Navy as a result of the establishment of the specialty.
With the growth of the state of the art and the technicalities involved
,
you have had to have as many different kinds of expertise, as you
25
could only get in having a public information specialty. Captain
Robin M. Hartmann, now retired, and currently the assistant public




public information specialty was a good thing
because if you are going to explain the Navy, you
need someone who knows how to explain things; an
engineer isn't going to do it properly. 2 "
Captain Dowdell summarized: "I think we did it right, but the Navy
27didn't think we did it right."
If there are differences of opinion over the establishment of the
public information specialty, all retired information specialists
interviewed agree that today's practitioner is the best in the history
of the program; however, all Navy line officers would not agree. Cap-
tain Manson recalls a tremendous difference between today's public
information specialist and the specialist of the early 1950s.
Since the middle 1950s, information specialists
have been getting better and better. The level of
competence, the whole thing— they are better trained,
the selection process is apparently better. . . .
The Navy has had a tremendous number of highly com-
petent information officers, and at this time particu-
larly in the Commander, Lieutenant Commander and Lieu-
tenant level. I haven't seen any decline in the level
of talent. 28
Captain Jenkins also asserted:
The professional expertise of the public information
corps today is so much better now than it was in
the beginning that I don't think the specialty will
ever be in trouble again, particularly if the Navy
keeps pumping talented, dedicated, and intellectually
qualified people in at the bottom of the rank struc-
ture. 2°
Captain Hartmann added that strengthening the specialty was due to
senior officers who began
... to pay attention to public relations and public
information. The Admirals and other senior officers
began giving their PIO more authority. You never stop
educating the senior officers about the importance of




However, Captain Castillo believed in many cases
that line officers still feel that public informa-
tion officers have not proven their worth, and a
lot of them haven't. In addition, there is some
justification to the feeling that you can take a
good Naval officer and teach him what he needs to
know about public relations, faster than you can
teach a public information specialist what he
needs to know about the Navy. But, as usual, the
truth is somewhere near the middle. ^1
Finally the increase in the number of public information spe-
cialists will be studied. Growth usually signifies viability of a
program. This study, emphasizing the continuing struggle to
increase the size of the public information specialty, will suggest
why decision-makers have effected increases or decreases in the
growth of the specialty.
Methods
The primary source of material for this study was reports of
Navy boards and studies of specialization and the public information
specialty, the correspondence of the Navy office of information,
and the solicited remarks of retired and active duty public informa-
32
tion specialists. Congressional hearings and reports, as well as
legislation, were reviewed to determine the extent of support or at
least lack of opposition to Navy use of public information special-
ists and to examine the legal basis for the specialty.
It is axiomatic that before undertaking any historical study,
the researcher must be familiar, not only with the events of the
period under study, but with the subject under investigation. Second-
ary sources have been basic to gaining contextual understanding of
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the 20-year period. The author, by profession a Navy public infor-
mation specialist since 1960, is qualified to understand the events,
relationships, personalities and developments accompanying the grow-
ing Navy public information specialist program. To avoid bias, the
investigator has avoided citing his conclusions during the presenta-
tion of the evidence.
A review of the reports of investigations of the specialty is
necessary because the documents indicate satisfaction or dissatisfac-
tion with the specialists; it is helpful to understand the manner of
presentation of these reports. The reports and studies are numerous,
but are occurring with decreasing frequency. Reports of boards and
studies generally have four parts: (1) precepts, guidelines or
approach in collecting and evaluating data; (2) pertinent information
uncovered by investigation; (3) applicable findings; (4) recommenda-
tions, usually the same as findings.
Correspondence is evidence of internal administrative decisions
that have affected the specialty, particularly its size. Although
the records of the information office and Washington National Record
Center files were reviewed, there has been some loss of material.
For example, files of general correspondence from 1945-1947, relative
to the administration of public relations, including personnel,
appropriations, allotments and organization surveys and studies were
destroyed in 1962, according to record center reports. It is important
to be aware that most naval correspondence is issued over the signature
of an official different from the name of the officer on the correspond-
ence. For example, the chief of naval operations rarely signs corre-
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spondence but delegates this to another officer. In most cases,
therefore, correspondence cited has not been signed by the originator.
Where his identity is critical, his name is given.
Interviews with retired and active duty public information
specialists constituted another important source of evidence. Almost
all the officers interviewed served at least 20 years as Navy public
information specialists, most were among the initial public informa-
tion specialist selectees in 1946-1947, and most have been retired
for at least three to four years—time to temper recollections and
reduce any animosity toward the Navy and its treatment of the specialty.
The specialists' recollections and reflections were important in
understanding the events and circumstances that led to decisions and
policy-making. The interviews also provided insight into perceived
naval attitudes and the reasons for developments and problems in the
specialty.
All these primary sources were used to present the chronological
development of the public information specialty. They served as
cross-checks on accuracy of dates, events and attitudes. Together,
all the sources uncover the elements in decisions to continue or
eliminate the specialty program and describe the Navy's evolving senti-
ment for a public information function buttressed by professionally-
trained practitioners.
Definitions
To eliminate confusion that might arise from the use of terms





. The number of people the Navy designates to perform
a certain function or mission. In the case of public information,
this is the number of such specialists the Navy has decided are needed
to carry out the function. Allowance is tied closely to ceiling (see
below)
.
Billet . A job, position, group of duties, specific task or
33
responsibilities of a military person.
Billet Structure
. Navy-wide job alignment of public information
specialists based on the rank of the officer, and the number of spe-
cialists assigned to various naval commands.
Bureau of Naval Personnel . The major element in the Navy's
administrative establishment responsible for coordinating all aspects
of personnel management, including selecting personnel for promotion
and education, writing and issuing orders for change of duty assign-
ments, and coordinating boards investigating personnel and education.
Ceiling . The maximum number of personnel assigned to an organi-
zation or activity. Usually does not exceed the authorized allowance.
Designator Code . Four-digit number to group both billets and
officers by categories for manpower, personnel accounting, and admin-
istrative purposes. The first three digits represent the officer's
work; 165 indicates full-time public information duty. The last digit
indicates whether the officer is a regular or reserve, for regular,
5 for reserve. Thus, a 1650 officer is a regular Navy public informa-




Line Officer . An officer, not staff corps and not restricted in
type of duty assigned, eligible for command at sea. The term "line
officer" is synonymous with "unrestricted line officer," currently
35
used in the Navy.
Public Information Officer . The Navy has three types of public
information officers. First, there are specialists whose full-time
duty involves mass media contacts, community relations and internal
information functions. This officer usually has been educated in
mass communications and has completed at least one tour of duty in a
public information billet. The subspecialist or part-time public
information officer performs the same duties as a specialist, but
lacks the specialist's experience and rotates in duty assignments
between line officer and public information billets. The subspecial-
ist must have either educational background and one tour as a full-
time information officer, civilian mass communications experience and
one tour as a full-time information officer, or two full-time tours
in a public information billet. Unrestricted line officers with
public information duties on a collateral basis comprise the third
category of Navy public information officers. Every Navy command,
however small, has at least one collateral duty public information
officer. Thus, in terms of numbers, collateral duty information
officers are most numerous, subspecialists next, and specialists, a
small experienced corps, about one-third to one-fourth the total of
all full-time public information officers. The term public information
officer is equivalent to: Special Duty Only (Public Information),
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SDO(PI), PIO, 1650, 1655, or 165x officer. These terms are often
used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
Regular . A career officer who gains tenure upon reaching the
rank of lieutenant commander, and who is not susceptible to release
from active duty during periods of Navy personnel cuts.
Reserve . An officer who may, or may not, be a career officer,
but who is vulnerable to release from active duty during cuts in Navy
personnel strength. Reserve public information specialists supplement
the regular Navy information specialists; an effort is made to main-
tain a ratio of six reserves on active duty for each four regular
Navy information specialists on active duty.
Restricted Line Officer . An officer, not staff corps, restricted
in the type of assigned duty, eligible for command positions only in
37his specialty. The Special Duty Only category, including public
information specialists, is within the definition.
Selection . Naval officers are chosen or "selected" by a group
of officers meeting as a formal board (a "selection board") for promo-
tion, advanced civilian or naval education, and specialist designation.
The individual officer can be expected to compete against a number of
officers for promotion, postgraduate education or specialist designation.
Specialist . An officer, not an unrestricted line officer,
designated for engineering duty, weapons engineering duty, special
38
duty and staff corps.
Specialty . A specialty is established when the required speciali-
zation cannot be attained and maintained by an unrestricted line
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officer even after his postgraduate education and during sea-shore
39
rotational duties. A specialty requires a full-time practitioner.
Staff Corps . Officer specialists in the Navy in eight areas:
medicine, medical service, supply, religion, engineering, nursing,
dentistry and law. The difference between a staff corps officer
and a public information specialist, for example, is that a staff
corps officer is not restricted in the performance of duty within
his corps, whereas an information specialist is restricted in the
performance of duty within his corps—the line.
Subspecialty . Excludes naval warfare and command at sea, but
includes significant qualification in a specialized field, from a
combination of formal education, functional training and practical
experience. Broad areas of naval warfare and qualifications, such as
aviation or submarine duty, are not subspecialties, but part of the
unrestricted line officers' specialty of naval warfare and command
40
at sea. Subspecialty, therefore, is secondary career development.
Subspecialist . An unrestricted line officer qualified in a
subspecialty.
Conclusion
The Navy attitude toward public information and the full-time
practitioner shows incomplete understanding of the complex practice
of public relations; this attitude has played an important role in
events affecting the specialty. Navy belief that a line officer can
do anything is still prevalent; however, the number of naval officers
with enlightened attitudes toward public relations, or at least toward
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the skilled practitioner, has increased over the years. A substantial
portion of this increased respect has been due to the improved per-
formance of the specialist. The struggle has by no means been won
but the continued demonstration of professionalism by the full-time
public information specialist, along with increased awareness of the
importance of public relations by more naval officers, seems to have
placed the public information specialty in a hard-won, but secure
position. Because understanding the past is essential to evaluating
the present and meeting the needs and challenges of the future, it
seems fitting that a study of the history of the public information
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. . . the Army-Navy troubles came from the
peculiar psychology of the Navy Department,
which frequently seemed to retire from the
realm of logic into the dim religious world
in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet,
and the United States Navy the only true church.
—Anon
.
The beginning of the Navy public information specialty occurred in
the turbulent four years after World War II. Political issues and per-
sonalities influenced Navy attitudes and actions during a struggle its
officers believed would determine the future of the service as an effec-
tive fighting force. Thus, review of existing political factors is
necessary to understand why the Navy believed it required the expertise
of full-time, trained public information specialists—a role unprece-
dented in Navy history. However, political issues were not the only
influence on the specialty's formation. The roles of certain personal-
ities will be considered to suggest their impact on the development of
the Navy specialty. The Dyer Board, which recommended establishing the
public information specialty, and subsequent Navy and Congressional
approval of its proposals, was basic to the formation of the public
information specialty. Selection of the initial group of specialists,
as well as opportunities for advanced training and fleet experience,
exerted significant influence on the Navy's attitude toward, and evalua-
tion of, public information officers. A continuous internal Navy battle
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to retain an effective information organization and nurture the growth
and maturity of a cadre of professional public information officers began.
All these developments and influences helped shape the character of the
Navy public information specialty during its formative years
.
Influences on Public Information
Political controversy over unification began during World War II
when unified operations created the need to consolidate administrative,
logistical and operational service functions. By 1944, the Navy's posi-
2
tion on the creation of a single service was "under study." When Con-
gressional hearings began in late 1945, the Navy proposed its reorgani-
zation plan, recommending three independent military services, instead
of the Army plan suggesting a Department of National Defense and a Chief
of Staff. 3
Naval officials' perception of the service's postwar composition
also influenced their attitude toward unification. The aircraft carrier
had replaced the battleship as the backbone of the fleet. In 1945, the
Navy began designing a flush-deck carrier to handle larger aircraft
capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Navy planned to request funds
4
for carrier construction in fiscal year 1948. Policymakers believed
they needed the carrier to exploit the potential of seapower. This Navy
plan for a new class of aircraft carriers was a significant factor in the
1945 battle lines forming over unification.
Some Navy officers were aware of public information's role in relat-
ing the Navy's combat achievements to the public during World War II.
Fearing that the service would not be "merged, but submerged" after the
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war, the Navy opposed unification, and a few officers realized the serv-
ice was in the position of having to explain its unification policies to
o
the American public. Public information became more acceptable to some
senior naval officers, but their acceptance of the function was attrib-
uted to a "fear complex . . . about losing the Navy's identity" rather
9
than to any major attitude change toward public relations itself.
The actual depth of Navy understanding of the role of public relations
perhaps was gauged by a comment of Warren H. Pierce, an ex-Navy public
information officer, then associate editor of The Chicago Times .
As a newspaper editor, with some 20-odd years in the
business, I was impressed (and frankly appalled) at
the complete lack of understanding or sympathy with
public information problems exhibited by about 99
per cent of the naval officers with whom I had con-
tact . . . the principal weakness of naval public
relations has been the fact that most naval officers
simply don't know anything about them. ^
On the other hand, Pierce believed "that once the officers did understand
and appreciate the importance and the complications of the problem, they
nil
were . . . cooperative.
There were problems, however, in presenting the Navy's unification
viewpoint to the public. The position was complicated during the post-
12
war period because President Truman seemed to support the Army plan,
and Navy opposition could have appeared to be an attack on the President.
The Navy's position seemed less awkward after the President stated the
Navy should be free to present its "untrammelled point of view to the
13
committees of Congress."
Passage of the 1947 National Security Act on July 26 provided "au-
thoritative coordination and unified direction [of the armed forces]
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under civilian control" 1^ and created the National Military Establish-
ment. Even though the Navy plan for three services was accepted,
budget consolidation triggered intense inter-service squabbles. By
1947, the American military establishment had endured four years of
bitter, vicious internal struggle for position, prestige and power within
the emerging department of defense.
Relations among the services were relatively peaceful until 1948,
when a quarrel began between the Navy and Air Force over the projected
budget, basically a squabble over mission and strategy. Air and sea
power technological advances had to continue replacing old, often obso-
lete, World War II weapons. The Air Force wanted a 70-group force; the
Navy wanted the flush-deck carrier. President Truman demanded a "bal-
18
anced budget," and the military was told to hold spending to a minimum.
In the arena of public opinion, the Navy and Air Force debated the
merits of their respective positions. Hampered by the lack of effective
19
spokesmen, the Navy was outclassed by the Air Force in winning support.
By June, 1948, the Air Force clearly had more Congressional support than
the Navy; this was reinforced by public clamor for more defense for the
dollar, "or as a later [presidential] administration said, 'a bigger bang
20
for a buck.'" At least one naval officer expressed surprise that the
Navy was not willing to fight for the country's security, by countering
what the officer called "the under-handed, subtle, insidious propaganda"
of the Air Force. He felt the Navy was being "meek and humble, like the
„21
chicken waiting for the ax [sic] to fall."
In early 1949, the Navy and the Air Force continued their rivalry
for favorable publicity. The Air Force scored a major victory with

27
announced improvements in B36 performance and a B50's non-stop flight
around the world. Paul Y. Hammond reported that the latter event pushed
22
news about a Navy exercise in the Caribbean out of the press.
The Air Force secrecy shrouding the non-stop B50 flight provided an
example of the lack of inter-service public relations cooperation dur-
23ing this period. Stuart M. Symington, secretary of the air force, and
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld , chief of naval operations, spoke at different
functions on the same evening in Boston.
They met in a hotel lobby following their speeches,
and Secretary Symington asked Admiral Denfeld how
he was returning to Washington. Symington said he was
going on past Washington, but he would be glad for
Denfeld to join him on his airplane as far as Washing-
ton. Following the stop in Washington, Symington flew
on to Fort Worth, Texas, where a big delegation of
press was waiting for the round-the-world B50 flight
to arrive . . . the flight set all kinds of records and
won wide acclaim. Despite the fact that the secretary
and the admiral had ridden together from Boston to
Washington, Symington never mentioned the flight to
Denfeld. 2A
As time passed, the Air Force and the Navy were attracting public
notice—both favorable and unfavorable. The public relations activities
of the two services—including biased articles submitted to newspapers
and popular magazines and speeches—were so intense that Carl Vinson,
chairman of the house armed services committee, threatened his own inves-
25
tigation of Navy and Air Force public information programs. On the
other hand , Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times , who also was a graduate
of the U. S. Naval Academy, noted an increasing awareness by "the serv-
ices of the role of the press in a free democracy." Baldwin added,
however, that "the services too often view . . . agencies of public infor-
. 26
mation as mouthpieces" of propaganda and withhold unfavorable information^
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Within the pentagon, civilian leadership was preparing to take its
own action on excessive service publicity. In March, 1949, Secretary of
Defense James V. Forrestal began to combine information activities of
the three services. Clarence H. Schooley, a former director of defense
information, recalled that intensified service in-fighting precipitated
the move, along with "flareups as the services failed to work well
27
together." (Forrestal's concept of a joint information office was
manifested earlier when he hired Harold Hinton of the New York Times
from late 1947 through early 1948 to establish a pilot coordinated press
facility for the defense department.) However, Louis Johnson, Forrestal's
successor, gave the order which emasculated the services' information
programs. One of Johnson's first actions after assuming office was to
direct the services to reduce information personnel to 15 in each depart-
29
ment and to transfer the others to the defense department. Captain
H. E. Sears, Navy director of public relations, stated: "The ceiling of
15 was an arbitrary figure arrived at prior to exploration and study of
30
the requirements of the services."
Forrestal's interest in public relations when he served as defense
secretary was not new, as evidenced by his active role in the Navy's
information program. Before becoming secretary of defense, Forrestal
served in the Navy department, first as under secretary beginning in 1940,
then as secretary from May, 1944, until he became head of the defense
31department in 1947. Forrestal had exerted considerable influence in
establishing a public relations consciousness in the Navy and supported
the establishment of the Navy's public information specialty. Forrestal
believed that "the armed forces of a democratic nation have a positive

29
responsibility to achieve the widest possible public understanding of
32
their missions and operations." ' He suggested it was the responsibil-
ity of the information specialist "to make citizens aware of their
33
responsibility to the services."
As early as 1943, Captain Leland P. Lovette, director of Navy
public relations, requested district commandants to state their views
on public relations because the function was "very close to the heart
of . . . Secretary [Forrestal] ." Forrestal was convinced that Congress
and the public would determine the size of the postwar Navy; the sec-
34
retary wanted to begin gaining the good will of both groups. Forres-
tal also wanted details on the Navy's information program and frequent
progress reports. The secretary's queries showed his perception of the
problem; he wanted answers in terms of "actual results of use . . .
35
rather than . . . gross output." On some occasions, he asked what
progress had been made toward realization of short-term objectives and
suggested ordering objectives according to priorities. The editors of
The Forrestal Diaries said:
Forrestal was keenly sensitive to public opinion
—
at times perhaps oversensitive. He followed it
closely, was always in touch with newspapermen and
commentators, filled his files with articles and
clippings that seemed significant to him and paid
considerable attention to the Navy's ... public
relations. 37
After a visit to Iwo Jima, a few days following the February, 1945, inva-
sion, Forrestal proceeded to Guam where he talked with Fleet Admiral
Chester A. Nimitz and other commanders and tried to improve press cover-
38
age of Navy activities. In persuading Navy officers of the value of
a sustained and widespread public relations program, Forrestal had two
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advantages: younger officers, mostly aviators, had utilized public
relations techniques in their campaign for naval aviation before the
39
war; these officers were pleased to have a sympathetic secretary.
By 1945, Forrestal's public relations sensitivity was evident in
the Navy. Vincent Davis, author of The Admirals Lobby
,
believed this
was due, in part, "to the fact that his [Forrestal's] message about the
importance of . . . public relations . . . was getting through to his
40
officers." When World War II ended, some officers in the Navy, in
general, and the fleet, in particular, seemed to have experienced a
modicum of attitude change toward public information. Much of the
impetus for this change, according to Rear Admiral H. B. Miller, came
from Secretary Forrestal "who [was] convinced that if . . . [the] Navy
41
. . . [was] to be saved, it must be done immediately." " Miller hoped
it was "not too late ... to overcome the lassitude which the Navy [had]
42
shown in its Public Relations attitude."
Meanwhile, Forrestal had resigned as defense secretary; Johnson's
subsequent actions caused consternation in the Navy. In April, 1949,
Johnson canceled Navy plans for the flush-deck carrier. Navy anger
mounted when the service was hard hit by additional budget reductions,
naval aviation taking the largest cut. Civilian employees were reduced
and
plans were announced to cut the Navy carrier groups
from fourteen to six, and to place four of the
Navy's large carriers in the mothball fleet. [In
the resulting] differences of opinion between [sic] ...
the Army, Navy and Air Force ... there were ...
many questionable tactics in the heat of the




Within the Navy, the carrier cancellation cast
an ominous shadow over other incidents, includ-
ing . . . centralizing the public relations activ-
ities of the services; an Army staff study
proposing transfer of Marine Headquarters to the
Department of the Army; and House action on the
defense budget, favoring as it did the Air Force. 44
The Navy public information specialists did not contribute mate-
rially to the Navy counter-information program after cancellation of
the aircraft carrier. Both Hammond and Schooley stated that sub rosa
public relations activity came from naval personnel who were not spe-
45
cialists. Schooley emphasized this probably happened because the
specialists as a group were not considered knowledgeable in public
46
relations, making it evident that the Navy "lacked confidence in the
47
ability of public information specialists to help carry the fight."
It is important to note two facts: there was little seniority in the
specialist group at that time; none of the specialists had served in
48
public information jobs during World War II. Captain F. M. Lloyd, III,
now retired, recalled "they [the Navy hierarchy] did not ask the 1650s
[public information specialists] for help because senior Navy officers
didn't trust the public information specialists. This was a cloak-and-
49
dagger operation which was being held very close to the vest." Such
lack of confidence, according to Lloyd, illustrated the "mistaken belief
in the Navy that the public information officers are working for the
press. Your command sees you defending the press, the press sees you
defending your command. As a result, the press damns you, and your
command damns you."
Another view of the post-World War II effectiveness of the office
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of information and Navy public information was given by the Secretary's
Committee of Research on Reorganization [SCOROR] . SCOROR was created
by Secretary Forrestal in fall, 1945, as a steering committee for the
Navy in its fight to substitute "unification" for "merger." This
committee augmented, and to some extent duplicated, the activities of
the public relations office and used similar tools to "educate" the
public and the Navy about the service's plan for unification of the
armed forces.
Even though SCOROR survived, the main purpose of the committee
ceased with the passage of the National Security Act and the creation of
the National Military Establishment. SCOROR may have been continued
because some Navy officers believed the service would have to campaign
aggressively to prevent its assigned military functions from being
usurped by the Army and Air Force. By 1948, SCOROR retained two essen-
tial tasks: indoctrination of naval personnel and responsibility for
the public relations campaign directed at the public and Congress.
SCOROR personnel did not believe the public relations office capable
of fulfilling either need although both areas were in the purview of the
information office. Apparently, the secretary's office agreed. Past
performance, according to SCOROR, indicated that the public relations
office did not utilize information officers in departments, bureaus and
52
commands to develop releases helpful to the Navy. As a result, the
public information specialists served primarily as bearers of unwelcome
media questions and merely were tolerated by most officers. SCOROR
characterized the initial two years of public information effort of the
public relations office and its specialist corps as being "inept" and
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consisting of one worthless project after another. *
The chief of public relations, Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen, disagreed
with the view that his organization was not accomplishing its mission.
Ewen noted that critics were "unaware of the Public Relations program
54
and accomplishments of the past two years." The SCOROR observations
merely showed, according to Ewen, "the impracticability of dividing
Public Relations planning between [sic] several offices."
By September, 1949, the future outlook for the Navy, particularly
for naval aviation, was ominous. The underlying controversy concerned
Navy and Air Force roles and missions and the future of naval aviation.
According to Hammond, the basic issues in the 1949 and early 1950
struggle focused on three interrelated factors: organization, budget
and strategy. Stein wrote that: "Many Naval officers began to make
direct appeals to the press in an attempt to gain public and congres-
58
sional support for the Navy." The crisis reached a climax with the
59
House Armed Services Committee hearings on unification and strategy.
A final influence on the establishment of the public information
specialty was rapid demobilization of personnel following World War II.
When the war ended, total Navy personnel dropped from 3,380,817 to
fciC\
381,538 by mid-1950. Almost three million of these men were demobi-
lized within two years after the war, the critical period for estab-
lishing the public information specialty. National pressure led to this




personnel demobilization "priority over any of [its] other obligations....
One senior naval officer bitterly complained that demobilization pres-
sure was nothing more than the "usual postwar situation in which the
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economic wolves ..." try to reduce the military establishment. ^
These developments were occurring "at the same time that the services
were attempting to maintain some semblance of their wartime strength
64
and establish the elements of their own long-term policies."
The extent to which demobilization impinged on the Navy's public
information plans was evidenced by the lament of Rear Admiral H. B.
Miller, director of public information.
At the moment, we are somewhat in the dark regard-
ing our personnel, because the point system is
robbing us right and left. We have proven our
value too completely to let it slip by us now.
Nevertheless the procurement of proper personnel
is simply beyond our knowledge. We do not know
where to turn to get them.*"
When the specialty was announced, many capable information officers
already had left the Navy. One who stayed recalled: "I was young and
single at the time and consequently didn't acquire points at a rapid
rate, and this is why I happened to be around at the time this thing
came up. If I had had a wife, I would have been out and back at the
university finishing up my degree."
Although political issues and Forrestal's tenure as secretary of
the Navy were the catalysts, the Navy's build-up of public information
officers during the war, and the determination of Admiral Miller to
begin a public information specialty were vital elements in Navy efforts
to establish a permanent means of telling its story. In effect, this
also formed a system which would help ensure the public's right to know.
The Beginning
Naval authorities stated that the public relations function and the
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specialty began in the early years of World War II with the operations
of Captain Leland Lovette, the selection of wartime information officers,
and the personal interest of Rear Admiral Miller. Captain James S.
Dowdell, now retired, stated: "The public information profession grew
during World War II when the Navy found itself in the position of being
fi7
almost totally ignored by the American public." Captain Frank A.
Manson, also retired, believed the Navy was prepared inadequately at the
beginning of the war. He recalled that Captain Lovette functioned
almost as the entire information organization. Because Lovette's office
CO
was understaffed, he was permitted to recruit. Lovette and Captain
W. G. Beecher, Jr., visited newspaper editors. While they were selling
the Navy, they also recruited public information officers from the ranks
69
of competent newsmen. These early information officers were working
newspapermen commissioned to inform the public of Navy affairs. "They
were chosen for their press value and experience." Captain R. H.
Mereness and others believed this growth period was the "nub of the
72
whole thing for the future." A few Navy officers, at least, realized
that World War II created the impetus to select a cadre of trained per-
73
sonnel to build a permanent public information organization. The
public information as a specialty was established because if the Navy
"ever had to expand again rapidly, there would be a nucleus of people
74
who knew the nature of public relations." At the end of World War II,
the Navy had approximately 700 to 800 public information officers serv-
ing throughout the world. Half were in the Pacific; the remainder in
Washington, D. C. ; the naval districts' headquarters which administer
most of the Navy shore establishment, Europe and continental United
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7 SStates commands. J Almost all the officers were wartime reservists,
directly commissioned from relevant civilian fields such as journalism
and advertising. Within three days of the Japanese surrender and even
before the formal ceremony aboard the battleship USS Missouri , the Navy
directed all commands to establish boards to interview officers desiring
transfer to the regular Navy. The directive stressed that "great
weight ... be given to performance of duty during war."
Admiral Miller wasted little time in seeking means to retain infor-
mation officers on active duty. Miller "strongly recommended that there
be established a special designator (PIO)—Public Information only—for
78
public information officers." This designation would apply to reserve
and regular personnel. On September 1, 1945, Miller recommended that
Secretary Forrestal support the designation plan and suggested PIOs be
brought into the regular Navy on a similar basis as officers in the
• n 79engineering specialty.
A review of Rear Admiral Miller's correspondence during this period
revealed his active role in establishing the public information spe-
cialty. Miller frequently wrote to Captain Fitzhugh Lee, then head of
Navy public information in the Pacific, about public relations problems
in that area and in the Navy. In one letter to Lee, Miller said he was
"making a strenuous effort to get Public Information officers designated
as Specialists in order that they can stay within the Public Information
80
structure." The next day, Miller wrote the chief of naval personnel:
"I consider it essential that a special designator such as PIO (Public
Information Officer) be established for the classification of Reserve
Officers who are public information specialists. Such designator should
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be established also in the Regular Navy. "81 Miller also told the per-
sonnel chief that if the designator were established, the director of
public information expected to control PIO selection, assignments, and
82
the number of specialists designated. When Miller again contacted
Lee, he wrote: "I am endeavoring to have BuPers [Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel] provide a Specialist designation for PIOs in order that any of
the lads who care to stay will not have to compete with the regular line
officers."83
All the evidence indicates that Navy perception of the impending
unification struggle, that the work and influence of Forrestal and
Miller, and that rapid postwar demobilization served, in varying degrees,
to establish an atmosphere favorable to the public information specialty.
The Dyer Board
Established by the chief of naval personnel in October, 1945, to
determine the Navy's post-World War II needs for officers in several
specialized categories including public information, the Dyer Board con-
sisted of eight officers. Headed by Captain George C. Dyer, the group
was directed to make recommendations on:
(1) The number of officers to be selected for each category of
specialization, including public information;
(2) The advisability of requesting legislation to establish a
technical or specialist group in addition to "Engineering Duty Only"
(EDO)
;
(3) The profession or specialties to be transferred from EDO to
84
the technical or specialist group.
The Navy establishes such formal boards, from time to time, to exam-
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ine a particular problem or to recommend specific action. These boards
are internal naval administrative bodies with broad representation.
Unlike the Dyer Board, most later boards considering the public informa-
tion specialty were formed to examine the billet structure of the spe-
cialist and subspecialist officer corps within the context of postgrad-
uate educational requirements.
Various officers testified before the Dyer Board on the needs of
particular sections of the Navy. Rear Admiral Miller, representing
the public information office, reminded the board of the need to keep
the public informed of Naval progress and problems, as well as of the
service's need for specially trained information personnel. Miller be-
lieved that professional journalistic experience was a prerequisite of
good press relations, that regular officers generally could not perform
adequately as information officers, and that civilian information offi-
cers would not enjoy the confidence of the working press. Miller esti-
mated that Navy public information needed 145 specialist officers and
the difference between 145 and the total number of specialists approved
by the board, would consist of line officers serving in public informa-
85
tion administrative billets.
After hearing testimony, the board formulated five precepts as the
basis of their recommendations. These guidelines were:
(1) The need for increased specialization of naval personnel was




(2) The need for specialists can best be met by providing "a con-
tinuing flow of young officers, suitably trained, into each specialty. 7
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A meaningful opportunity for specialist promotion should provide good
communications between the specialty "and the rest of the Navy;'
(3) An increased number of line officers should receive postgrad-
uate training and serve with specialists so the latter learn the ideas
of the operating forces;
(4) Because some specialties are not related to engineering or to
89
each other, the "Specialist Duty Only (SDO) [designation]" should
90designate all non-engineering specialists;
(5) Special legislation should be introduced to ensure that SDOs
would not have a better promotion selection opportunity than line offi-
cers, although specialists probably will have more shore duty than
91
regular line officers.
The board then moved to its main task: recommendations based on
the guidelines. Public information was among five specialties for which
92
enabling legislation was suggested. The Dyer Board further recom-
mended, concurring with Admiral Miller, that 145 Navy public information
93
officers were needed, 70 specialists immediately. The board then modi-
fied its suggestion by further recommending that only 70 per cent of the
94
officers be selected initially. This limited the initial selection of
information specialists to 49. (The board's estimates of the number of
officers to be selected initially were based on the assumption that post-
95
war Navy strength would be about 500,000 officers and men} The board
added that initially the Aeronautical Engineering Duty Only (AEDOs)
,
EDOs and SDOs should equal 7.5 per cent of line officer strength, in-
creasing to 8.5 per cent over a five-year period, particularly in the
96
SDO group. There is no evidence of a hard commitment by the board to
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the recommended 145 public information officers. There is evidence,
however, that the board expected that recommended personnel allowances
for specialties would be reached over several years with some appli-
97
cants drawn from the regular line. The board believed the rank struc-
ture of the SDO groups should approximate the line, with a yearly input
.98
to avoid stagnation.
Having defined the need, the board established qualifications for
specialists and suggested a method of selection. The criteria included:
a college degree, at least one year of sea duty (preferably two) , and
99
special or postgraduate courses in the area of specialization. Fur-
ther, the board stated that an officer should not be selected for spe-
cial duty unless his "practical duty or naval duty has been broad enough
to provide a firm foundation" for future development. The Dyer Board
anticipated a time lapse before Congressional action. Because authority
existed (an Act of June 25, 1940) to designate officers as EDOs , the
board suggested the Navy temporarily select officers for that category
102
and later transfer the men to the SDO classification.
The struggle to establish the public information specialty cleared
its first hurdle when the Dyer Board completed its work and the report
was sent to the chief of naval personnel on November 15, 1945. The
report was significant because it established selection criteria, sug-
gested the total number of public information specialists for the near
future and, most importantly, gave official Navy sanction to the infor-
mation specialty.
A month later, the bureau of naval personnel had not acted on the
public information designator, although the Dyer Board's recommendations
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were approved. The delay was in part due to the bureau's "detailed
study of the administrative steps necessary to implement the recommenda-
103
tions of the . . . board." The other aspect of the delay was the
squabble over the merger of the armed services. Admiral Miller stated
that although obtaining the designator was important, everything else
104had to wait until Congress settled the unification problem. (The
unification struggle hurt the public information specialty because the
merger froze all legislation, including plans for the designator.)
Admiral Miller wrote Captain Lee that if the PIO designator had been
approved earlier, the Navy "could have salvaged a good many [public in-
formation] Reserves." Thus, the merger, and resulting inaction, caused
the loss of many good officers to civilian jobs.
Meanwhile, the office of information acted to try to stem the flow
of reserves to civilian life. On January 26, 1946, the following mes-
sage was sent to all naval commands:
BUPERS DESIRES REQUESTS FROM OFFICERS ALL GRADES
REGULAR AND RESERVE QUALIFIED FOR DUTIES CONNECTED WITH
PUBLIC INFORMATION X RESERVE OFFICERS HAVING BACKGROUND
OF PUBLIC RELATIONS NEWSPAPER WORK ADVERTISING RADIO
OR WRITING EXPERIENCE OR GRADUATES IN JOURNALISM OR
REGULARS WITH INCLINATION OR APTITUDES FOR PUBLIC IN-
FORMATION WORK PARTICULARLY DESIRED X NEED FOR THESE
OFFICERS IS IMMEDIATE AS REPLACEMENTS FOR PERSONNEL
LOST BY DEMOBILIZATION X OFFICERS DESIRING POSTPONEMENT
RELEASE FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED X SUBMIT
REQUEST VIA AIR MAIL SPEEDLETTER ATTENTION PERS 3121
WITH ENDORSEMENT OF COMMANDING OFFICER INDICATING AVAIL-
ABILITY X ALL COMMANDS ARE URGED TO EXPEDITE REQUESTS X
REQUESTS WILL NOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY BUPERS BUT
OFFICERS NOT RECEIVING ORDERS WITHIN ONE MONTH SUBMIS-
SION SHOULD CONSIDER SERVICES WERE NOT REQUIRED. ... 106
This identified potential information officers and provided a way to
replace demobilized reserves.
With assistance from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, official
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action was begun to select regular Navy public information specialists.
In March, 1946, Forrestal told the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral
Louis E. Denfeld, that it was "considered essential that the services
of Navy public information continue to function in peace as in war."
Accordingly, Forrestal directed that billets be established throughout
the Navy, that qualified information personnel be assigned, that such
personnel receive in-service training, and that the Navy use 250 offi-
cers in the overall information program. Establishing billets
involves reviewing Navy needs based on command function and then allo-
cating positions on the basis of public relations responsibilities of
individual commanders.
On March 23, 1946, a message was sent to all Navy commands request-
ing applications from officers interested in appointments as public
information officers in the regular Navy. The message said the Navy was
particularly interested in officers with a degree in journalism or
1 QQ
experience in public relations. Confident that the "Special Duty
Only" category would be approved by Congress, the Navy made an initial
selection of public information specialists under the existing "Engineer-
ing Duty Only" category. Each selected officer was appointed into the
regular line, with the agreement, that when the law changed, all would
109
be given "Special Duty Only (Public Information)" classifications.
The Initial Selection
Between June, 1946, and April, 1947, 48 officers were selected for
designation as public information specialists. Of the initial 48,
ten refused appointments as regular Navy public information specialists.

43
All selections were announced. The last notification was July 10, 1947,
and it ended the initial selection of specialists into the Navy, but
indicated that later selectees would be notified by letter. Four
112
additional officers were selected between August, 1947, and July, 1949.
These four officers were not, by definition, included in the initial
selection.
The Dyer Board and the March 23 announcement established criteria
for initial specialist selection, although there are varying analyses of
the application of these standards. In some cases, the overriding cri-
terion was experience in mass communications, while in others, particu-
larly at a junior rank level, emphasis apparently was placed on experi-
ence with the fleet. Lieutenant (junior grade), later Captain James E.
Jenkins, USN (Retired) recalled the selection board was
looking for people with a lot of sea duty, because they
didn't want to start their information specialists off
on what was obviously going to be shore duty for most
of the rest of their career without as much sea duty
as possible behind each applicant. I always felt that
my wartime experience of two or three years in destroy-
ers got me by over some of the fellows who had a
better background in public affairs, but who were .
going to be short of sea duty the rest of their career.
Jenkins's background also included limited experience with a college
newspaper and radio station. Another retired officer and an initial
selectee was Lieutenant Commander, later Captain Frank A. Manson. Man-
son served on destroyers through the war and experienced much sea duty.
He recalled submitting his application for the public information speci-
alty and being interviewed by a board from the secretary of the Navy's
office.
There were three members and they asked me if I wanted
to join the regular Navy. I replied that I was inter-
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ested in the field of public relations and I had
a few ideas. At that point, the board stopped me
and one of the officers said, "That is all we want
to know. We want people here who have ideas so
that's as far as we want to interview you."H
^
Perhaps not apparent at the time, the quality of the initial selec-
tion was mediocre. Manson charged that many initially chosen "were
people that just happened to be around and for whom the priority in
civilian life wasn't high enough, or who didn't have some special inter-
est. They were not selected particularly for their talent, but because
they hadn't been demobilized" Commander C. R. Wilhide, now retired,
said: "There were relatively few specialists and the percentage who did
not have the very best professional reputation was inordinately high
when contrasted with their number." Most of the senior specialists
—
the majority—had very little staff experience and less than ten per
cent of the specialists had served aboard a ship as a public information
officer. Many had never had a single shipboard tour of duty. Just
as the demobilization point system robbed the Navy of many of its best
information officers, it influenced selection.
Other officers observed what they believed was favoritism in the
selection of some information specialists who later performed poorly.
Most of the initial selectees applied while serving in the office of
information; prior to their arrival in CHINFO (used interchangeably for
Chief of Information and Office of Information) , they had had little
experience in mass communications. Dowdell doubted their ability "to
118
give sound advice." Lederer added:
The high percentage of incompetents in public
information ... [was] natural. When the PIO corps
started, anyone with a newspaper background of any
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kind (one guy got in because he ran the morgue
on a paper) or being a "party boy" moved in and
joined the club.-'--^
In addition, Wilhide noted
As a result, there was an impression that there
were damn [sic] few specialists who were recog-
nized as being able to do a complete job—commu-
nity relations, media relations, planning, etc.
There were a lot of aged people and not necessarily
in number of years—some of them were old—but most
of them had had it. 120
Besides lacking professional expertise, many in the original group
knew little of the Navy and its procedures. Typical of the problems
encountered by senior non-Navy experienced officers (comprising one-
third of the active strength of the specialty) was an incident at the
time of the Bikini bomb tests in 1946. Jenkins later related:
During these first tests, the only films of the tests
—
which were spectacular—which were large and of high
quality, were taken by government cameras, since
reporters and photographers were on ships too far away
for good pictures. So, an elaborate system was estab-
lished to pool the release of the glossy prints. [In
those days, the shipboard wire photo system was not
very reliable; the nearest facility was in Hawaii.]
The plan called for flying the negatives and prints to
Washington, D.C., for pool release there. The film was
to be processed and prints made onboard the aircraft
while the plane was enroute from Kwajalein to Washington.
Since nobody knew when the pictures would be coming in,
his job was to receive the incoming message advising
aircraft arrival time, and arrange for pick-up and dis-
tribution of the photography. The message arrived using
Zulu, or Greenwich time. The duty officer left the
pictures sit almost nine hours, overnight, because he
failed to understand the need to convert Greenwich time
to local time.-'-21
The example highlights the incongruity of rank and experience with
the serious responsibility senior information officers had in the Navy's
information program. Jenkins observed that many newsmen were unhappy
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and other naval officers were able to observe what they considered to
122be a typical, incompetent public information specialist.
Jenkins continued:
The problems created by this type of fiasco were
difficult to overcome because the admirals who now
run the Navy were junior officers then, and they
watched some of these comics who were just bad,
and who were in positions of a lot of responsibility
and authority, who should no more have been there
than the man in the moon. Many of the original
selectees were commanders who made captain almost
immediately and who really weren't qualified for
ensign. 123
Inexperienced information officers created other problems. The
admiral in command of battleships in the Pacific complained "about the
increasing tendency on the part of people in Public Information—to
deal directly with ships of . . . [his] command. ..." without check-
ing with him. Such errors by inexperienced information officers even-
tually caused animosity in line officers operating the ships. All these
problems hindered the development of the specialty, substantially damag-
ing the reputations of all specialists. Jenkins believed many naval
officers formed the opinion that public information specialists were
125
"half-baked, alcoholic, or worse." ' In all probability, the selec-
tions were the only ones to be made at the time. The important thing
initially was to begin. The lesson, perhaps, was that unless all per-
sonnel of a small specialty are outstanding, the group runs the risk of
serious criticism and rejection by the larger organization of which it
is a part.
Training and Education
The Navy has prided itself on the quality of its personnel training
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and the opportunities for advanced education, as well as high-level
professional courses for the officer corps at joint-service schools and
service war colleges. The backgrounds of the initial group of officers
selected for the public information specialty indicated a need for edu-
cation in naval affairs and in public relations. The director of public
information recognized the need, but little official action was taken.
In contrast with usual Navy policy, training and education for the
public information specialist corps from 1945 through 1949 was minimal.
During 1946, two courses were offered. A few specialists, and non-
specialists, attended a summer program at the University of Missouri,
but the program ended in 1948. Concurrently, a three-month course at
the Army Information School, Carlisle, Pa., was operating. In contrast
to the Missouri course, which provided professional training for full-
time public information officers, the Army course (although longer) was
127
geared primarily for collateral duty public information officers. In
1948, an evening course was begun at Boston University. A Navy Public
Information Office news release in Boston announced that "The first all-
Navy Public Relations course to be conducted at an institution of higher
learning is underway in Boston with the authorization of a one-semester
course ... at Boston University." The classes were for policy-making
senior officers, as well as for public information officers. The
courses included public relations, psychology of public relations, propa-
ganda and public opinion, semantics, newspaper practice, radio technique,
1 ?R
motion pictures and training aids and public speaking.
In the absence of more formal instruction, each public information
officer was urged to read professionally. Texts recommended by the
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office of information were: Public Opinion and U. S. Foreign Policy by
Walter Lippmann; Modern News Reporting by Carl Warren; A Short History
of the American Navy by Clark, Stevens, Alden and Kraft; U . S . Navy at
War 1941-1945 by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King; World War II by Roger W.
Shugg and Major H. A. DeWeerd; and Geographical Foundations of National
Power by Headquarters, Army Service Forces. The Navy provided these
129books and other materials for each specialist. The heavy emphasis
on Navy history probably was due to the minimal naval background of most
public information specialists.
Officer Personnel Act of 1947
The recommendations of the Dyer Board to establish a "special Duty
Only" officer category was beyond the scope of naval administrative
authority and required Congressional approval. The complicated task of
drafting proposed legislation was prolonged because, in addition to the
"Special Duty Only" category, other substantive changes in the Navy pro-
motion system were being incorporated into the proposed legislation—the
Officer Personnel Act of 1947.
By February, 1947, the Navy completed the officer promotion proposal,
including provisions for a public information specialty. Draft legisla-
tion was submitted to the House of Representatives. Hearings began on
130
April 1, 1947, before the Committee on Armed Services. Rear Admiral
T. L. Spraque, representing the bureau of naval personnel, told the com-
mittee that it was necessary to establish a specialty corps to meet
increased specialization needs in certain areas so these specialists
131
could devote full time and effort to their fields. During the hear-
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ings , only one member of the committee, Representative Carl Vinson,
inquired about the type of work to be assigned to officers in the special
duty categories. Commander D. L. Martineau, attached to the bureau of
naval personnel, discussed the seven fields, including the public infor-
mation specialty, and noted that the "special duty officer" category was
being established because the Navy found it difficult to obtain top per-
formance from information officers and others who also had to meet
132
general line qualifications. The question by Vinson was the closest
the House or Senate came to expressing interest in establishing or pre-
venting a public information specialty. The hearings ended on May 12,
1947, and the committee began drafting a new bill, combining Navy legis-
lation with a similar Army measure. This combination was introduced to
133
the House of Representatives on June 13, 1947, and passed on June 25.
The 1947 Officer Personnel Act went to the Senate the next day and was
134
reported and passed there on July 26.
The legislative history provides insight to Congressional inten-
tions for part of the new legislation. The Senate committee remarked
that the bill devoted "considerable attention . . . to . . . specialty
corps . . . [and] provides the same opportunities for promotion advance-
135
ment to such group as are available to line officers." The committee
added several amendments to the House version of the bill, including one
to "insure representation of the various specialists on selection boards
which were considering their officers for promotion."
The 1947 Officer Personnel Act, signed by President Truman on
August 7, 1947, contained several provisions significant to the evolving
history of the Navy public information specialty. For example, the
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total number of specialists was limited to two and one half per cent of
137
the total number of active duty unrestricted line officers. In addi-
tion, the selection for promotion percentage opportunity for special
duty officers could not be less than the selection opportunity afforded
138
the unrestricted line officer. Another provision of the law speci-
fied that
. . .whenever officers designated for . . . special
duty are eligible for consideration by a selection board
for promotion . . . the Secretary of the Navy shall
appoint, as alternate members of the appropriate
selection board, three officers of the same designation
and classification as any eligible officer . . . [or]
such less number as shall be available ... No
such alternate member shall act upon the cases of
officers other than those of the same designation
as himself .139
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, then, gave the public information
specialist statutory legitimacy, established size and grade parameters,
protected promotion opportunity and assured that each specialty would
have a voice in determining fitness of its officers for promotion. The
requirement to include a 1650 specialist on appropriate selection
boards was unaccountably ignored by the Navy for some years in the future.
Allowance, Billets and Ceiling
The scope of the commitment to a vigorous public information pro-
gram was reflected in the number of Navy billets (jobs or positions)
assigned for full-time public information officers. These billets pro-
vided tangible evidence of belief by some officials in the value of
public relations and indirectly reveal the policymakers' attitudes toward
the specialists. During the postwar years, the size of the Navy's public
information organization led to a flexible policy for retaining reserve
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officers while attempts were being made to fill information billets
with qualified regular line officers. Billets, to an extent, are a
140factor in determining the number of specialists.
The immediate postwar size of the public information organization
dictated the retention rate of reserve officers. In March, 1946, Sec-
retary of the Navy Forrestal specified a ceiling of 500 personnel
engaged in public information activity, but not more than 250 officers.
Based on this, the office of information estimated that at least two
years would be needed to train regular Navy officers for public infor-
mation functions. For this reason, the policy was made that all quali-
fied reserve officers (but not more than 221) who requested retention
141in public information billets could remain on active duty. By Febru-
ary, 1947, the number of information officer billets the Navy believed
it needed had been established by naval personnel planners. The Navy
approved 143 public information officer billets, mostly ashore. The
director of public relations believed this number adequate if billets
were manned by specialists. (Admiral Miller had recommended 145 speci-
alists before the Dyer Board.) Only 40 billets were assigned newly
selected ''Special Duty Only" public information officers; the remaining
93 jobs were filled either with properly qualified line officers or with
142
retained reserve officers. However, public information officials
feared a large number of reserve officers would be released from active
duty in the wake of budget reductions, further diminishing the number of
qualified information officers and increasing the use of qualified line
officers.
An agreement was reached, however, to increase the number of public
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information billets during the next fiscal year; the office of informa-
tion wanted qualified officers
—
preferably specialists. Thus, in April,
1947, a meeting with representatives of the chief of naval operations
and the navy administrative office resulted in an increase in the allow-
ance for public information billets from 143 to 194. Coincident with
this increase was a loss of qualified officers to civilian life, and an
immediate need to train line officers to fill new billets and replace
departing reserves.
Having established a satisfactory size for the shore-based public
information organization, the office of information turned its attention
to the fleet. As early as March, 1946, Secretary Forrestal directed the
Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, to establish
public information billets "within all staffs ashore and afloat ... to
assure adequate public information coverage." Therefore in August, 1947,
the Director of Public Relations Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, requested
the Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, to pro-
vide an allowance of 21 officers for 14 different staffs in the Atlantic
and Pacific fleet areas. Additionally, a pool of public information
144
officers was proposed to meet unforeseen and special assignments.
Scarcity of qualified personnel—an intended increase in specialists
—
doomed the proposal; it was two decades before a similar plan became
operative. In December, 1947, the office of information again requested
public information officers for staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific areas,
but there was no longer an emphasis on only public information special-
ists. The director of public relations conceded that "the rank of offi-
cers to fill these billets is of no consequence provided they are
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experienced in public information, nor does it matter whether they are
145
Line.. . ." officers. In mid-May, 1948, there were only ten billets
146
established on seven staffs.
Concurrent with the drive to establish public information officer
billets was an effort to delineate the PIO place within the Navy command
structure. From August, 1948, through March, 1949, the chief of naval
operations had begun to formalize the organizational position of the
public information officer within naval commands. These efforts—suc-
cessful in the fleet—were directed toward ensuring access by the infor-
mation officer to the commanding officer and toward informing the public
147information officer of all Navy developments of public interest.
Somehow, the naval shore establishment was omitted from the directives,
and the public information officer was placed in an organizational posi-
tion subordinate to the administrative officer, a position not conducive
to direct access to the commander. When this oversight became apparent,
the chief of public relations requested the chief of naval operations
(CNO) to ensure that the public information officer would have "prompt
148
and direct access to his commander". . ." The CNO did not approve
the request to give the district public information officer the organi-
zational position of an aide. The CNO believed the advice of the public
information officer was available to commanders regardless of organiza-
149tional placement.
The early postwar period of Navy public information saw a solid
framework of public information billets established—although not as
many specialist billets as information officials would have preferred.
Additionally, the information officer had attained the position of a
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direct adviser to the commander on afloat staffs, but was shackled by
bureaucracy ashore.
National Military Establishment
The Navy, as well as the other services, disagreed with the public
relations policies of the new national military establishment. These
policies the Navy believed would give the secretary of defense central
control over the administration of service information programs, author-
ity to release all information to the Washington, D. C. press, and to
require that all service information officers be assigned to one defense
department office. The Navy maintained that placement of all public
information personnel in a central information office would create con-
fusion rather than clarification. Navy sources also said that "the
exercise of too close control might destroy necessary initiative and
nullify the real purpose of service public relations. One phase of
this public relations mission, the Navy believed, was "to foster and
satisfy the interest of the public in each of the services as an arm of
152
national security." Basically, the Navy believed it should administer
its own public relations activity except in those areas under the pur-
153
view of the secretary of defense. The Navy foresaw consolidation
robbing the service of its specialist and non-specialist public informa-
tion officers.
This policy disagreement became academic on March 17, 1949, when
Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the services there was a greater
"need for central control" of public information activity. Accord-
ingly, he created an office of public information for all armed services
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in Washington. The establishing directive provided that the new office
would be the "sole agency ... at the seat of government for dissemina-
tion of information to media of public information. ..." The memo-
randum directed the services to provide manpower, retaining only suffi-
cient information personnel to transmit policy directives and coordinate
the field activities' information programs. The services were prohibited
from retaining personnel to perform functions of the nex^ office of pub-
1 xze.
lie information. The consolidation gave the central office responsi-
bility for
Press service and news room; photograph and news-
reel service; public contacts (public relations,
civil relations, speakers bureau, presentation
teams for public meetings, etc.); accreditation
of correspondents; clearance, reproduction, and
distribution of all press releases and pictures;
and analysis (clippings, news digests, editorial
analysis, information research, etc.)-'--''
As the defense department assumed service public information respon-
sibilities, the Navy information organization was reduced substantially.
By June, the Navy office of information—in response to consolidation
orders—had transferred 73 officers, enlisted personnel and civilians
to the defense department. This number included seven public information
158 159
specialists, although by July, only five remained. At the height
of consolidation, the Navy was reduced to 15 people in its departmental
office of information. Of these, fewer than one-half were officers;
only one was a public information specialist. As a result,
In the Fleet and in the Shore Establishment outside
of Washington, approximately 100 Information Officer
Specialists (42 code 1650 and the balance reserve
officers code 1655) were assigned to primary duty
information billets during fiscal year 1949. These
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officers lacked direction from Washington and
there was no coordinated information effort in
the Navy. 160
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's efforts to halt individual service
publicity releases also were successful. Navy public relations planning
and execution were reduced to sporadic efforts toward orientation and
161
guest cruises and occasional participation in national conventions.
By September, 1949, the impact of providing personnel for the defense
department and the resulting growth of public information activity in
the naval districts was increasing the work load for every Navy informa-
1 f>?
tion office in the country.
The consolidation triggered Navy reaction—covert and overt, planned
and unplanned—in handling public information personnel. Although the
new office of public information controlled nearly half the Navy's infor-
mation personnel, the office depended on the Navy to provide qualified
reliefs. Navy career rotation pattern policies and Navy reluctance to
deprive its field organizations of highly qualified officers soon caused
problems; qualified men were not made available, in large numbers, for
duty in the defense department. The defense department complained
164
and requested "competent service representation." Budget restric-
tions further complicated the problem in July, 1949, for fiscal year
1950, and forced the Navy to reduce overall manpower. It was difficult
to fill both Navy and defense department quotas for public information
officers. Naval authorities predicted the problem would grow because
the service approached the new fiscal year with more regular and reserve
... ,_ , . ,165information specialists than authorized.
The new defense department office of public information also ham-
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pered Navy public information efforts. The acting information chief,
Captain H. E. Sears, said it reduced the Navy's ability to "maintain
and increase public understanding of the activities, functions, opera-
tions, and necessity of the Navy as an integral part of the National
Defense.. . ." The specialty also suffered from service antipathy
toward the defense department. Captain Frank A. Manson commented:
"If you are trying to get a partisan point of view across, you can't
very well do it through a mouthpiece that speaks with three tongues."
Thus, consolidation frustrated efforts to show the operating Navy, whose
approval specialists needed, that public information officers could per-
form professionally.
Conclusions
The interplay of political pressures and personal influences were
significant factors in establishing the public information specialty and
in providing the basis for its subsequent perception by naval officers.
There was strong evidence of Navy-wide ambivalence toward information
specialists during the formative period. Despite the unification crisis
and Rear Admiral Miller's determination to establish a public informa-
tion specialty, it appears now that Forrestal's influence was vital for
Navy approval of a public information specialty and maintenance of a
viable service information organization. Demobilization affected the
quality and hence the professional performance of the initial informa-
tion specialists. Their subsequent inability to help the Navy during
the carrier-B36 controversy further damned the group in the eyes of most
naval officers. Lack of naval experience and professional training
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spurred marginal performance, with a resulting bad reputation and dis-
trust of specialists among line contemporaries.
Problems outside the immediate control of the specialists also
contributed to the difficulties of the public information officers.
Defense consolidation of service public information activity generated
obstacles for Navy personnel and long-range planning. Throughout the
period there was a dwindling number of regular Navy public information
specialists; few officers were added after the initial selection. Budget
limitations and reductions in overall Navy personnel strength continued
the trend toward an increasing number of line officers in public rela-
tions. With these almost overwhelming burdens, the specialty failed to
serve the Navy adequately in the hour of need. But, if success can be
measured by survival, then the public information specialty was victo-
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THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SPECIALTY STUDIED: 1950-1954
An Increasingly large segment of the Navy recognizes
the usefulness of the professionally competent
public information specialist. The specialist may
not be loved by everyone in the Navy, but he has
gained acceptance.
—Captain K. W. Wade
The Korean War, introspective analysis and a growing recognition
of the importance of public relations by top management were key reasons
why the Navy public information specialty survived the rigors of the
early 1950s. The demands of the war unleashed Navy public information
from defense department domination and enabled specialists to demon-
strate their ability to forward Navy objectives and to reverse their
earlier reputation of incompetence. The war and the resulting public
information personnel crisis, along with post-war austerity, serve to
measure Navy perception of the value of full-time public relations
practitioners. Performance, more than rhetoric, contributed to recog-
nition of expertise; thus it is necessary to review internal and external
inquiries into the public information specialty during that time.
Studying these inquiries should provide more insight into the evolving
development of specialists' abilities and should help highlight areas
of Navy satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the specialist.
In like manner, attention must be given to other developments
which influenced the growth of the specialty, as well as decisions of
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top management. The interplay among offices and individuals in the
continuing struggle over allowances and billets necessarily reflected
the decision-making process in developing specialization in public
relations. As the Navy emerged from the late 1940s and early 1950s--
a period of atrophy for the public information specialty—substantial
support for public information and the specialty was given by top-level
management. There is a need to consider the factors which influenced
management policy, as well as to delineate the extent of administrative
contribution to the specialty. All these factors, in addition to
efforts of the specialists themselves, must be evaluated to understand
the evolving status and degree of acceptance of the public information
.specialist, as well as changing Navy attitudes toward public relations.
War and Public Information
The Korean War replaced internal defense department policies as
the major influence on the public information specialty in the Navy.
It also is true that Congressional budget limitations on public infor-
mation, defense department pressure for qualified information personnel,
and continued ambivalence at some Navy management levels, continued to
restrain the growth of the information specialty. Nevertheless, the war
provided an opportunity for the specialty to expand and consolidate its
position.
The aircraft carrier-B36 controversy that dominated the late 1940s
was forgotten when the Korean War began on June 24, 1950. Funds were
made available to the Navy for building large Forrestal class carriers
2
and to the Air Force for completing its bomber development program.
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This benefited the Navy, which had begun emphasizing the "development
of defensive and offensive weapons, including an atomic submarine"
—
a clear indication that naval aviation had suffered heavily in the 1949
3
"Unification and Strategy" hearings.
The unification hearings were a turning point for Navy informa-
tion; naval officer and civilian hierarchy realized that the Navy had
not communicated to the public the service's role as a member of the
national defense team. There are indications that service public
relations showed only slight understanding on the part of the Navy,
little use of public relations in the field, and almost no Navy effort
to reach the civilian community. The two-month survey also pointed
out that Navy public information personnel had inadequate training and
small staffs. In addition, poor personnel assignment policy was preva-
lent. Study results helped provide the impetus for a new Navy public
information program.
When Admiral Forest P. Sherman became chief of naval operations
in November, 1949, he immediately moved to bolster public information.
In December, Sherman advised the Navy:
The personal responsibility of a commanding officer
in the conduct of public relations within his
command is identical with his responsibility in
other affairs . . . [and is] one of the functions
of command .
'
Sherman's directive on public relations command responsibility
precipitated other moves by the information office. The Chief of Public
Relations, Captain H. E. Sears, suggested that all fitness reports of
commanding officers and admirals should include an appraisal of their
public relations performance. He believed this would encourage them
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to conduct vigorous information programs. Secretary of the Navy Dan A.
g
Kimball agreed.
Statements by Sherman further revealed his attitude toward public
information. In his first speech, Sherman told the Navy:
If the American Navy is allowed to languish and
deteriorate, it will largely be the fault of us,
the articulate Navy, for not presenting these
facts and our needs convincingly ,°
Sherman also stated that one product of good Navy public relations was
increased Congressional appreciation of the need for a Navy; later
speeches strongly emphasized the need for seapower.
Finally, Sherman supported improving the public information
officer's position within the Navy organization. In mid-1949, the
office of information presented a plan placing district public informa-
tion officers on the immediate staff of district commanders; the request
was refused by the CNO. In the intervening months, Sherman issued his
statement that public relations was a function of command, and a general
order designated the district commandant as the direct representative
of the chief of naval operations in public relations matters. A revi-
sion of naval district organization in August, 1950, did not provide,
nor assure, access to the commandant by the public information officer.
Thus, the chief of information in October, 1950, resurrected his earlier
proposal and again requested modification of naval district administra-
tive organization to establish public information as a separate staff
division not responsible to the administrative officer. The information
chief recommended that district public information officers be "Assist-
12
ants for Public Information" directly responsible to the chief of staff.
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(This was the same arrangement other "Assistants" had under organiza-
13
tion policy.) This time, the recommended changes were approved.
Although the Navy public information program benefited by the war,
there were problems. The major one was the lack of qualified per-
sonnel. Because of the shortage, some Navy information officers during
the initial period of the war had experiences similar to those of then
Lieutenant, later Captain R. H. Mereness and Commander Merle MacBain.
Mereness was sent temporarily to Task Force 77, operating off both
sides of Korea. The Captain recalled that he left so hurriedly he had
virtually no money and few clothes. Six months later he was allowed to
14
return to Washington to close his apartment. MacBain was ending a
tour of temporary duty with the Seventh Fleet when the war began, but
he stayed another two years. The major benefit to public information
from the war was expansion of the Navy's departmental information organ-
ization with the tacit approval of the secretary of defense. By
October, 1950, the Navy allowance in the defense department public
information office was reduced to 27; half were lieutenant commanders
or commanders; of these, only three were public information specialists.
In 1951, Congress limited public information spending, hindering
specialty expansion and generally causing difficulty for Navy informa-
tion management. The limitation was made because, according to Rear
Admiral W. G. Beecher , Jr., chief of information,
Congress was determined to stop competitive self-
promotion by the Services including the development
of public opinion through information techniques




The public information funding limitation caused the Navy office of
information to reorganize activity and regroup responsibility. As a
result, the number of officers assigned public information duty (spe-
cialist and non-specialist) was reduced in fiscal year 1953 to 243,
19
compared to 503 the previous year. The reorganization committee
reported:
The fiscal limitation imposed by Congress on public
information activities constitutes a continuing
management problem .... It is considered that
any further reduction in funds would restrict the
operations of the Navy Public Information organiza-
tion beyond the point where any relief could be
provided by management improvements
.
* * *
The limitation imposes a prohibitive administrative
burden on the Navy. The costs to the Navy of
accounting and auditing the number of man-hours
devoted to functions defined as susceptible to the
limitation is believed to exceed the total of the
funds authorized.
Nevertheless, total funds were reduced successively from $3,810,211
21
in fiscal year 1951, to $1,350,000 in fiscal year 1954. The Navy
believed that defense department administration of funds further com-
plicated the issue. In December, 1953, the chief of information
protested proposed reductions in the Navy's share of the funds. He
noted that during the three previous years, Navy public information
operations had been reduced 50 per cent by Congress. In addition, he
said the prime effect was personnel reduction. The proposed cut by
defense would cause a further cut of 15 per cent in the total number of
22
personnel assigned to Navy public information.
There is little evidence to indicate the performance level of
public information specialists during the war, but one information
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office not connected with the war did receive kudos from the press.
The Navy's London office kept the media informed during the celebrated
sinking of the freighter Flying Enterprise in 1952; and, according to
Public Relations News
,
received the praise of media men all over the
23
world for highly professional performance, thus indicating some
degree of professionalism in the specialty corps.
Two important developments during 1953 and 1954 influenced the
public information program and the specialty. First, the slowdown in
the Korean War and President Eisenhower's election brought the "massive
retaliation" theory and almost complete reliance on nuclear deterrents
24by the Strategic Air Command, coupled with a severe reduction in
25
military spending. Second, Admiral Sherman died suddenly in July,
1951, and was succeeded by Admiral William Fechteler, who served a
little over two years. He was replaced in August, 1953, by Admiral
Robert B. Carney.
Carney was the first chief of naval operations who actively sup-
ported the cause of the public information specialist. According to
Captain James S. Dowdell,
. . . the public information specialty survived through
having a few CNOs , who from my personal experience,
recognized the value of specialists in public relations
on their staffs; one of these was Admiral Carney. ^°
Captain Frank A. Manson agreed, and said he believed Carney was the first
27
CNO to recognize the need for public information specialists. Carney's
public information officer was Commander Merle MacBain, who also stated




Admiral Carney believed that if you wanted public
information work done, then you had to have someone
who understood how to handle it properly. Carney
also liked the idea of two-way communications. He
wanted to know what people thought in the United
States, and he believed that a public information
officer could tell him better than someone else.
Carney knew the importance of public opinion, and
the value of public relations and he wanted itOO
used properly. °
According to Captain Robert S. Jones, now deputy director of defense
information, Carney's support for public information specialists
stopped overt attempts by some Navy officers to reduce the size of
the specialty. According to Jones, this allowed the specialty to
grow without outside interference until the program was strong enough
29
to defend itself.
Admiral Carney's speeches also revealed his position in two areas
of vital importance in building a public information specialty: spe-
cialization and public relations. In a speech before the Reserve
Officers' Association in Washington, D. C, Carney stated:
The business of the armed forces is becoming so complex
today that it is impossible to go along the way we did
25 or 30 years ago when it was practicable for a man to
be a Jack-of-all-Trades . We must rely more and more
on specialization.
* * *
Public relations is a responsibility of every Command-
ing Officer and the responsibility in some measure of
every individual. Public relations cannot be defined
as the process of getting publicity. There's a little
more to it than that . . . the insurance of public
knowledge of the objectives and methods of carrying
out those objectives ....
A public relations program to be valid has to be
predicated on honest and sound principles. It must
be, as far as we're concerned, free from the expediency
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of "getting off the hook." . . . Public relations
is not a casual thing. It doesn't just happen ....
As 1954 ended, one public relations journal assessed the change in Navy
public information:
The Navy has done a complete about-face since World
War II and now considers public relations a major
function of the top command. This is a big change




In the crisis situation of the Korean War, the Navy rapidly
increased its information organization, relying heavily upon its cadre
of public information specialists. Although the war necessitated
expansion of the Navy's information organization, it was the leadership
of Admirals Sherman and Carney that awakened the service to the impor-
tance of public relations and established the need for full-time practi-
tioners. The war also served to terminate permanently defense department
restrictions on the number of officers the Navy was allowed in its
departmental information office, although defense continued to control
budget allocations. Congressional funding limitations and forced reduc-
tions in naval personnel strength prevented specialty expansion; the
latter was the more influential factor.
Board's and Studies
During 1951-1954, two formal Navy boards and five studies investi-
gated problem areas and submitted recommendations related to the public
information specialty. The formal boards considered the questions of
whether there was a need for specialization and whether the specialist
corps was making a worthwhile contribution to the service. One, the Low
Board, recommended eliminating the specialty. Two studies were conducted
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by John B. Shipman, civilian public relations consultant hired by the
Navy information office, to suggest improvements in the specialty. The
remaining investigations included an internal office of information
board, a CHINFO plans division study, and a joint study by the informa-
tion office and the bureau of naval personnel. Although the evaluations
were concerned with problem areas, primary attention centered on the
structure, number and selection level of specialists; the source, need
for competent, and elimination of incompetent, public information
officers; and the advisability of affording specialists increased Navy
training, as well as graduate education. Despite apparent duplication
of findings and recommendations by the boards and studies, each made
some contribution to improving the public information specialty. These
ranged from better understanding of the causes of specialists' problems
to articulating means to revitalize the specialty, to forcing top-level
Navy leadership to stress the need for public relations.
The Smoot Board
The first board was organized in 1951, after five years of Navy
experience with specialization and when some in the service were begin-
ning to question the validity of the "special duty only" concept. In
response, the chief of naval operations appointed Rear Admiral Roland H.
Smoot, in May, 1951, to head a board to study the SDO organization to
determine whether the authorized categories should be combined or dis-
continued and to recommend the optimum number of men in each in propor-
32
tion to the total line strength of the Navy.
The Smoot Board, in effect, made two major recommendations based
on the directive and developed recommendations of its own, although the
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board's suggestions virtually were ignored until 1952. By its silence,
the board approved continuation of the public information category.
And in a positive proposal it suggested that the public information
specialty remain 15 per cent of the total number of specialists in all
categories and that the SDO group constitute 1.35 per cent of line
33
officer strength. The board made additional comments: it recommended
that SDO selections be made only at the lieutenant commander level.
One lieutenant a year, the group said, could be selected in "exceptional
34instances." Perhaps more important, the group recommended a high
level review to determine Navy specialization needs. In the language
of the board, "specialization . . . has continued over a sufficiently
long period to permit a reexamination, based on experience, of its
35
merits and drawbacks." In November, 1952, Navy personnel reductions
were considered in terms of legal limitations on the size of the spe-
cialist category, the Smoot Board report was implemented. As a result,
the public information specialist was established at 87.
Shipman Study, 1952
In mid-1952, Korean War experience demonstrated serious deficiencies
in the specialty and in the service's information program; another study
began. The chief of information believed the problems accrued because
of "assignment of naval personnel to the highly specialized activity of
public information who have not had the inclinations, aptitudes, train-
37
ing, or enthusiasm required for success." He blamed poor selection
and training practices. Subsequently, Captain John B. Shipman, a civil-
ian public relations consultant and a retired Navy public information
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specialist, was retained to study the problem. Shipman served in public
information assignments for 11 years; his last job before 1948 retire-
ment was information officer for the bureau of naval personnel. The
results of Shipman' s investigation reflected the status of the specialty.
He communicated these to the information chief in two stages: findings,
og
December, 1952; recommendations, February, 1953.
To begin, Shipman studied the composition of the specialty. During
the Korean War, the specialty remained close to pre-war formation in
numbers and rank structure. The public information specialist category
received 10 per cent of the total number of Navy specialists. In
39December, 1952, public information specialists totaled 47. Forty-one
officers were assigned the 1650 public information designator. The
existing rank structure is shown in Table 1. The Navy traditionally
TABLE l
40
PUBLIC INFORMATION SPECIALISTS BY














places great emphasis on selection, training, and assignment of personnel;
public information, Shipman believed, was an exception. Based on expe-
rience and investigation, Shipman concluded that the core of the problem
was haphazard selection of the initial group of specialists. He said
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some specialists were selected "because they were friends of special-
41
ists, not because they had ability."
Marginal initial selection, combined with traditional Navy dislike
for public information, led to a move to eliminate the specialty, but
Shipman believed there were alternatives. Anti-specialist feeling was
particularly strong in some Navy power structures, such as the bureau
42
of naval personnel. Shipman agreed that some specialists performed
badly; on the other hand, he noted that a combination of factors was
at fault. He argued that the problem primarily stemmed "from lack of
understanding and acceptance in some quarters of the part Public Infor-
43
mation can and should play in the day-to-day operations of the Navy."
Eliminating the specialty was not feasible for Shipman because it would
involve Congressional action. There also was doubt whether sufficient
non-specialist line officers were available to fill specialist posi-
44
tions. The two alternatives were to build the specialist group into
a more effective organization or to eliminate incompetent men. The
latter alternative concerned Shipman because the Navy had no power to
release incompetent men from active duty. An officer could only be
45
removed involuntarily by decision of a regular selection board. Such
action is taken, however, only after an officer receives at least one
unsatisfactory fitness report from his commanding officer. Shipman
observed that although at least one public information specialist
received an unsatisfactory fitness report, none had been selected-out,
46
and there was no administrative provision to allow the Navy to do this.
Therefore, the officer felt it imperative "that a continuing effort be
made to remove those officers who are not doing the job required, and
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who are thereby giving the entire specialty a bad reputation in the
47
service." The biggest obstacle was commanding officers' reluctance
to sign unsatisfactory fitness reports, and information specialists'
reluctance to recommend unsatisfactory fitness reports for junior
information officers. Additionally, Shipman asserted that the nature
of public relations involved developing close personal relationships
between the commander and his information officer, between the informa-
tion officer and his subordinates. The expert noted that this often
48influenced fitness marks given an officer by his superior. To solve
the problem of fitness reports, Shipman suggested officers be graded
according to special criteria outlined by the bureau of naval per-
49
sonnel. He also urged the chief of information to review continually






Shipman saw some partial solutions to the immediate problem:
selection, rotation and education. He believed the selection of offi-
cers into the specialty was a prime method of inducing changes. Re-
cruiting from the Naval Academy and the Naval Reserve Officer Training
Corps program was suggested. Recognizing that the Navy's most pressing
need was for highly qualified spokesmen, Shipman acknowledged that the
newly commissioned officer would not fill this requirement, but sug-
gested this was the only source available. Shipman elaborated that the
reserves were not a good source of specialists because many incompetent
specialists already had come from the reserves. However, Shipman
conceded that some selection of reserve officers could begin if stress
was laid on aptitude, professional qualification and selection of
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junior officers.-* 2 Regarding career patterns, Shipman found no regular
•
*
sea and shore rotation of information specialists nor any sort of job
53
rotation to broaden specialist experience. The chief of information
was urged to ensure that junior specialists, in particular, were rotated
54
to increase background experience. Rotation between sea and shore
billets provided a partial solution to the problems of increasing spe-
cialists' knowledge of the Navy. Shipman also recommended that special-
ists be accepted as students at the general line school and the Navy
War College. Specialist educational opportunities did not exist.
Although one officer was scheduled to attend the Armed Forces Staff
College in 1953, postgraduate study at civilian institutions was not
permitted. The exception was line officers sent to civilian univer-
sities for graduate public relations training by the bureau of naval
personnel. Shipman urged the chief of information to proceed slowly.
"Considering the obstacles which had to be overcome to get . . . [this]
authorization," Shipman believed it wise to wait before trying to
58
include specialists in the postgraduate program. Shipman also recom-
mended that information specialists be assigned to civilian public
59
relations firms for six-month periods to learn practical matters.
In concluding his report, Shipman also looked to the future. The
solutions to the immediate problem, Shipman suggested, "are nothing
more than palliatives given to a sick patient to help get him over a
rough period." He felt real corrective action would take many years.
Shipman asserted that public information specialists must be selected
from the unrestricted line to be accepted by the Navy. He envisioned
an evolutionary process whereby unrestricted line officers would rotate
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between regular sea duty and shore jobs in public information. ? He
anticipated that these officers would apply for specialist status at
the lieutenant commander and commander level. Accordingly, Shipman
recommended that specialists first attain the rank of lieutenant
commander.
The Case for Navy Public Information
Concurrent with his investigation of the public information spe-
cialty, Shipman worked with Commander, later Captain James C. Shaw, of
the Navy information office. They produced a popularized version of
Shipman 1 s findings and recommendations entitled The Case for Navy Public
Information
,
which viewed the specialty more optimistically. This
pamphlet was published and distributed prior to Shipman 's report to the
chief of information.
The Shaw and Shipman pamphlet provided an overview of the Navy's
information program and the specialty and attempted to assess Navy
perception of public relations. They said the quality of the Navy's
information program was good, and that the service had the good will
of a majority of Americans. The two authors believed that some Navy
line officers were beginning to show a greater appreciation of public
67
information, even though the average officer knew little about tech-
fift
niques. Additionally, Shaw and Shipman asserted there were some good
69information specialists. On the negative side, the two investigators
added there was too little top-level support and too many poorly quali-
fied specialists. The two said that"the Navy possesses neither
philosophical understanding nor neon-lighted proof of public relations
merit. Psychological opposition to Navy-information as a violation of
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the traditional silent service concept also appears . "'^ These tradi-
tional barriers were not eliminated during World War II because most
specialists were considered civilians who would leave when the shooting
72
was over.
Acceptance of public information specialists as full members of
the Navy team was difficult and part of the blame was the Navy's. Navy
information officers were not included routinely in policy discussions;
73
they were mere spectators. This was a severe burden because, the
authors noted, the Navy had to recognize that good public relations
74
is planned by experts. Some specialists performed badly and their
incompetence reflected on the entire specialty. Those lacking com-
petence were described as changing their designator "for a free ride."
The Navy public information specialist had become known as a press
agent, influence peddler or worse. The authors believed that if the
Navy's traditional distrust of non-line officers was added, the result
was little "respect or confidence [from the] seagoing Navy." The
pamphlet implied that the Navy erred at the end of World War II in not
planning to absorb qualified reserve information specialists in the
regular Navy. New personnel were rare after the initial selection.
The blunder was about to be repeated after Korea, according to Shaw
and Shipman.
Finally, several solutions to specialist problems were advanced.
Shaw and Shipman suggested new approaches to increase Navy acceptance
of the specialist to avoid repetition of errors. They proposed that
good officers be rotated between sea and shore, with shore duty in
78
public information billets. The two proposed maximum input at the
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bottom of the rank structure, with the hope that good people would
79float to the surface. Additionally, the need still existed for highly
qualified, carefully selected information specialists who had "top-level
80
support and encouragement." These officers need increased voice in
policy and operational planning, the report said. Moreover, the person
responsible for assignments "must know the personality and background
81
of the individuals far beyond anything written into fitness reports"
to make maximum use of his abilities.
In essence, most recommendations proposed by Shaw and Shipman were
the same as Shipman' s final report to the chief of information and were
directed to the chief of naval personnel who quickly advised CHINFO of
his reactions. The personnel chief indicated the bureau would assist
the information office in screening officers for public information
82
duty. A new program to transfer qualified reserve public information
83
specialists into the regular Navy was slated to begin in May, 1952.
In addition, notice was given ship commanders and others in the Navy to
request again applications for public information duty from interested
officers to help find qualified men. The bureau's attitude toward
the specialists was implicit in its agreement with Shipman' s long-range
87
plan for having specialists drawn only from the regular line.
The Low Board
The same month that Shipman submitted his report to the chief of
information, February, 1953, a study of all service specialization
began. The secretary of the navy directed Vice Admiral Francis S. Low




of specialists to non-specialists. The Low Board was guided by the
following principles: changes in administrative procedures should be
based on improved performance by special duty officers, the SDOs should
89be "true specialists in their fields," and "the numbers of such
officers should be held to the minimum required." Practices which met
the Navy's technical requirements during the two world wars should be
A 90continued.
In deliberation, the Low Board reviewed the findings and recom-
91
mendations of all previous boards studying the specialist, called
witnesses and concluded that the public information specialty should
be eliminated. The incumbent Chief of Information, Rear Admiral L. S.
Parks, testified that public information duties could be handled by
unrestricted line officers with postgraduate training. He felt, how-
ever, that a "small cadre of specialists in the upper ranks" should be
92
maintained. Hearing testimony and remembering past performances of
information specialists, the board stated that public information did
not meet its criteria for a specialty and that public information duties
could be performed by officers with "short periods of instruction . . .
or by civilians or Naval Reserve officers [working] under the supervi-
93
sion of unrestricted line officers." Accordingly, the Low Board
recommended that these specialists be phased out or transferred to the
94
restricted line. In summary, the board noted that it
is aware that a so-called perfect solution is not
possible. It believes though that the recommended
administrative and legislative changes would effect
a considerable over-all improvement in the general
effectiveness of the . . . SD group (s).9->
The Low Board also suggested periodic review.
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In March, 1953, the Low Board results were forwarded to the Secre-
tary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson who disagreed with the recommenda-
tion to eliminate the public information specialty, and told the Chief
of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., to make a new
recommendation. In September, Secretary Anderson approved in principle
the recommendations, except the one to abolish the public information
specialty. Anderson stated:
I consider that there should be limited numbers of
specialist career officers in the field of Naval
Public Information, the majority, but not neces-
sarily all, of whom should come from the unrestricted
line, because: (a) Only a few unrestricted line
officers do and will have a special flair and affinity
for Public Relations and Information duties. (b) It
takes a very special type of personality and mentality
to perform effectively in this field. (c) Extensive
experience in duties involving this field is a pre-
requisite, (d) It may be that insufficient numbers of
qualified and motivated unrestricted line officers
will be found within the ranks of the present and
future U. S. Navies. [and] (e) Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, in order that control of this field
will not, either actually or tacitly, have to pass to
Naval Reserve officers and/or civilians.
The secretary directed the chief of naval personnel to reconsider the
97public information specialty. Ten months later, in July, 1954, Vice
Admiral Holloway told the secretary of the navy that the review had been
conducted. The bureau chief noted that of all the boards, only the Low
Board recommended discontinuing the specialty. He recommended continu-
98
ation. Vice Admiral Holloway further recommended that the unrestricted
line continue as the source for public information specialists because
Knowledge of the Navy is equally important in a Naval
Public Information specialist with knowledge of infor-
mation media and procedures .... I am confident
that a sufficient number of young officers with an
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inclination toward Public Information work will be
available to meet Service needs and that they can be
designated at an optimum time with respect to posses-
sion of an adequate Naval background and opportunity
to develop as effective Public Information specialists .
"
The Low Board had serious effects on the morale of the information
corps and contributed significantly to a deteriorating personnel situa-
tion. Whether effects of the board's actions were real or imagined was
not relevant in 1953-54. Shipman stated the specialists were "firmly
convinced that the recommendations of the Low Board concerning Public
Information Specialists is being unofficially implemented. And, they
are just as firmly convinced that BuPers is doing the implementing."
This belief, according to Shipman, was based on the theory that the
bureau of naval personnel deliberately failed to plan to absorb reserve
public information specialists into the regular Navy and that there was






Meanwhile, in July, 1953, the chief of information established
still another special board, headed by Captain Walter Karig, to recom-
mend an organization for Navy public information to enable the service
to comply with Congressional budget cuts while establishing a "positive"
102
public information program. The Karig Board believed that shortage
of qualified personnel was the most difficult long-range problem facing
Navy public information: too few officers had both an understanding of
naval operations and policies and expertise in public relations. The
board said a two-pronged training program was needed to remedy the
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situation: postgraduate training at civilian and military institutions,
103
and a "regular schedule of rotation between sea and shore duty. . . ."
During the time of reduction in public information officers, the Karig
Board noted an increase in what they called Navy awareness of public
104information responsibilities. Because upgrading public information
personnel was a vital concern of the Karig Board, the major recommenda-
tion was that: "Plans be made for integrating certain selected reserve
officers with professional public information training and experience
into the regular Navy . . ."as designated public information special-
ists "to provide a hard core of officers with technical training not
available in the Navy." The board also suggested developing a long-
. 1. * 106
range training program and periodic tours of sea duty.
By October, 1953, shortage of qualified public information officers
caused top-level concern and another study began. Reluctance of line
officers to serve in public information billets because of lack of pro-
motion security was assessed as the reason for the shortage. Both the
chief of naval operations and the secretary of the navy expressed con-
cern over performance of public information specialists. As a result,
the office of information and the bureau of naval personnel joined in a
study on obtaining qualified personnel and providing opportunity for
107
professional advancement and promotion.
Shipman Study, 1954
For the next nine months, there were no more public information
studies, but in July, 1954, Rear Admiral W. G. Beecher, Jr., assumed
command of the information office and immediately requested John Shipman
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to conduct an analysis and evaluation of the progress made on the recom-
10P
mendations in Shipman* s last study and make additional recommendations.
Despite an apparent cooperative attitude, Shipman found that few of his
proposals had been implemented. Of the 34 earlier recommendations, no
progress had been made on 23; some, but not substantial, progress had
109been made on four; and significant progress was made on seven. These
were generally fringe recommendations, not key issues. No action had
been taken to eliminate incompetent public information specialists
because a means for factual evaluation had not been developed. There
was, however, some indication that an evaluation was planned. Shipman
again urged that these efforts continue. There had been a few attempts
to improve specialist quality, but personnel shortages and continued
loss of qualified officers hampered these efforts. The new Shipman
study indicated that the chief of information had tried to improve the
quality of information personnel and fill vacancies through selection
112
of qualified reserve officers. This failed because there was no
113
enabling administrative practice. The policy not to transfer reserve
officers was made by the bureau of naval personnel by administrative
rule and, according to Shipman, indicated some prejudice against the
public information category because reserve legal specialists were
accepted for transfer to the regular Navy. Further inquiry revealed no
, , .
,.114
plans to bring new officers into any specialist category except legal.
Lieutenant, later Captain R. S. Jones, then a reserve public information
specialist, recalled:
I applied for a 1650 [public information specialty]
designator and received a letter from the bureau of
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naval personnel which said the Navy did not intend,
for the foreseeable future, to add any more 1650s
to the specialty. Furthermore, the bureau indicated
"don't write us, we'll write you. 1'^
Since the initial study, it appeared to Shipman that the personnel
situation had worsened. In 1954, 54 public information specialists
were authorized; only 39 were on active duty, two fewer than in 1952.
Although one Naval Academy graduate, physically unfit for line duty,
had been designated a specialist; there were three losses due to death
and resignations. The Karig Board report showed a need to increase
the total number of full-time public information jobs from 159 to 247
and suggested an increase to 127 specialists. Shipman believed
expansion should be gradual. He asserted a more effective organization
could be built by moving slowly and gaining cooperation of Navy offices.
His report expressed deep concern that there were not enough qualified
information specialists to fill new positions and that even more unqual-
ified officers would be selected as specialists in the expanded pro-
118
gram. Shipman' s point of view was reinforced by the fact that an
information personnel shortage was the reason junior officers had not
been assigned varied information work. Nevertheless, some broadening
of public relations expertise occurred as information officers found it
119
necessary to be skilled in many facets of the function.
Long-range recommendations met little acceptance, but Shipman
persisted in the suggestion to recruit line officers and proposed new
ideas. Shipman determined through unofficial discussion that policy-
makers were unwilling to recruit public information specialists from
the Navy line or the service academy, a departure from the bureau of
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naval personnel's previous apparent enthusiasm for the idea. Despite
BuPers reluctance to endorse the long-range proposals, Shipman was con-
vinced that eventually the
public information organization must be composed of
officers of and/or from the unrestricted line—regard-
less of whether they ever change their designators.
There is no alternative to acquiring complete accept-
ance by the Navy. ^
Shipman' s recommendations for information specialist's education
fared best. A sea-shore duty assignment policy had been implemented.
In addition to one officer attending the Armed Forces Staff College,
an officer had been admitted to the Naval War College. Only a personnel
122
shortage precluded assignment of an officer to the General Line School.
Lack of personnel also prevented assignment of information officers to
123
civilian public relations firms. Postgraduate training improved when
the bureau of naval personnel authorized attendance at the School of
124
Public Relations, Boston University, by two officers, one, a 1650.
During the period between studies, one new problem had arisen:
public information specialists were not equitably promoted. The infor-
125
mation in Table 2 was presented by Shipman.
In view of the information presented by Shipman in Table 2, the
public information specialty consistently received the smallest selec-
tion percentages. In the opinion of some information officers, this was
discrimination. The chief of information established a committee to
1 9 f\
determine the facts. Lieutenant, later Captain Jones, and Commander
Merle MacBain investigated and uncovered a situation which, in view of
the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and its legislative history, was
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legal and intelligence specialties collectively had been receiving a
higher percentage of selection than the other specialties. Captain
Jones recalled the two-man investigation:
The Bureau of Naval Personnel had interpreted the
law to mean that every selection board must have
three SDOs every year, not one from each specialty,
and the three SDOs each year were from the communi-
cations, legal, and intelligence specialties. 127
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Jones said that, as a result of the findings, Vice Admiral E. W.
Grenfell was appointed to head a special board to investigate further.
The problem, in addition to the low number of public information
selections, according to Jones, was that the specialties competed
against each other, rather than with themselves. Furthermore, the
line selection percentage was being applied to the entire specialty
1 28
corps rather than to each specialist category. Jones continued
that
Admiral Grenfell called a Pers A [promotion planning]
officer and said, "How do you determine who is on
the selection board?" This officer said, "Well, the
only thing we do is determine what the requirements
are in terms of the three SDOs needed to sit on the
selection board.' We send that information to Pers B
[officer detailing] so they can issue orders to the
appropriate officers." Grenfell then called in an
officer from Pers B, and said, "How do you determine
who is on the selection board?" The officer from
Pers B said, "We don't determine it, Pers A tells us
what kind of officers they want detailed to the selec-
tion board." So Admiral Grenfell then said, "You two
guys go out, and in 10 minutes, come back and tell me
who makes the final determination of what designators
go on the board." The two officers went out, and 10
minutes later they came back and said, "Pers A says
three SDOs are needed; Pers B then goes into the SDO
category, and starts with the communications special-
ists to see if any Captain is available, eligible,
and hasn't served on the selection board the previous
year." Normally they could, and so that filled one
spot. Then they would go to the lawyers, and there
were plenty of lawyer captains around so they would
fill the second slot; then to the intelligence spe-
cialists where the same thing happened. 1™
As a result, Admiral Grenfell recommended that an SDO, if available,
would be assigned from each specialist category under consideration
while that category was being selected. More importantly, SDOs would
no longer compete as a group; the line selection percentage would be
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applied to each specialist category. Jones described these develop-
ments "as the two biggest factors in the promotion area—we previously
lost a number of highly qualified people simply because the promotion
130
opportunity was so limited."
Shipman ended his last study by warning that a mediocre information
program would leave the Navy far behind the other services in the
131
opinion of the American public and recommended:
1) investigating the selection procedure,
2) admitting qualified reserve officers,
3) increasing the number of full-time public information billets,




There was yet one final study of the public information specialty:
a late 1954 internal information office investigation to determine how
133
the Navy could gain public support and develop such a long-range plan.
The board concluded that the Navy depended on the public information
specialist to gain public support. Because the specialist group was
constantly faced with an uncertain future, poor morale resulted and top
quality personnel was "frightened away."
The Wilhide Report indicated some hopeful signs and suggested
possible corrective action. There had been a significant increase, by
the fleet, in the awareness of the importance of public relations. At
the Washington, D. C. level, there was increasing cooperation "between
the Chief of Information, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of
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Naval Operations. "135 Despite the optimistic signs, the report suggested
the only way for public information (the specialty) to "survive is to
adopt in some form the Army and Air Force system by integrating public
information officers into the Navy's service information and education
program
—
perhaps changing the designation to "Information Services"
,,. 136
officers.
Results of the boards and studies during 1951-1954, provided clear
evidence of the concern of the public information corps itself, and of
the Navy, for the performance of the public information specialty.
There was formal acknowledgement of the need to improve the quality of
the information specialist through additional naval instruction and
experience and civilian postgraduate education. The studies provided
impetus for changing the Navy's position on specialist training, but not
the sole impetus. They did, however, appear to have a direct connection
with development of career patterns and rotation policies for specialists.
The Low Board performed a distinct, though unintended service, for
the public information specialty. The board's recommendations to abolish
the specialty led to emphatic support by the secretary of the navy and
stifled immediate attempts to eliminate the specialty. The principle
therefore was established at the highest Navy level that special talent
was required for the full-time practice of public relations, contrary
to the opinions of some naval line officers.
But it was the 1954 Shipman study which made the most important
long-term contributions to the specialty. By drawing attention to
inequities in promotions, the study triggered subsequent action leading
to the assignment of a public information specialist to selection boards
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-that considered specialists for promotion. All specialties gained
ultimately by the decision to have the unrestricted line selection
percentage used for each specialist category and by the end of unfair
competition between officers of different categories.
Allowance, Billets and Ceiling
Other factors occurring simultaneously with the boards and studies
also exerted influence on the public information specialty. One of the
most important was the effort to maintain an adequate number of public
information specialist positions in the Navy, as well as information
billets in the service information organization. Much of this effort
was made by officers assigned to the office of information in a continu-
ing struggle to ensure the Navy did not destroy the specialty and the
information program through the simple expedient of reducing the number
of specialists below the limit necessary to maintain a viable organiza-
tion. Commander, later Captain James S. Dowdell in the office of infor-
mation was a zealous advocate of the specialist cause. Toward the end
of the period, Admiral Robert B. Carney wielded the authority of his
office to begin building the specialty of the future.
During 1952-1954, outside pressures forced personnel reduction and
the specialty corps was forced to persuade the service of the need for
more specialists to enable the specialty to survive. The cutback in the
size of the armed forces prior to, and following, the Korean War
affected the public information specialty through mandatory cuts in
personnel, primarily reserves. Those closest to the specialty personnel
situation were forced to compromise to keep the specialty alive. Com-
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.mander Dowdell asserted that if the specialty had been unwilling to
compromise, connive and use outside influence it is doubtful if the
specialty would have lasted to 1955. Dowdell observed:
It hasn't been a question of presenting your case
and having it stand on the facts, it has been a
fight for survival, a fight to stay alive, a fight
to keep the nucleus, to maintain that small handful
upon which the Navy could build if needed. It does
not mean the specialists were not needed during the
early and mid-1950s, nor does it mean there was no
requirement at the time. But it meant that we had
to compromise to survive. 137
Initial quibbling over the size and composition of the public infor-
mation specialty from 1950-1954 revolved around conversion of line
information positions to specialist positions and the retention of
reserve public information specialists. In late January, 1950, the
chief of naval operations requested the chief of personnel to review
public information officer allowances of continental United States
staffs to reduce the number of such officers by the maximum number pos-
1 38
sible. This request reflected anticipated personnel reductions and
increasing demands for senior line officers In joint and international
commands, primarily line commanders and captains. These officers, along
with reserve information specialists, had been filling many of the
Navy's public information billets. The bureau of naval personnel believed
requested reductions could be made by releasing reserve officers and
converting information billets from line to specialist status. The
bureau also planned to fill assistant information officer billets with
139
line officers, lieutenant commander or junior. In response, the
Chief of Public Relations Captain H. E. Sears noted there were many
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vacant billets. Although public relations was gaining acceptance, he
said there were still insufficient numbers of trained information per-
sonnel. He argued there was a need to fill 22 billets with reserve
140information specialists. The chief of information agreed to conver-
sion of line commander billets to specialty commander billets—in effect
increasing the number of specialist billets and further increasing the
need for reserves. He noted, however, there were no specialists avail-
able to fill the new jobs. The proposed status change for assistants
meant that information specialists would become the senior assistant in
141
most information offices.
A move to define the size of the specialist category for fiscal
year 1950 began in April. The approved allowance for the public infor-
mation specialty was 8.9 per cent of all Navy specialists or 43 officers.
The long-range percentage specified for public information was only 8.5
142
per cent. The actual number of specialists on January 1, 1950, was 42.
The Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral John W. Roper proposed that
vacant spots in the specialty corps be given to the law category. Con-
sidering normal attrition, the personnel chief recommended that two
additional public information specialists be selected during fiscal year
143
1950. Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball approved on May 31,
144
1950.
The Korean War in June, 1950, caught the Navy with only one public
information specialist assigned to each of two Far East naval commands;
a feverish effort was made to provide additional assistance. It was
quickly evident to media personnel on the scene and information officers
in Washington, D. C, that the demands for information assistance placed
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on these two officers exceeded their resources and abilities. The
Navy's initial reaction was to send several officers from naval district
staffs and the office of information, to augment the two officers
already in the area. The chief of information commented: "It was
146
necessary to give most of the personnel on-the-job training." Addi-
tional information officers were obtained by recalling qualified reserve
147
officers to active duty, however, there was no general mobilization.
By the end of September, 1950, 13 more officers, including one captain
and commander, as well as two photographic teams, had been assigned
to Navy commands in the Korean area.
After the Korean experience, the chief of information suggested
advance planning for personnel and equipment in the event of emergency
149
operations in the Mediterranean. He believed Korea provided ample
evidence of the desirability of assigning an experienced senior public
information specialist to all overseas and fleet commands. The Com-
mander Sixth Fleet was advised that he probably could obtain a senior
public information specialist if a change in staff structure was re-
quested. A public information specialist was assigned to the Sixth
Fleet staff for the first time.
Also in June, 1950, preparations began to select additional regular
Navy public information specialists. The director of public relations
requested the personnel bureau to select 1650 designator officers from
line and aviation line applicants. Applicants were to be selected from
among those marked in the top 20 per cent of their fitness reports.
Additionally, applicants were required to have two years of college, and
public relations interest or aptitude, shown by duty assignments or
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civilian experience. 1-* 2 This was the first request for new public
information specialists since the specialty was begun in 1947.
During this same period, there was an increase in the number of
public information specialists allowed. This resulted from an increase
of 3,000 naval officers by the end of 1950. An emergency authorization
during the Korean War gave the specialty an additional six officers.
As a result, the specialty was increased to an approved allowance of
153
95. Accordingly, the specialty was apparently allowed to select six
154
additional specialists, rather than the two authorized previously.
By April, 1953, the anticipated Korean armistice caused the Navy
to reduce its overall manpower, including public information special-
ists and a board was established to establish retention lists for
reserve officers. Specialty strength was 87; there were 89 on active
duty; 41, regular Navy. The chief of naval operations directed
implementation of the new ceiling. In response and in anticipation of
still further reductions, the chief of information requested a board
recommend which reserve public information specialists should be released
from active duty. By July, 1953, budgetary limitations resulted in
reduction of the number of information specialists to 82. Because six
billets were held in reserve for contingencies, the effect was to
establish an active duty ceiling of 76 specialists. The chief of
naval personnel convened the Stone Board to determine retention prior-
1 CO
ities in releasing excess personnel from active duty. Captain Robin
M. Hartmann, now retired, recalled the procedure used.
Every specialty had a representative on the Stone
Board, and I was the public information member.
Before the board met, a formula was developed in
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CHINFO for ranking our 32 reserve officers. The
ranking was done in order of retention, so that
the ones on the bottom would be the first to go.
This allowed the Navy to easily determine who was
to be released as percentages were set.
During this period public information specialists first began to
assume a strong role in formulating personnel policy. A review of
CHINFO correspondence during the mid-1950s revealed that then Commander
James S. Dowdell was frequently the officer who fought to retain a viable
public information specialty. According to Captain E. L. Castillo, an
initial selectee, now retired,
One of the major problems of the specialty during,
and immediately after, its formative years was the
great lack of a public information specialist any-
where near the top of the information organization.
Dowdell was the first 1650 to move into that sort
of position. As a result, he was often in a position
1 where he had to make difficult decisions no one else
was willing to make.
Captain Jenkins credited Dowdell with efforts to rid the specialty of
1 f.
-i
incompetents. Dowdell played a leading role in the 1953-1955
struggle which solidified the future numerical position of the public
information specialty.
By 1954, the Low Board recommendations received wide distribution
and extensive discussion; specialists were concerned that the Navy would
act before the board's recommendations were approved. Affected by other
pressures, a three-month struggle over the specialty's allowance began.
The office of information believed that the Low Board report should not
influence any action in changing the number of authorized public infor-
mation billets. The chief of information urged retention of the 82
billets until the "Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the
Navy indicated a downward or upward revision is required." The staff
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of the chief of naval operations concurred in maintaining the status
164
quo. However, by early 1954, further reduction in overall Navy
personnel strength, not the recommendations of the Low Board, was
most important in determining the size of the specialty. In January,
1954, the deputy chief of naval operations for logistics told the chief
of information that the specialty should plan for a 16 per cent reduc-
tion in shore-based public information billets and a 10 per cent reduc-
tion in fleet billets for fiscal year 1955. The chief of information
replied that reduction to 77 billets for public information specialists
would have "serious adverse effects upon the Navy." He believed this
contradicted the policy set by the secretary of the navy and a special-
ist shortage would hinder an aggressive public information program to
gain and sustain public support. Then in February, 1954, personnel
planners anticipated the Navy would undergo only a 6.5 per cent person-
nel reduction in fiscal year 1955. Nevertheless, the planners indicated
the public information specialty would be reduced from 82 to 77.
The chief of information protested the proposed reduction. He argued
that a 6.5 per cent decrease was not equitable because the specialty
increased less than the overall Navy during the Korean War. Chief of
Information Rear Admiral Lewis S. Parks urged maintaining the status
quo. In March, the assistant chief of naval operations for personnel
advised the chief of information that a ceiling of 77 had been estab-
lished. In response to earlier arguments, the assistant chief noted




Meanwhile, the office of information pursued the personnel struggle
through the bureau of naval personnel. Deciding the best defense is
offense, the chief of information sent a strong letter, prepared by
Dowdell, on behalf of the public information specialty, to the chief
of naval personnel in February, 1954. Parks referred to the CNO's
earlier instructions for an aggressive public information program and
argued for immediate institution of a program to recruit, train and
assign public information personnel. He noted that public information
personnel shortage was acute—one-seventh of all public information
billets in the Navy were vacant. Of those filled, most had unwilling
incumbent officers. The chief of information further stated that a
recent request for applications from line officers for public informa-
tion duty did not result in a single application. The letter specified
other problems. Before the Korean War, there were 423 authorized public
information billets. After the war began, these billets were increased
to 763. By 1954, progressive and drastic personnel reductions lowered
the number of billets to 220—almost less than half the number before
the war; 43 of these were required by the defense department, NATO and
169joint commands. Dowdell put the reductions in perspective.
Taking our lumps and cuts is not necessarily a reflec-
tion that people do not think well of the public
information officers, although more often than not,
you are taking a beating because people do not think
well of you. During a period when the Navy is being
cut back, the chief of naval operations cannot go
to the chief of naval personnel and say we need more
PIOs, because the other fellow would say we don't
have enough officers under this limitation to man the
critical jobs. You have many other assignments which
are more essential to the operation of the Navy than
public information officers, despite the fact that
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you need them. It's a matter of relative value,
and relative requirement. The rank structure
requirements of the Navy also severely restricts
the latitude of the chief of naval personnel. 1™
The chief of naval personnel suggested to the chief of naval opera-
tions a special board to consider the unsatisfactory public information
billet situation. Subsequently, the bureau said it would decide whether
more PIO billets were needed by the Navy, whether training should be
increased, and whether the situation could be helped by the selection
172
of additional specialist information officers. The extent of the
downward trend in the size of the specialist corps and the public
information organization by mid-1954 is shown clearly by Table 3.
TABLE 3173
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER AND PUBLIC INFORMATION
SPECIALIST BILLETS, FISCAL YEAR 1951-1955
Fiscal Year Total Public Information Total 1650 Officers






However, in December, 1954, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Robert B. Carney, upset by earlier bureau of naval personnel rejection
174
of Captain Jones' request for regular Navy augmentation and concerned
over the need for information specialists, took action to increase the
size of the public information specialty, reversing the personnel
bureau's policy. He directed the chief of information to establish
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plans to select additional information officers. Carney wanted the
public information specialty expanded to 82, an increase requiring
selection of 17 new information specialists, reserve and regular.
Within the total of 82, a tentative quota of 55 regular Navy information
specialists was established as a "minimum" ceiling. The resulting plan
specified that selectees be lieutenant or lower grade, with officers
selected from the regular Navy or the reserve. Selection criteria were
established that emphasized aptitude, motivation and potential. The
chief of information requested that a public information specialist be
included on the selection board and that the chief of personnel advise
CHINFO of the number to be selected and of the expected ratio between
A 1 • 1-f - 176reserve and regular specialists.
The impending specialist selection and the arrival of a new admin-
istrative officer for the information office generated interest in
deciding who should nominate specialists for information jobs and in
establishing a rotation policy. Past policy was vague. Assignments
were handled by the administrative division which did not understand
the needs of the Navy or the duties of a public information specialist.
Captain A. H. Ashton, then head of the CHINFO plans division, believed
low promotion percentages for specialists reflected this defect in
personnel planning. Ashton added that career planning for information
specialists should be a major consideration in rotation. As a conse-
quence, he recommended establishing the following rotation cycle:
a. Each 1650 officer should expect within any
eight year period to be assigned to at least three




(1) At Sea or Overseas 2 years
(2) Naval District Headquarters 2-3 years
(3) Department of the Navy or DOD 3 years
(4) Joint or Special Duty 2-3 years
The evidence clearly shows interaction of personnel planners in the
information office with the findings and recommendations of the various
studies and boards. Successive cuts in the specialty allowance and the
ceiling for information officers were rebutted with arguments which
caused reassessment of these directives. The composition of the public
information specialty had undergone extensive change from the initial
group of specialists in 1949. Of the original 52 specialists, only 31
were still on active duty. Eight new specialists had been added to the
178
group by the end of 1954. Planning to select 17 regular Navy spe-
cialists during 1955 began. Selection criteria were formalized and
expanded to include consideration of aptitude and motivation, in addi-
tion to formal training and on-the-job experience with emphasis on the
selection of junior officers. Some weeding-out of less qualified
officers had occurred; and by the end of the period, there was reduced
emphasis on ridding the specialty of incompetents. It was apparent that
a decision had been made to build from the bottom up. There is also
evidence to indicate the specialty was beginning to manage its own
affairs. The continual internal investigations revealed poor personnel
planning. Recommendations from the studies and within the information
office were directed at establishing guides for a specialist career
pattern, and formalizing the specialists' role in job assignments.
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The interest and support of top-level management was evident.
Directives by the CNO and secretary of the navy increased naval offi-
cer's awareness of the importance of public relations and seemed to
induce flexibility in considering solutions to specialty problems.
There is no question but that the intervention of Admiral Carney had
been essential to ensuring that future crises like the Korean War would
find the specialist corps, and the Navy, more prepared to provide timely
and qualified professional assistance.
Training and Education
In the early 1950s the Navy again began providing advanced public
relations training for the specialty. Specialists attended both Boston
and Harvard universities. Congress reduced the projected postgraduate
program by limiting funds in 1953. The bureau of naval personnel
rebuffed attempts by the office of information to teach public rela-
tions at service schools.
The attitude of the bureau of naval personnel toward public rela-
tions instruction for a segment of Navy men was revealed in June, 1950,
when the chief of information tried to establish a public relations
course in Navy schools. The director of public relations proposed
courses at the U. S. Naval Academy, the naval postgraduate school, the
Naval War College and the naval training centers. The bureau chief was
responsible for curriculum; he believed an independent course in public
relations was not desirable. The bureau's view was that anyone who
needed detailed instruction in public relations could receive the




Forces Information School. The rationale was that junior officers
and enlisted personnel would have little use for public relations edu-
cation and that curricula should not include subjects as specialized
as public information. As an alternative, the bureau suggested an
address by the chief of information on public relations be given at the
U. S. Naval Academy. Information about media relations and interview-
ing was considered adequate for the postgraduate school and the war
11 18°college.
Advanced professional training for public information specialist's
began at Harvard with the Nieman Fellowship program. In September,
1951, Captain William J. Lederer became the first public information
181
specialist to attend Harvard University as an associate Nieman Fellow.
After it was begun, eligibility for the Nieman Fellowship program was
limited to lieutenant commander and commander public information spe-
cialists. Restrictions in the will of Mrs. Lucius W. Nieman prevented
Navy associates from receiving financial aid. The Foundation, however,
was willing to accept a naval officer on an informal basis, if Harvard
accepted him as a special student. The Nieman course for senior offi-
cers complemented postgraduate training later established at Boston
182
University for junior officers. Commander B. L. Britton attended
Harvard in 1952 as a Nieman associate, but Navy participation was can-
1 oo
celed in 1953 due to a lack of funds.
Meanwhile, the Navy had begun efforts in 1952 for postgraduate
education for junior public information specialists, and later tried to
reestablish the Nieman program. In September, 1952, the chief of infor-
mation advised the chief of naval personnel that effective public
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information depended on a nucleus of officers with professional training
in public relations and that the nucleus did not exist. He recommended
that the Navy establish a postgraduate program in public relations,
beginning with fall, 1953, with five line and public information spe-
cialists each year. Although the school selection was left to the
184
chief of personnel, Boston University was recommended. This proposal
coincided with Shipman study recommendations. At the same time, the
chief of information tried to reestablish the Nieman program for the
1954 school year. He stated the program provided "the Navy with an
unequalled opportunity for the training of specially qualified personnel
in the field of public information and advanced techniques of public
185
relations." Lieutenant Commander, later Captain Pickett Lumpkin was
nominated for the 1954 program, and was accepted by Harvard and the
Nieman Foundation. Participation was dependent upon the availability
of funds, but the Navy, nevertheless proceeded.
The chief of naval personnel approved both the Boston University
and Nieman Fellowship program participation requests in his reply to
the chief of information. The personnel chief stated:
An evaluation of the recommended professional training
in the field of public relations for naval officers
indicates that the Navy would undoubtedly benefit if
a few of the most talented public information officers
were permitted to undertake advanced instruction in
the field. It is believed that the association of
naval officers with outstanding men in the journalism
profession, as well as the professional training they
would receive, would result in an infusion of valuable
new ideas into the public information organization. 0/
The chief of naval personnel said two officers a year should receive
advanced professional training in public relations. A one-year post-
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graduate course was established for public information specialists
188
and approval was given for one student in the Nieman Fellowship program.
In January } 1953, the naval postgraduate school was requested to arrange
for a one-year postgraduate course. The chief of information recom-
mended Boston University because the school was a pioneer in postgraduate
189public relations and offered a degree in the field.
At this juncture, the Nieman and Boston University programs col-
lided as a result of Congressional action. In the summer of 1953, the
House Appropriations committee stated:
The Department [of the Navy] can get along without
further increase for postgraduate instruction,
190including officers studying public information.
Captain Castillo remembered that "it was just as though God had reached
down and put his finger on top of our head. This would have been the
first time we had ever had two officers attending civilian universities
191
at the same time." In view of committee remarks, the Navy reduced
public relations graduate students to one officer annually and ended
192
participation in the Nieman Foundation program.
Establishing graduate education for specialists during 1950-1954,
characterized a policy change by the bureau of naval personnel. This
change probably was affected by recommendations of the Shipman study in
late 1952 and early 1953. In any event, the public information specialty
was able to send officers to graduate school for the first time since





Significant factors influencing the public information specialty
during the five-year period from 1950-1954, as the specialty grew and
matured, were war, politics, personal influences, and internal and
external studies. Service acceptance of the public relations function,
if not the specialty, was evidenced by the rapid response to the Korean
crisis and the accompanying increase in both personnel and public infor-
mation billets. Although substantial reduction occurred after the war,
this was attributed more to overall Navy personnel reductions than to
strong feeling against the specialty. The war also provided evidence
to line officers of the need for public information specialists on
fleet staffs and for public information planning. By the end of 1954,
the active duty number of regular Navy specialists decreased, but plans
were made to increase their number. Congressional funding cuts served
to reduce public inter-service squabbling, created significant manage-
ment problems, but tended to have slight impact on the public informa-
tion specialty.
Two chiefs of naval operations supported public information, one
made a long-term contribution toward maintaining and expanding the
specialty. Admiral Sherman enhanced the role of the PIO as an adviser
to top management and defined command responsibility for the conduct
of public affairs. Admiral Carney's support for the specialty resulted
in growth and increased acceptance of the need for the specialist and
the function of public relations by the Navy.
Internal studies of the specialty formally delineated weaknesses
and strengths of the specialty and provided substantive recommendations
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for improvement. The studies also indicated a growing appreciation
within the Navy for public information and some increased awareness of
the need for the full-time practitioner. Major contributions of the
studies were in the areas of improving promotion opportunity, defining
selection criteria, providing a data base to corroborate future recom-
mendations, emphasizing and gaining acceptance of the need for post-
graduate training to increase professionalism, and helping to identify
reserve and junior officers as future experienced leadership. The Low
Board, in particular, resulted in top-level management affirmation of
support for specialists and ended, at least for a time, attempts to
abolish the specialty. Perhaps, one of the most important developments,
was the realization of the specialists that they should, could, and did
have a role in shaping their own future.
All the influences and factors worked in combination during this
period. They intermingled at times in varying degrees. Specialists
seized the opportunity Korea provided and demonstrated to some in the
Navy that public information could benefit the service and showed that
professional expertise was necessary. The specialty not only survived,







Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York and Toronto: The New
American Library, 1956), p. 295.
3
Stein, op. cit .
,




Anon., "The History of Navy Public Relations," undated, p. 9,
Larson Personal File. Although it is recognized that anonymous docu-
ments lack credibility, the statements in this history are consistent
with other evidence.
Anon., Public Relations News , April 3, 1950, p. 4.
Letter, The Director of Public Relations to The Chief of Infor-
mation, serial 2124, June 7, 1950, p. 1, CHINFO files for 1950.
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and Stations,
serial OpOO/mm A7-1, 106P00, December 30, 1949, CHINFO files for 1949.
8
Letter, Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy,
serial 969, April 5, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 2/39:19, 23.
9
Letter, The Director of Public Relations to The Chief of Infor-
mation, serial 2124, June 7, 1950, p. 2, CHINFO files for 1950.
Karig Board, p. 1.
Manson interview.
12
Letter, Chief of Information to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Administration), serial 3821, October 9, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/72:11-7,
13.
13
Letter, Chief of Information to Secretary of the Navy, serial
4741, December 19, 1950, CHINFO files for 1950.
Mereness interview.
Captain R. S. Jones, USN. private interview held in Washington,
D. C. , January 27, 1970.
Karig Board, p. 6.
Letter, Administrative Officer, CHINFO to Chief of Information,




Letter, W. G. Beecher, Jr., to The Secretary of the Navy,
serial 608, February 11, 1955, CHINFO files for 1955.
19
Letter, Chief of Information to Judge Advocate General, serial
5397, August 19, 1952, WNRC, 11031, 9/65:49-2, 21.
20
Anon. , "Report on Organization of the Office of Information-






Letter, Chief of Information to The Secretary of the Navy,
serial 01-100/JSD, December 29, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 18.
23
Anon., Public Relations News
,
February 4, 1952, p. 1.
24
Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, pp. 162-163.
25
Millis, Arms and Men, p. 304.
Dovdell interview. Note that Sherman was the first CNO to
give PIOs direct access to the Commander.
27m • -Manson interview.
28
Commander Merle MacBain, USNR (E.etircd)
,
private interview held




Extemporaneous speech delivered by Admiral Robert B. Carney,
USN, Chief of Naval Operations Before the National Council, Reserve
Officers' Association at the Washington Hotel, Washington, D. C.
,
February 6, 1954, Larson Personal File.
31
Anon., Public Relations News , December 27, 1954, p. 2.
32
Department of the Navy, "Report Of A Board To Study The Special
Duty Officer Structure," Washington, D. C. , May 15, 1951, Bureau of
Naval Personnel Technical Library, Washington, D. C. This information
is contained in the appointing letter from the Chief of Naval Operations












Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 2795P10, November 24, 1952, WNRC, 11031, 9/65:49-2, 21.

117
37Department of the Navy, "Report of Findings Concerning The
Selection and Training of Naval Personnel For Public Information
Duties," Washington, D. C, December 31, 1952, p. 2, CHINFO files.
This report was prepared by John B. Shipman for the Chief of Informa-




, and Department of the Navy, "Report of Recommendations
Concerning The Selection And Training Of Naval Personnel For Public
Information Duties," Washington, D. C, February 2, 1953, CHINFO
files. This report was prepared by John B. Shipman for the Chief of
Information. Hereafter cited as Shipman Recommendations.












































Shipman Findings, p. 11.





Shipman Findings, p. 13.

























Robert S. Jones, "The Relationship Between Recommendations of
Civilian Studies and the Mission and Organization of the Navy's Office
of Information (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, Boston,
1958), p. 40.
66
Karig Board, pp. 13-14.
Captain John B. Shipman, USN (Retired) and Commander James C.
Shaw, USN, "The Case For Navy Public Information, 1952 ," p. 42. This
pamphlet marked "Restricted," was obtained from the personal files of
Captain R. H. Mereness, USN (Retired). There is no indication of place
of publication, nor of the organization under whose aegis it was pub-










































Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Information,














Letter, Secretary of the Navy to Vice Admiral Francis S. Low,
serial JAG: 111:7, February 11, 1953, Bureau of Naval Personnel Tech-
nical Library, Washington, D. C. This was the appointing letter for
the board which included the following as members: Vice Admiral Low,
Rear Admiral Calvin M. Bolstar, Rear Admiral Wilson D. Leggett, Jr.,
Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Rear Admiral William B. Ammon, and Rear
Admiral Ira H. Nunn.
89
Department of the Navy, "Report of Board To Study The Engineer-
ing Duty, Aeronautical Engineering Duty, and Special Duty Officer
Structure," Washington, D. C. , March 24, 1953, p. 6, Bureau of Naval







These included the Compton Board, January 3, 1941; the Dyer
Board, November 30, 1945; the Leggett Board, July 18, 1951; and the
Smoot Board, September 7, 1951.
92











Letter, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Personnel,
September 16, 1953, WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-1, 14.
Ibid .
98
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Secretary of the Navy, serial








Department of the Navy, "Evaluation Study Concerning Navy
Public Information," Washington, D. C, October 29, 1954, p. 53,




Letter, Captain Walter Karig, USNR (Retired) to Chief of
Information, serial OI-100/JSD:gmch, December 14, 1953, WNRC, 12584,
9/81:41-5, 10.
103










Anon. , "Report on Organization of the Office of Information-
Navy Department," October 14, 1953, pp. 10-11, Larson Personal File.
1 08















































































Department of the Navy, Office of Information, "Proposed Long












p. 5, Part II.
Dowdell interview.
I OQ
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Public Relations
via Chief of Naval Personnel, serial 195P415, January 31, 1950, WNRC,
8236, 9/39:19, 23.
139
Letter, FIRST ENDORSEMENT, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief
of Public Relations, serial L669, March 16, 1950, on CNO letter 195P415,
January 31, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
140
Letter, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Operations,
serial 978, April 14, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
Ibid.
142
Letter, The Chief of Naval Personnel to The Secretary of the








Letter, FIRST ENDORSEMENT, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of
Naval Personnel, serial 59P10, May 26, 1950, on Bureau of Naval Person-
nel letter of April 13, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
^Letter, Chief of Information to Commander SIXTH Fleet, serial
4276, November 7, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
146
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Operations,
serial 3313, July 10, 1951, Enclosure (1), p. 2, WNRC, 9/38:13-4, 2.
147
Karig Board, p. 13.
148
Letter, Chief of Information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval
Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, serial 3711, September 30,
1950, CHINFO files for 1950.
Ibid .
Letter, Chief of Information to Commander SIXTH Fleet, serial
4276, November 7, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
Letter, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 2302, June 8, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 2/39:19, 23.
152
Information Bulletin, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
November 27, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 2/39:19, 23.
153
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 1712P10, December 18, 1950, WNRC, 8236, 9/39:19, 23.
154
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 0116, December 18, 1954, CHINFO files for 1954.
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Distribution List, serial
820P10, April 30, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel, May 5,
1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Operations,
July 27, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
158
Letter, Commander Robert E. HART, USNR to Chief of Naval Per-




161 T . .Jenkins interview.

123
162MMelemorandum, Captain Parish to Admiral Parks, January 29, 1954,
WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
16Memorandum, Op-07 to Op-10, January 29, 1954,. WNRC, 14192,
9/27:35-2, 18. Op-07 is the Office of Information, and Op-10 is the
office on the CNO's staff which allocates billets.
164
Memorandum, Captain Parish to Admiral Parks, January 29, 1954,
WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
Letter, Chief of Information to Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Logistics, April 5, 1954, WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
1 f\fi
Memorandum, Op-10 to Op-07, serial 229P10, February 1, 1954,
WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
Memorandum, Op-07 to Op-10, February 25, 1954, WNRC, 14192,
9/27:35-2, 18.
1 f\R
Memorandum, Op-01 to Op-07, serial 412P10, March 1, 1954, WNRC,
9/27:35-2, 18.
169
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
February 4, 1954, WNRC 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
Dowdell interview.
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Naval Operations,
March 5, 1954, WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
172
Letter, Rear Admiral W. G. Cooper, Bureau of Naval Personnel
to Captain E. W. Parish, Jr., Office of Information, March 10, 1954,
WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2, 18.
1 7"}
Memorandum, Op-07 to Op-02 , undated, WNRC, 14192, 9/27:35-2,
16. This memorandum is signed by Captain E. W. Parish, Jr., who served
as Deputy Chief of Information during the period July, 1954 to Septem-
ber, 1954.
174
Jones, MacBain, and Manson interviews.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,





Memorandum, Captain A. H. Ashton to Chief of Information,
December 21, 1954, WNRC, 14192, 9/27:33-7, 8.
178
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,




Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Director Public Relations,




Letter, Captain William J. Lederer to Chief of Information,
April 22, 1958, CHINFO files for 1958.
182
Memorandum, Lieutenant Commander Pickett Lumpkin to Captain
L. J. Kirn, November 24, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
183
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Superintendent, U. S.
Naval Postgraduate School, serial 79506/1650, June 23, 1953, WNRC,
12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
184
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 5871, September 5, 1952, WNRC, 11031, 9/65:49-2, 20.
185
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
June 29, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
-I Of.
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Superintendent, U. S.
Naval Postgraduate School, serial 79506/1650, June 23, 1953, WNRC,
12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
187
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Information,




Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Superintendent, U. S.
Naval Postgraduate School, January 2, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19.
See also letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
February 26, 1953, WNRC, 12584, 9/81:43-1, 19, which stated that the
courses offered at Boston University considered of value for Navy
public information officers were: community relations, semantics,
.broadcasting for organizations, advanced writing, writing non-fiction
for publication, press and national affairs, and press, public opinion
and foreign policy.
190
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1954 , H. Rept. 680, 83rd Cong., 1st sess.,
1953, House Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills , III, p. 34.
191Castillo interview.
192
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,




THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SPECIALTY ACCEPTED: 1955-1959
. . . much of what is to come is entirely in your
hands. You now have a challenge for the future
—
to think wisely, to counsel wisely, and to be so
good that no one can doubt your future. As one
last caution, let us be sure that we all understand
that no part of the Navy can live as a part unto
itself. We are all here to see that the Navy's
story is told so that our country can always make
the correct decisions. Let that be your goal and
you have nothing to fear.
—Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick
International tension, rapid introduction and use of military
technological advances, implicit Navy recognition of the need for pub-
lic information specialists, and increased Navy emphasis on public
information played key roles in developing the public information
specialty during the late 1950s. The Congressional decision to stop
limiting public information funding was only of secondary importance.
Although one study and two boards reviewed public information and Navy
specialization during this period, one, the Keith Board, was the most
important in helping specialists attain long-range objectives.
Review of these studies show changing Navy attitudes toward public
information and specialization. The struggle to gain more full-time
public information billets for the entire Navy and to increase the
public information specialist ceiling reflected Navy reaction to inter-
national developments such as the Lebanon landings in 1958, as well as
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Navy appreciation of the abilities and contributions of qualified public
information officers.
However, educational opportunities for public information officers
were reduced at the request of the office of information, and plans
were made by the bureau of naval personnel to increase line officer
attendance at service schools and colleges at the expense of specialist
quotas. All these developments, particularly the 1959 Keith Board,
added a new dimension to Navy realization that public information
required the expertise of the full-time practitioner.
The Cold War, Modernization and Public Information
The need for public information and specialists was supported
between 1955 and 1959 by internal, as well as external, influences.
These factors included building a "new" Navy and continuing American
concern over international developments and trends. Eventually there
was a successful effort to remove the Congressional limitation on public
information funding. The information chief, as well as specialists,
played a growing role in attaining overall Navy objectives and received
greater acceptance by the service. Although no one personality was
dominant, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke continued the policy of past chiefs
of naval operations by supporting public information and the specialty.
During the late 1950s, the Navy moved into a far-reaching techno-
logical revolution, adapting from guns and steam to nuclear power and
guided missiles and necessitating changes in the information program.
2
On January 17, 1955, the USS Nautilus was "underway on nuclear power."
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This was followed by commissioning the world's first guided missile
cruiser, USS Boston
,
and authorizing development of the Polaris missile
and the fleet ballistic missile weapons system. By July, 1959, the
3
nuclear powered cruiser USS Long Beach was launched. Supersonic jet
fighters and bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, also accel-
erated in development.
Supporting this technological revolution, the office of information,
in 1955, recommended a new program to meet Navy public relations needs.
The proposal, "strongly and enthusiastically" supported by Admiral
Robert Carney, chief of naval operations, was approved by the secretary
of the navy. The objectives were to gain public support, to ensure the
Navy understood its purpose and to improve professionalism of public
information specialists. The information chief said that in the previ-
ous two years there had been a "vast improvement in the awareness of
4
public relations' value within the Fleet."
By November, 1957, developments in missiles and the need for a
modernized fleet led the chief of information to suggest that the Navy
shift public relations emphasis to "The Navy's Future Role." There
was increasing concern over the difficulty of retaining qualified Navy
men, and a major effort was made to develop "career incentive" within
the service. However, by June, 1958, the Navy was forced to eliminate
45,000 billets. Consequently, an austere redistribution of remaining
officers produced shortages in areas where increases were desirable,
including public information.
The chief of information protested a proposed 25 per cent reduction
in his office staff, and cited several of their public relations sue-
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cesses. He gained support from John Dillon, the administrative assist-
ant to the secretary of the navy, who wrote the bureau of naval
personnel that such an extensive reduction in CHINFO personnel was
ginequitable and suggested reducing the proposed personnel cut.
Coincident with increased Navy public information for a rebuilding
Navy, was the retirement of Admiral Carney and the appointment of Admiral
Burke as chief of naval operations. Burke was interested in the Navy's
information program. He wrote periodic notes to the chief of information
requesting briefing on public relations objectives, emphases and prior-
ities. One note said:
My recent schedule has precluded the opportunity to
hear much from your shop [the office of information]
on what we are planning for the coming fall and
winter. A briefing by your staff along these lines
is requested. . . .'
The admiral suggested the public information organization release data
on enemy submarines and defenses against guided missile attacks on air-
craft carriers in "such a manner that the average civilian can reaily
understand." Commander C. R. Wilhide, Burke's public information
officer, later recalled that the admiral supported the specialty and
respected some information office specialists. Captain Jenkins agreed
with Wilhide and added that Burke's attitude was influenced partly by
his favorable press.
The image and effectiveness of the office of information, accord-
13ing to some retired specialists, depends on the aggressiveness of the
information chief, his deputy and the division directors. Jenkins and
Wilhide agreed there was vigorous leadership in the mid-1950s, coupled
14
with knowledgeable line officers and an adequate specialist staff.
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Jenkins also recalled that competence and experience increased in the
late 1950s when the specialty gained and retained experienced leader-
ship.
The specialists slowly won the confidence of Navy line officers,
sometimes through small practices like participation in the morning
briefing for the chief of naval operations and senior Navy pentagon
officers. Wilhide recalled that he had been briefing Admiral Burke on
the morning news for several years when the admiral suggested including
the briefing with intelligence and operational summaries. Thus, in
1959 the morning naval briefing was expanded to include news. Both
Wilhide and Dowdell cited this event as a major breakthrough for the
specialty. Dowdell stated:
This exposed the Admirals to what was going on in
the outside world, as well as what was going on in
the Navy. The news briefers were public informa-
tion specialists, they were sharp, and they had the
answers. As a result, the Admirals were impressed
and the specialist corps gained a reputation of
competence. It was just one more step in the long,
slow process of convincing the Navy that the public
information specialist performs a vital role.-*-^
While there were no shooting wars during the late 1950s, increased
international tension and inter-service fund controversies exerted
moderate pressures. After 1955, military budgets remained relatively
stable in response to Soviet truculence, except in 1957 when severe
personnel cuts were made. In 1958, the Formosan and Lebanese crises
and Russian achievements in missilery and space prompted increased
•t- a- 19military spending.
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Captain Frank A. Manson explained that a growing military establish-
ment required public understanding. He believed the Navy was "remiss
in not having more specialists, particularly in comparison with the
20Army and Air Force," indicated in Table 4.
TABLE 4
21
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN INFORMATION ACTIVITIES, 1959
Agency Total Officers Officers in Pub- Enlisted in Pub -
and Enlisted lie Information lie Information








However, the nature of inter-service rivalry shifted from the 1949
struggle over strategic issues to one over control of weapons develop-
22
ment, funds and responsibility. All these factors led to increased
23
emphasis on public relations by each of the services. The rivalry
also led to action by the President and the assistant secretary of
defense for public affairs. President Eisenhower directed the defense
secretary to control service publicity and reduce personnel assigned
24 25
public information duties. The secretary agreed. Although the
President was upset by inter-service rivalry, Brigadier General Thomas
R. Philips, USA (retired) later explained that the problem did not
involve public information officers. He said the real culprits were
some intimate subordinate of the . . . Chief of
Naval Operations who calls you in . . . hoping for




. . . [providing]
considerable classified information, and once
published they follow it up. °
The services succeeded in breaking Congressional restraints on
public information funding. The limitations hurt all the service's
information programs to some extent; the Navy's chief of information
believed that Congress had not intended to limit the flow of informa-
tion to the American public or hinder normal inter-service competi-
27
tion. Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, information chief in 1957, stated
that the limitation was
one of the more confusing and unrealistic problems
I have encountered since reporting for duty as
CHINFO. . . . Unfortunately, this limitation is a
requirement of law, which we must administer,
whether we like it or not. We do not like it, and
28have been taking steps to have it eliminated. ...
The testimony of Errett P. Scrivner of the defense department,
and former member of the House appropriations committee, confirmed
Rear Admiral Beecher's opinion that the limitation was imposed to
reduce service publicity campaigns designed to win support for a par-
29ticular position. Scrivner introduced the information in Table 5
to show the extent of the successive cuts in public information funding
for the Navy.
TABLE 5 30
FUNDING FOR NAVY PUBLIC INFORMATION,
FISCAL YEARS 1952-1959
Millions 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
of Dollars :
3.20 1.60 1.35 1.00 .95 .94 .81 .72
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The defense official then stated that the cost of administering the
limitation to all services was about $350,000 per year because of
duplicate accounting procedures and he doubted whether the appropria-
tions committee knew public information involved only 10 per cent of
31
the services' public information programs. He urged the committee
to abandon the limitation.
The experience, over the years, of the difficulties
encountered under the limitation has been an effec-
tive object lesson to the Service, demonstrating the
penalty that must be paid for undue Service self-
promotion and bickering. Once the limitation is
removed, knowledge of the ease with which Congress
can reimpose it, will be an effective restraining
force holding down the Service headline hunting and
vying for supremacy in the news columns
.
Congress agreed. J
The Navy was affected by ship modernization, transition from steam
to nuclear power and guns to guided missiles. The service's informa-
tion program was molded to help reach these objectives. Russia's con-
tinuing arms development program fed the Cold War and contributed
toward maintaining a large military establishment. The Formosa Straits
crisis and Lebanon landing imposed more burdens on the Navy information
program. As the public information specialists matured and gained
Navy acceptance, office of information influence on day-to-day public
information activity in the field waned. Specialists began demanding
more voice in Navy public relations policy-making. Admiral Burke's
personal interest in Navy public information generated additional sup-
port for the specialty and public relations. Although there was
momentary concern over inter-service competition, Congress removed the




Two boards considered specialization and one group completed a
study of the public information program and the specialist corps during
late 1950. Although the Pratt Study continued the earlier work of
Shipman, Wilhide and Karig, it afforded an opportunity for a non-Navy
evaluation of the service's attitude toward public information spe-
cialists and public relations. The two boards, one headed by Under
Secretary of the Navy W. B. Franke and the other by Rear Admiral Robert
T. S. Keith, reflected a change in Navy philosophy toward specializa-
tion; a new concept, "subspecialization," was introduced. The Franke
Board recommended abolishing the public information specialty. Like
the Low Board recommendation, the Franke Committee's potentially de-
structive suggestion ultimately benefited the specialty.
Pratt Study
In March, 1955, after the defense department suggested the Navy
re-evaluate its information program, the first study of the Navy's
information program by a non-Navy evaluator began. The chief of infor-
mation engaged Laurence 0. Pratt—formerly of Batten, Barton, Durstine
and Osborn, a civilian public relations firm— to survey the overall
information program. Part I of the Pratt report contained seven
specific recommendations; three concerned public information special-
35
ists. Part II spoke to short-range public information objectives.
Pratt began by assessing the status of Navy public information




The present situation in Navy Public Relations can
be likened to the farmer who was dissatisfied with
the work performed by his horse. To express his
displeasure, he kept feeding the horse less and
less oats, while whipping the nag harder and harder.
£•The results were not all to the farmer's likin~
A strong undercurrent of criticism of the public information special-
ist existed in the Navy, and Pratt admitted that "a few [specialists]
37had . . . not lived up to expectations." Pratt contended many
specialists were inadequately educated, had low morale, received poor
duty assignments and little "support, encouragement or recognition of
38
his [the specialist's] efforts." Wilhide recalled that Pratt meant
that information specialists were poorly placed for effective public
relations and there was still little acceptance of public information
officers in some commands. Several Navy commands needed specialists,
39
while others were overstaffed. Pratt also noted: "Too many officers
have approached the Public Information job from the purely negative
angle of keeping out of trouble—and their results have been negative,
too." Despite the deficiencies, Pratt argued, "the backbone of Navy
public relations is still the specialist. Their know-how has contrib-
uted enormously to such successes as we [the Navy] have enjoyed."
Although Pratt recommended continuing the specialty, he acknowl-
edged that the best information officers were those with previous sea
42duty and Navy experience. He added:
Public Relations in its broader aspects is not a
subject that can be mastered in a few weeks or
even a few months. The line officer who comes to
the Pentagon . . . cannot logically be expected to




Pratt further stated that the informed public information officer pro-
vides creative leadership only if he is aware of current mass media
developments. A specialist therefore is required, Pratt argued, and
must be given the "opportunity to keep up-to-date « . . [to receive]
44
support and encouragement, as well as a proper atmosphere."
Three areas of public information particularly disturbed Pratt:
promotions, policy-making without consulting specialists, and the
Navy's commitment to public information. Pratt reported that one-third
fewer specialists than line counterparts were being promoted, a fact
Shipman recognized. Pratt believed that this was one cause of the
serious 1650 morale problems. He said public information specialists
were being "judged by line officers on the basis of their fitness for
line duty rather than their qualifications to advance the public rela-
tions program of the Navy." Wilhide and Lloyd agreed. The latter
commented
:
Good public information officers were not promoted
because selection boards were looking for people
who could perform professionally as line officers with-
out being an embarrassment to the Navy, if the public
information specialty was ever abolished. This vacil-
lation, is he or isn't he, affected behavior of public
information specialists. '
Pratt wrote that improved selection must be insured because: good men
were leaving for civilian jobs, some from non-promotion; further loss
would disrupt continuity needed for an effective program; and there is
48
a continuing need to attract motivated officers. The report also
revealed that the chief of information still was not being included in
Navy policy-making; until this step was taken, Pratt said, an aggressive
49
and effective public relations program could not be achieved. Pratt
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compared the information efforts of all the services, and the Navy was
found wanting. He stated, for instance, that where the Navy assigned
one officer to work with scouting groups, the Air Force had 11 or 12
full-time officers. Pratt also suggested adding public relations
to the Naval Academy curriculum, as at West Point. Finally, Pratt
strongly recommended that the deputy chief of information be a public
information specialist to make expert advice available at the top of
52
the Navy's information organization.
Pratt's report was approved in principle, but not implemented.
Combining the Pratt and Shipman studies, 41, or almost half, of all
their recommendations were geared to improve the public information




In August, 1958, after the secretary of the navy perceived two
major developments effecting Navy efficiency, another specialization
study began. The two developments were: rapid advances in weaponry
54
and associated weapons systems and defense department reorganization.
Consequently, the secretary established a committee headed by Under
Secretary of the Navy W. B. Franke to study Navy department organiza-
tion and to recommend changes to increase organizational efficiency,
combat readiness of naval forces and effective, efficient and economical
administration.
One area of committee concern was the Navy's need for specialists
and their effect on combat efficiency. The committee noted that the
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Navy benefited from experienced, highly qualified officers in public
information. The committee considered it important to have a system
to select and assign information officers. The question was whether
the Navy could be served best through continuing the specialist program
or through initiating the subspecialist concept. Agreeing that both
unrestricted line officers and specialists were important, the committee
ruled that the Navy should have only the number of specialists actually
CO
required. The committee also was vexed because specialists were
allowed to wear the line star identification device on their uniforms.
Because the committee believed the device was misleading, they consid-
ered it more appropriate to give specialists a "distinctive designation
which identifies them as officers contributing special skills to the
Navy
.
The Franke Committee's investigation concluded with two findings
about Navy specialization. The committee said that with the exception
of communications specialists, unrestricted line officers with appro-
priate training could perform SDO duties without significant performance
loss. Use of such officers, the committee added, would lead to a maxi-
mum input of fleet experience into specialty areas, spreading technical
competence throughout the fleet. Officer assignment would be easier
because all officers could perform all jobs. However, the Franke Com-
mittee recognized possible disadvantages, including reduction in tech-
nical expertise and possible deterioration of the Navy's material
readiness position. The committee also anticipated line officer
reluctance to devote substantial portions of careers toward obtaining
technical knowledge to replace the specialist. Secondly, the committee
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recommended a "Naval Technical Corps," composed of all specialist
groups. The committee justified the technical corps by observing
that the term "restricted line," and not the quality or qualifications
of personnel assigned to it, caused the Navy problems in use of special-
ists. Establishing a corps, according to the committee, would give the
specialist "a recognized, rightful place in the personnel structure
64
of the Navy."
The committee findings led to a final recommendation that all
special duty categories, except communications, be eliminated. The
categories to be dropped were: public information, photography,
intelligence, law and hydrography. Affected officers could remain
in the Navy as restricted line officers or transfer to the unrestricted
line where, the committee believed, the ex-specialists would be able to
compete for promotion and assignments. Secretary Franke said a modern
and highly technical Navy required many officers with specialized train-
ing. If an officer obtained technical training while maintaining line
qualifications, the secretary added, the Navy would attain a higher
degree of effectiveness from improved communication between users and
producers. Franke also complained that the Navy was overspecialized in
fiP,
some areas, underspecialized in others. A review of the recommenda-
tions indicate the committee believed the Navy lacked experts in tech-
nical areas necessary for combat readiness and was over-supplied with
non-technical personnel.
Two ex-information specialists viewed the Franke Committee's find-
ings and recommendations from a different perspective than the secretary.
Captain Wade gave a typical specialist reaction:
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The Franke Committee report was one of the more
interesting attempts to give us 1650s the oppor-
tunity either to remain on active duty in a program,
which we knew was deliberately going to be allowed
to die on the vine, or be allowed to transfer back
to the unrestricted line. I don't know any public
information officers who could have done this, with
any hope of success. I couldn't possibly catch up
with my contemporaries in the sea-going business,
any more than I could expect them to leave the ship
and come catch up with me in my business. But un-
doubtedly, somebody thought we [information spe-
cialists] would fall all over ourselves in the rush
to come back into the fold where we could be recog-
nized as real honest-to-God naval officers.
"
Captain Dowdell commented later on the motivation behind the committee's
recommendations
.
If you look at the composition of the board, I think
they were formed, met and deliberated only to con-
firm a preconceived conviction, on the part of quite
a few senior officers, that the specialty corps was
not needed. It wasn't an unbiased impartial examina-
tion of the needs of the Navy, but how do we get rid
of the bastards. u
Following release of the Franke Committee's report in March, 1959,
Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr., gave each specialty an
71
opportunity for rebuttal. Deputy Chief of Information, Captain W. C.
Chambliss, a 1650, was designated by the information chief to answer
the committee. In his presentation, Chambliss noted that under the
new scheme, senior Navy information officers would have a year and a
half experience when they assumed duties as full-time information
officers. As a result, the information deputy foresaw Navy public
relations conducted by "massed professional ignorance" and inexperienced
personnel. Chambliss said that, because the new plan envisioned offi-
cers who completed postgraduate study, the cost of the plan to the Navy
and to the American taxpayer must be considered. With 299 billets for
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information specialists and subspecialists , with normal personnel plan-
ning requiring three trained people for each job, and with an average
cost of $10,300 (1959 figures) per man, a total expenditure of
$8,835,200 would be required to train information officers. This
figure would increase by $2,572,000 annually to replace departing
72personnel. Chambliss continued that
. . . there is another cost: the cost of a public
inadequately informed of the work and mission of
the Navy. If this situation is allowed to develop,
the result will be the kind of Navy that left the
job of informing the public to part-time Public
Information officers. The kind of a Navy that
figured in the debacle of December 7, 1941. ^
Chambliss also made several organizational recommendations for the
Navy's information program: a need for approximately 150 information
specialists; designation after completion of a tour of sea duty; and
a master's degree in mass communications. The degree, according to
Chambliss, was to be earned at the individual's expense during free
74time to demonstrate motivation for specialist designation.
In May, 1959, Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, disagreed
with some Franke recommendations, particularly the proposal to eliminate
specialists. Because Gates believed subspecialization was a valid
concept, he ordered an additional study. Gates stated there was a
"need for increased postgraduate education of unrestricted line offi-
cers. ... A greater interdependence between . . . the unrestricted
line and the specialists was expected as more officers received spe-
cialized training." Importantly, the restricted line, including the
public information specialty, was retained. Two categories, photography
and hydrography, were eliminated and specialists were permitted to
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continue wearing the line star device on their uniforms. ' Finally,
the chief of naval operations and the assistant secretary of the navy
for personnel and reserve forces were directed by the secretary to
undertake further studies to determine the future composition and use
78
of specialists, as well as postgraduate education needs. This
decision by the secretary ended the concept of a naval technical corps
and efforts to eliminate public information as a Navy specialty. Other
ramifications were formation of another board to study the entire spe-
cialization situation, giving information specialists an opportunity
for self-direction. The information chief wrote Navy public informa-
tion specialists that they had survived another assault. "The Secretary
of the Navy, with the full support of Secretary Franke . . . decided
79
that the PIO continue as a specialty in the restricted line category."
The Keith Board
As a direct result of the secretary's earlier directive, Rear
Admiral Robert T. S. Keith, assistant chief of naval operations for
reserves, was appointed on June 15, 1959, to head a 26-man board to
study specialization. The board, the largest ever convened by the Navy,
included Captain J. S. Dowdell as the public information representative.
The secretary directed the board to study specialty billet and post-
graduate needs; to consider whether, and to what extent, information
specialists needed postgraduate instruction; and to review postgraduate
educational requirements for unrestricted line officers in fields
80
related to restricted line specialties.
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The Navy's need for technically trained officers and the secretary
of the navy's specialization philosophy influenced the board's deliber-
ations. As the Navy grew more complex and technically oriented, it
was evident that all officers, restricted and unrestricted, needed
specialized experience. There was a need for operating forces to make
maximum use of technological advances, a need to ensure that fleet
requirements were communicated accurately to specialists responsible
for providing up-to-date weapons systems, and a need to improve fleet
81
combat efficiency through timely introduction of modern advances.
Gates believed that a goal of the Navy's postgraduate program was to
qualify subspecialists to supplant specialists. A problem was that
subspecialists had to maintain meaningful career patterns, remain pro-
ficient in primary duties as naval officers, and retain the same pro-
go
motion opportunities as non-specialists.
The board determined billets to be filled by specialist and
go
unrestricted line officers with special training. Past experience
showed that selection and promotion caused problems in acquiring high-
caliber officers for the specialty, particularly the small public
84information group. Additionally, the board believed postgraduate
education an integral part of expertise. The postgraduate program,
however, was weak because billets were evaluated according to varying
criteria. Further, there had been little opportunity for a review of
85
billets to determine which ones required advanced degrees.
,
86
The public information panel, one of the board s subdivisions,
thoroughly reviewed the history of the public information specialty,
its rationale and its future. The panel interviewed representatives
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of the other services, mass media, Navy information and senior officers
and academic leaders. Vice Admiral S. H. Ingersoll, Naval War College
president, believed in public information specialists. He stated that
he could
cite countless examples to justify my contention that
our Publnfo specialists are invaluable to the Navy.
Public information in my humble opinion is not an
area in which you specialize on Tuesdays and Thurs-
days but not on Wednesdays and Fridays. Professional
competence in the mechanics of media communications
is needed in this Navy, and I think it should be left
in the hands of experts to whom it is a vocation. '
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral H. G. Hopwood
wrote the board:
It is my feeling that it is essential that every
major command in the Pacific Fleet should have the
benefit of the services of a public relations pro-
fessional. . . . This was dramatically demonstrated
during the 1958 Taiwan crisis when it was necessary
for me to send my PIO to that area. . . . The Navy
cannot afford to let public information officers
learn their jobs at the expense of the Navy's good
name and our national security. . . . The public
information officers . . . are fulfilling their
traditional role of keeping the American people
informed. ... I recommend that your [board] . . .
consider the possibility of both increasing the number
of public information specialists and in improving
their opportunities to broaden their knowledge of the
Navy, world affairs, and their profession. 00
The panel learned that the Army information program numbered 600 offi-
cers, of which 75 were full-time. The biggest difference between Army
and Navy officer assignment procedure was Army reassigning selected
officers to repetitive tours in information billets, while the officers
89
maintained regular line qualifications. Dowdell commented:
The Navy never did this. They rotated a man from one
job to another. As a result, some specialties were
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accepted because they were too complicated or too
technical, or because they could be better defined
than this nebulous area called public relations. °^
The Air Force, on the other hand, did not identify officers as infor-
mation specialists although approximately 600 billets were designated
for them. However, some Air Force officers served as full-time infor-
mation specialists, and some were assigned a specialty code, indicating
qualification for information assignments. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps
with 45 information billets, assigned reserve, instead of regular
91
officers to these jobs.
The quality of Navy public information specialists also was ques-
tioned during the panel's investigation. A majority of senior naval
officers interviewed considered the average public information officer
inferior to regular line officers. Testimony charged that 40 per cent
92
of information specialists were unqualified, incompetent or poorly
motivated. The panel said the 1650 specialty needed to be "purged"
93
of unqualified personnel. Dowdell claimed many of the senior officers
and panel members were using an erroneous criterion to judge information
specialists: that specialists should possess line officer qualifica-
tions for command at sea. Dowdell asserted: "The concept that a spe-
cialist should be qualified for command at sea, as well as his specialty
n94is a pipe dream. It's impossible."
Because qualifications are an important aspect of competence, the
panel investigated public information specialist selection criteria.
Designation criteria required the applicant to have a baccalaureate
degree in mass communications or a U. S. Naval Academy degree. Addi-
tionally, the officer was expected either to have three years of sea
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duty, one year of sea duty and two years ashore in an information
billet, or three years ashore in an information assignment. Two years
of civilian public relations experience could be substituted for a year
95
of military experience ashore. The panel decided information officers
should meet the qualifications of a true specialist: an officer with
considerable fleet experience, "sincere enthusiasm and strong motiva-
tion," mass communications experience, and appropriate college education.
The panel also wanted specialists with at least two tours in an informa-
tion assignment, 15 years active service, the grade of lieutenant
commander /commander, and command experience, or certification for
96
command, of a ship or squadron. Dowdell disagreed, but remarked:
As a public information specialist who is out-numbered
by line officers on a panel considering the public
information specialty, you'll accept anything as long
as you can keep the nucleus of people in the specialty.




The board accepted panel recommendations that officers should have fleet
experience as unrestricted line officers, postgraduate education, and
98
rank of lieutenant commander.
The board also determined the number of approved billets for
specialists, the overall ceiling established by the chief of naval
operations and the number of specialists actually in the Navy. The
panel conducted a billet-by-billet survey of all naval commands to
determine requirements. Evidence indicated the total number of 1650
billets could be reduced if qualified unrestricted line officers were
available. However, 64 billets was the "optimum and the minimum to




tion officers. As a result of the survey, the board recommended
that the public information specialty be reduced from a total of 80
to 67, including an allowance of three officers for flexible personnel
assignment. An important consideration in deciding on 67 was an
awareness that billets would be staffed by public information special-
ists ranking as lieutenant commander and above. Only two billets were
designated for lieutenants. Dowdell recalled that 67 billets would
double the size of the specialty upon implementation of the Keith
102
Board report. Captain Jones explained:
If you determine the number of officers required to
attain 67 senior officers, you come out with 155
officers overall. Thus to implement the Keith
Board, instead of decreasing the specialty to 67,
you increase the number of public information spe-
cialists to 155. 103
In addition to specialist billets, the board also recommended 240
billets as the optimum number of full-time, non-specialist, public
information officers needed to support shore, staff and fleet require-
104
ments. Of the seven specialist categories reviewed by the board,
six were decreased in number, public information receiving the second
lowest reduction. The board realized recommended reductions would
be gradual. More importantly, the board stated:
Considering the length of time necessary to educate
subspecialists , to allow for a normal sea shore
rotation of duty, and to allow for attainment of
appropriate grade structure, the Board considers
that a number of years will pass before its recom-
mendations can be fully implemented. uo
Testimony on postgraduate training for public information special-
ists was inconclusive. Some witnesses said public relations is an art
to be practiced by almost anyone and that there are few precise academic
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requirements for practitioners. Generally, testimony of civilian public
relations practitioners suggested that academic background in general
mass communications or the liberal arts would be adequate. The testi-
mony suggested the most important factors were motivation and on-the-
107job experience. The board concluded that all specialists and sub-
specialists should hold at least a bachelor's degree in mass communica-
tions and that selected officers continue to the master's degree. The
board also recommended that the Navy postgraduate school include some
1 08
mass communications courses as possible electives. Dowdell remarked
that postgraduate education was affirmed, not for the specialist, but
for the line officer who needed some specialized training. However,
the education billets were established for both line and specialist
„. 109
officers.
In October, 1959, four months after they began deliberation, the
Keith Board reported to the chief of naval operations. Rear Admiral
Keith summarized the challenge in the report and acknowledged that
implementation depended upon "the acceptance and support by the officer
corps of the concept of sub-specialization." Significantly, Keith
reiterated the necessity to continue using specialists and noted their
vital contributions to the Navy. Rear Admiral Keith asserted that
members of the board "were converted to the conviction that the need
for specialization would become more evident in the future because of
increasing complexity and expanding technology. He strongly asserted
that an officer's promotional outlook must not be degraded by sub-
112
specialization. In conclusion, Keith reiterated that:
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Sufficient unrestricted line officers educationally
qualified in the subspecialty [must be found] . . .
to fill specialty billets prior to reduction of the
113
number of specialty billets.
The chief of information agreed with some of the board's recom-
mendations and suggested still another study. Rear Admiral Kirkpatrick
asserted that 300 billets requiring full-time public information offi-
cers (specialist and non-specialist) proved the need to augment the
roster of qualified and trained public information specialists. More-
over, the information chief stated that until enough unrestricted line
officers were qualified to fill the billets, there should be no spe-
cialist reduction. The chief of information particularly noted that
the board's proposal to reduce the specialty from 80 to 67 was based
on senior billets. Rear Admiral Kirkpatrick concurred with the board's
recommendation to develop subspecialists and agreed that when enough of
these officers became fully qualified, it would be possible to reduce
the number Of specialists. Finally, Kirkpatrick recommended a further




Kirkpatrick' s comment on specialty reduction from 80 to 67 was
based on a prefatory sentence in the Keith Board report, eventually a
key determinant in the growth of the public information specialty. The
board was unable to consider all factors governing the number of offi-
cers required to maintain appropriate grade structures. As a result,
the board made "no recommendations ... on optimum numerical size of
the specialist and sub-specialist groups." ' This meant that recom-
mended billets were senior officer billets (67 for public information)
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to be filled by specialists. The board did not determine the number
of junior officer (lieutenant and below) billets needed to produce the
required number of senior officers.
The study and the two boards conducted during 1955-1959 had little
immediate effect or influence; however, there was substantial long-
range impact. The Pratt study re-emphasized earlier findings by Ship-
man, Wilhide, and Karig, and provided outside confirmation of problems
previously identified by Navy investigators. The Franke Committee
report was directed toward all specialists and suggested that special-
ists again had failed to communicate with the operating Navy. However,
the committee report did prompt an unprecedented examination of the
Navy's postgraduate program and specialist billet allocations and intro-
duced the subspecialization concept. The Keith Board recommendations,
although not implemented immediately, were the most significant and
important developments in the history of specialization since the 1945
Dyer Board. As a result of the Keith Board, specialty billets were
permanently correlated to postgraduate needs, and, more importantly,
specialists were retained until subspecialists were available. If there
is a turning point in the survival of the specialty, the Keith Board
report turned the survival odds in favor of the public information spe-
cialty. It is apparent that the personal efforts of Rear Admiral Kirk-
patrick and Captain Dowdell were instrumental in developing overall
strategy to produce recommendations favorable to the specialty.
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Allowance, Billets and Ceiling
A shift in emphasis from the Navy's public information billet
structure toward expanding the public information specialty corps
was apparent from 1955-1959. The first re-evaluation of allocated
specialist billets since World War II began. This was accompanied
by some Navy recognition of the need for full-time public information
specialist expertise, as well as the need to conserve limited personnel
resources.
Two late 1954 developments took hold in 1955: specialist person-
nel planning and selection of additional public information officers.
In December, 1954, Captain A. H. Ashton proposed that specialists begin
coordinating their own personnel matters. The chief of information
appointed a four-man public information personnel board in January to
1 -i f.
assign and detail public information officers. The information
chief expressed "particular interest" in 11 officers as possible infor-
mation specialist selectees into the regular Navy. The bureau of
naval personnel replied that applications had been received from four
of the 11 and that the others had been invited to apply for augmentation
118
into the regular Navy as code 1650 officers. In June, the selection
board selected 11 officers, not the same 11 as regular Navy public infor-
119
mation specialists. Although this was not the first time officers
had been selected since the initial group in 1946-1947, it was the
largest number selected since that time and increased the number of




Specialist selection was continued yearly because the specialty
was beginning to experience annual losses; however, there was diffi-
culty finding qualified applicants. It was also true that U. S. use
of military power in support of foreign policy increased the need for
specialists. Selection boards meeting to select 1650 officers in 1956
found few applicants. One officer suggested an "aggressive campaign
to encourage junior officers to apply for a career in public informa-
120
tion." The head of the information office plans division agreed
and reported that during fiscal 1956, nine specialists were expected
to leave the Navy. He said, this stressed the need to increase the
specialty ceiling because present restrictions did not allow room for
121
many junior officer selections. By fall, international events ac-
cented the need for additional naval public information specialists.
The information chief requested the bureau of naval personnel to desig-
nate six instead of three officers as information specialists. He
noted that urgent requests were received from SEATO and the U. S.
Taiwan Defense Command for specialists. Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor said,
however, that the information office would be unable to send men unless
122
more 1650 officers were designated. For the first time, the demand
for information specialists exceeded the supply.
In response, a special committee appointed by the chief of naval
operations recommended that the number of information specialists be
increased; changes in billet location were recommended. Next, the
chief of information proposed restructuring public information billets.
He stated there had been more requests for specialists from fleet and
other operational commanders for specialists because of a growing
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emphasis on public information, and requests from senior commanders to
change unrestricted line billets to public information specialist
billets or to establish new specialty billets. Moreover, the informa-
tion chief pointed out that a U. S. Navy Enlisted Career Conference
recommended assignment of a full-time public information specialist
to every naval command. In May, the CNO indicated the general request
123
to restructure public information billets would not be approved.
As a result, a compromise conference was held between representatives
of the naval operations and information chiefs. In July, after person-
nel planners of the CNO's staff restudied the request, they agreed to
the proposed change. For planning purposes, they approved a long-
range rank/billet structure for the specialty. The long-range and 1957
billet allocations are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6124
CURRENT AND LONG-RANGE PUBLIC INFORMATION SPECIALIST




Lieutenant Commander 25 31
Lieutenant 17 25





The chief of information attempted to increase the specialty
ceiling but was frustrated by the secretary of the navy. In early
1958, the secretary imposed a ceiling of 80 on the total number of
125public information specialists, reserve and regular. By July, the
Chief of Information, Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick, had been unable
to increase the ceiling. He told the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval
District
:
I can appreciate your concern with the PIO shortage
in your district and throughout the Navy in general.
We are up against the stops with no give for unusual
demands imposed by the times. . . . The response
to my speedletters . . . showed an overwhelming con-
sensus that more PIOs are required. So far I have
been unable to crack the imposed ceiling of eighty. . . .
One thing you can count on is that I'll keep trying.-^"
In December Kirkpatrick advised the navy secretary that the public infor-
mation personnel situation was in critical condition, the authorized
strength, "unrealistic and inadequate." Boards, reports and surveys
for three years recommended increases of 17 to 28 specialists. One
survey of Navy commands (the speedletters) indicated a need for 31
more information specialists on commands already staffed with at least
one public information specialist. In addition, the office of informa-
tion needed specialists. These factors led the information chief to




In December, the chief of naval operations recognized the critical
situation and again appointed a panel. Because 1958 budget and officer
personnel limitations prevented an increase in the PIO ceiling without
reducing billets in line or other categories, the CNO requested the
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ad hoc panel to review public information officer assignments. In
addition to considering PIO billet reallocation, the chief said the
panel should recommend establishing additional billets on a few major
128
staffs so officers would be available for emergency assignment.
The panel was organized on January 12, 1959, to review the overall
situation of public information specialists in terms of present duty
assignments and possible use of unrestricted line officers in public
129information. Headed by Captain Lowell W. Williams, the five-man
panel included two information office representatives. Three precepts
guided deliberations : the authorized number of public information spe-
cialists depends on Navy needs, the number of specialists is established
by the chief of naval operations, and any increase in information spe-
130
cialists depletes other categories. Specialist billets were allocated
only in those areas where the requisite depth of
experience in the particular field cannot be acquired
within the normal career pattern of other officer
code categories. J
The panel also decided, over the objections of the public information
members, to limit its study solely to placing the 80 authorized infor-
mation officer billets. They decided any adjustment or reallocation of
information billets for the unrestricted line would affect only author-
132ized billets.
Identifying information billets was difficult, but panel findings
revealed useful information. Some billets were disguised to avoid the
Congressional limitation on public information funding. Nevertheless,
the panel tried to determine the most effective placement for the 1650
133billets. Panel findings indicated the non-information members of
the panel accepted the importance of the function, revealed problems in
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personnel assignment, highlighted demands for service-wide information
specialists far exceeding the supply, and exposed lowered specialist
requirements in some commands because of poor attitudes toward the
function. The panel reported that unrestricted line officers could fill
134
some information jobs. In a later memorandum to the chief of naval
personnel, the chief of information disagreed and requested deletion of
the finding.
The panel concluded the study, recommended a novel joint-Navy use
of information specialists, introduced a special allowance factor to
specialist personnel planning, recognized problems and suggested future
review. The panel recommended that some billets be reallocated even if
some commands would suffer severe losses. The panel proposed grouping
information specialists in geographical areas to form a talent pool.
The panel also authorized five Transient Patient and Prisoner (TP&P)
billets to provide flexible personnel reassignment, including personnel
137
assigned to postgraduate education. Department of defense require-
ments were an increasing burden because the Navy filled these jobs with
its own limited personnel. Finally, the panel strongly supported a con-
1 1Q
tinuing review of 1650 billets. It stipulated that the ability and
talents of the specialists' be matched with jobs while ensuring equi-
139
table Navy personnel distribution.
The panel's report was approved, but no action was taken to increase
the number of specialists. The chief of naval operations approved adjust-
140
ments in public information personnel assignments on April 10, 1959.
He also concluded "it would be both indefensible and undesirable" to
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increase the number of public information specialists in view of per-
141
sonnel shortages and overall naval strength ceiling.
By the end of 1959, a clear trend in the assignment of information
officers and in the public information ceiling was evident. Almost all
information billets during World War II had been filled by reserve
information officers. By 1947, the ratio of specialists to non-
specialists had equalized, but it declined to one specialist for every
three billets during the Korean War. The ratio then declined further
until in 1959, more than 75 per cent of information billets were filled
142by non-specialists. Table 7 shows the public information ceiling
from fiscal year 1955 through fiscal year 1959. Of the 80 specialists,
143
57 were regular Navy.
TABLE 7 144
PUBLIC INFORMATION SPECIALTY CEILING COMPARED WITH
TOTAL SDO AND NAVY OFFICER STRENGTH,
FISCAL YEARS 1955-1959
Code 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
1650 82 82 82 80 80
All SDO 1,085 1,024 1,029 1,048 1,066
Total Navy Officers 74,000 72,800 73,800 70,600 68,670
Although total Navy officer strength dropped 6,000, overall SDO strength
remained constant with most of the loss absorbed through elimination of
the hydrography and photography specialties. Of all specialties, only
law showed an increase during the five-year period. The intelligence
145
specialty suffered the heaviest losses.
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The five-year period ending in 1959 appeared to reflect some
attitude change by Navy officers in the continuing struggle over the
size of the public information specialty. The number of regular Navy
specialists increased to 57, the highest number in 13 years. Although
there was reluctance to expand the total beyond 80 specialists, there
was increased agitation to establish a ceiling of 130. There also was
an indication that some officers were aware of the need of the full-
time practitioner. On the other hand, there was ambivalence toward
specialists in some naval power structures, although the officers
resisting the specialty appeared more willing to compromise than in
the past. Nevertheless, there was a continual input of specialists
in the program and evidence that the specialists would play an active
role in strengthening the specialty.
Education and Training
Specialist postgraduate education and advanced service schooling,
earlier expanded, was reduced substantially during the late 1950s.
Graduate education at Boston University was canceled in 1958. The de-
crease was attributed to the wishes of specialists and to Navy policy
of assigning more unrestricted line officers to service professional
schools. A 1956 study of postgraduate education crystallized the office
of information's policy toward higher education, as well as selection
criteria for advanced schooling.
Advanced graduate civilian education for specialists and non-
specialists continued at Boston University until 1958, with Navy graduate
students preparing theses on topics on general interest to the service
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and the Navy's office of information. One specialist attended the
university in 1956, but in 1957, two attended because there was no
student from the unrestricted line. The program was dropped in 1958.
Money previously available for the Boston University program was used
to allow information specialists to take courses off-duty, a tuition-
aid program.
In late 1955, disagreement arose over specialist quotas for
advanced service education and the temporary resolution benefited the
specialty. In December, the chief of naval personnel reduced public
information specialist attendance at service and joint-service schools
for fiscal years 1957 and 1958 because public information specialists
were displacing line officers. Accordingly, the bureau chief eliminated
the 1650 officer at the staff college, and said that an information
specialist would be selected for the war college in alternate years.
The information specialty also could send one officer to the Naval War
148
College junior course biennially if he did not displace a line officer.
About 14 per cent of the specialists received some advanced training.
The type and extent of education is indicated in Table 8. The chief of
information protested, but the bureau of naval personnel compromised,
agreeing not to change specialist quota assignments to the Naval War
and Armed Forces Staff colleges for fiscal year 1957. The future quota
was one 1650 officer at the war college and two specialists at the staff
n 15 °college.
In late 1958, the bureau of naval personnel promulgated another
long-range officer education plan, reducing advanced service school





REGULAR NAVY INFORMATION SPECIALIST ADVANCED TRAINING
BY TOTAL OFFICERS, RANK AND COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
Rank Number Naval Armed Forces Graduate General
War College Staff Coliege School Line School
Captain 4 1
Commander 11 2 4
Lt. Commander 19 1 3 1
Lieutenant 12 2 1
Lt. (Jr. grade) 5
Ensign 6
Total 57 3 7 4 1
of information to change the policy were unsuccessful. In January, 1959,
the chief of information protested that the new plan violated the 1955
agreement. The information chief said public information specialists
need advanced service training for duty on major staffs and for career
incentive. He also reminded the chief of naval personnel that the 1955
agreement required assignment of specialists to both the Naval War and
Armed Forces Staff colleges and requested inclusion of 1650 officers in
the new long-range plan. The chief of naval personnel replied that
many officers were eligible for training at the two schools so SDO parti-
cipation was reduced. He said one 1650 officer could attend either the
152
Armed Forces Staff College or the Naval War College every third year;
153
the information chief chose the Naval War College.
Meanwhile, in early 1956, the Navy defined its expectations for
graduate education. In January, the chief of naval personnel, at the
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direction of the assistant secretary of the navy for personnel and
reserve forces, convened a board, headed by Rear Admiral Charles E.
Weakley, to review the Navy postgraduate program and to recommend a
new program for 15 to 20 years. The bureau chief hoped the plan would
represent a realistic approach to the needs of the
Navy; best meet the actual and prospective needs of
the various Bureaus and Offices for graduate-trained
officers; and insure a maximum return to the Navy
for the educational investment in the relatively few
officers available for such assignment.
The chief of information was requested to assess public information
specialty needs for graduate education. Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor
told the Weakley Board that specialists in the rank of lieutenant or
below should attend the Navy's general line school. He believed
the nature of information specialist jobs on Navy staffs required ad-
vanced professional naval education at the Naval War and Armed Forces
Staff colleges. Rear Admiral Taylor said specialists do not need Ph.D.
degrees. Selection for graduate educations at universities was made
according to academic potential and professional merit. Taylor further
stated that the academic degree was incidental to education and "post-
graduate courses should be constructed on the basis of the requirements
1 r
/-
best suited to the needs of the Navy."
Cancellation of specialist education at Boston University, attend-
ance at the Armed Forces Staff College in 1958, and reduced quotas for
the Naval War College, essentially ended substantial advanced education
opportunities for public information specialists. The office of infor-
mation's perception of higher education was pragmatically oriented
rather than degree oriented. Justification for advanced training was
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to attain public relations expertise equivalent to an unrestricted line
officer in naval warfare and to ensure professional and academic back-
ground necessary to advise commanders on the public relations aspects
of problems.
Conclusions
The significant factor that emerged by 1960 was Navy acceptance
of public information as a legitimate area of specialization. This was
emphasized particularly by the Keith Board. The one study and two
boards that investigated public information and specialization further
indicated Navy support for public information. Although the Franke
Committee recommended abolishing the specialty, it recognized the
necessity of qualified full-time public information officers, and like
the Low Board, allowed top-level management to reiterate support for
the public information specialty. A new concept, subspecialization,
was introduced; its impact on the specialty depended on future Navy
acceptance of the concept. Although there was a slight decrease in the
overall ceiling for the public information specialty, there was an
increase in the number of regular Navy information specialists, and the
promise of further growth on implementation of Keith Board recommenda-
tions.
The boards, however, had not exerted influence in a vacuum: other
factors, internal and external, were present. The continued tension
between the United States and Russia helped maintain a sizable military
establishment, indirectly providing specialists the opportunity to
demonstrate their essentiality, competence and ability. Despite these
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gains, there was a reduction in the level of advanced training for the
specialist, indicating a lack of real appreciation for the specialist
by some in the naval power structure. This was partially offset by
Congressional removal of restrictions on public information funding.
Thus, the late 1950s was a period of growth for the specialty, and
increased Navy awareness of the competence of its public information
specialists—important factors in the survival of any group contrib-





"Tlemorandum, Chief of Information to Each PIO Specialist (I65x)
on Active Duty in the United States Navy, serial 1596, May 14, 1959,










pp. 437-447 pasim .
4
Letter, Chief of Information to Secretary of the Navy via Chief
of Naval Operations, January 14, 1955, WNRC, 59A2745, 10/33:41-7, 9.
Letter, Chief of Information to Secretary of the Navy via Chief
of Naval Operations, serial 3750, November 12, 1957, WNRC, 61A2586,
9/41:43-6, 11.
Letter, Chief of Information to Administrative Officer, serial
1393, May 1, 1956, CHINFO files for 1956.
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 1078P10, June 10, 1958, WNRC, 62A2507, 19/60:39-7, 23.
o
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel via
Secretary of the Navy, serial 3022, September 11, 1958, CHINFO files
for 1958.
9
Memorandum, Chief of Naval Operations (Op-00) to Chief of Infor-
mation, May 17, 1956, WNRC, 60A2293, 9/53:55-1, 12.
Memorandum, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Information,
serial 230-57, April 11, 1957, WNRC, 61A2586, 9/41:43-6, 15.
Wilhide interview.
12
T , .Jenkins interview.
13
Dowdell, Jenkins, and Wilhide interviews.
14











Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 199-202 pasim ; and Mollenhoff,
op. cit
.
, pp. 167-231 pasim .
Manson mtervxew.
21
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1960), p. 399, and U. S., Congress, House, Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, Hear-
ings
,
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives, on H.R. 7454, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 2.
The percentage of personnel from each service engaged in public infor-
mation activity is not listed because the percentages involved are too
small to provide any meaningful comparison.
22
Huntington, op. cit
. , pp. 412-415 pasim .
23
Anon., Public Relations News
,
November 18, 1957, p. 1.
24
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Problems of Journalism
(Proceedings of the 1958 Convention) (Washington, D. C. : American










Memorandum, Chief of Information to The Secretary of the Navy,
serial 608, February 11, 1955, CHINF0 files for 1955.
28
Letter, Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor to Rear Admiral C. H. Lyman,
January 16, 1957, CHINFO files for 1957.
29
Statement, Errett P. Scrivner, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Before the Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriations of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropria-
tions on the Public Information Activities, FY 1960, March 23, 1959,
p. 1, CHINFO files for 1959. See also U. S., Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,
Hearings
,
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, on H.R. 7454, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959,







Ibid. > pp . 7-

165
U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960, H. Rept. 408, 86th Cong., 1st
sess., 1959, House Miscellaneous Reports On Public Bills , III, p. 19.
34
Letter, Chief of Information to Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative and Public Affairs), serial 2005, July 5, 1956, WNEC,
60A2293, 9/53:55-1, 12. Pratt's brother was assistant secretary of
the navy at the time.
35
Laurence 0. Pratt, "A Three Year Program For Navy Public Rela-
tions," Office of Information, Department of the Navy, Washington,
D. C, undated, CHINFO files. This report is undated; based on the
content it probably vzas written between May and July, 1955. Lieutenant,
later Commander C, R. Wilhide, now retired, assisted Pratt and generally









































p. 5, Part I.
46
Lloyd and Wilhide interviews,
Lloyd interview.
















p. 8, Part I.
53
Anon., "History of Navy Public Information," undated, p. 4,































p. 116. This finding was in accord with the recommenda-
tions of the Hobbs Board of 1958, which studied the composition of the
Navy officer corps in 1970. The Hobbs Board proposed that the Navy
officer structure be "divided into three areas: a Line Branch, a Tech-
nical Branch, and a Staff Corps Branch." Under this concept, the
Technical Branch would have been substantially larger than the unre-








Transcript, press conference held by Under Secretary of the
Navy, William B. Franke, Washington, D. C, March 20, 1959, p. 2,







Letter, Captain W. C. Chambliss to All 165x Officers, April 2,
1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
72
Captain W. C. Chambliss, "Presentation Before Assistant Secretary
of the Navy Jackson Concerning Part III-H Of The Report of the Committee























Kirkpatm'ck Memorandum, p. 1. The support of Secretary Franke
was important because Franke was to become Secretary of the Navy on
June 8, 1959.
80
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 1059P10, April 10, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
81
Keith Board, p. 1-1.
82
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Rear Admiral Robert T. S.
Keith, serial 11044P10, June 15, 1959, p. 3, Keith Board Report.
83







The Keith Board divided into panels to consider the various
specialties, a departure from the procedures of previous boards, but
necessary because many problems were reviewed by an unusually large
number of personnel. Each panel investigated its own area and reported
back to the entire board. Findings and recommendations of individual
panels were reviewed before final recommendations of the board were
prepared.
87
Letter, Vice Admiral S. H. Ingersoll to Rear Admiral C. C.
Kirkpatrick, August 28, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
88
Letter, Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet to Chief of Naval
Operations, serial 013/3327, August 17, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
89
Department of the Navy, "A Report to RADM Robert T. S. Keith,
U. S. Navy By The Public Information Panel to Study Billet and Post-
graduate Educational Requirements in the Specialty Areas in the Line
of the U. S. Navy," Washington, D. C, September 1, 1959, p. 1, section








Keith Board, p. IV-5.
93




Keith Board Panel, p. 1, section 2.F.(2).
96
Ibid




Keith Board, p. IV-5.
99
Keith Board Panel, p. 1-2, section 2.G.(1).
Keith Board, p. IV-7,9.
Keith Board Panel, p. 2-4, section 2.G.(1).














Keith Board Panel, p. 1, section 2.G.(5)-(6)
I QO
Keith Board, p. IV-5.
109
Dowdell interview.
Letter, Rear Admiral Robert T. S. Keith to Chief of Naval









Letter, Chief of Information to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Personnel and Naval Reserve), serial 4347, December 3, 1959, CHINFO
files for 1959.
Keith Board, p. l.

169
Memorandum, Chief of Information to Captain James C. Shaw,
January 7, 1955, WNRC, 59A2745, 10/33:43-2, 18.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 61, January 18, 1955, WNRC, 59A2745, 10/33:43-2, 20. The
eleven officers were: Lt. R. P. Brett, Lt. R. S. Jones, Lt. R. B.
Phillips, Lt. T. C. Powers, Lt. P. L. Taylor, Lt. G. H. York, Lt. W. L.
Baylor, Lt. I. C. Griswold, Lt. K. W. Moorehead, Lt. J. N. Williams, Jr.,
and Lt. R. M. Robinson, Jr.
118
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Information,
serial L-5682, March 2, 1955, WNRC, 59A2745, 10/33:43-3, 20.
119
Letter, Acting Chief of Information to LTJG H. E. Hetu, June 28,
1955, WNRC, 59A2745, 10/33:43-3, 20. A similar letter was sent to each
specialist selected for regular Navy.
120
Letter, Commander John H. Levick to Chief of Information,
March 14, 1956, CHINFO files for 1956.
121
Memorandum, Head, Plans Division to Chief of Information,
March 21, 1956, CHINFO files for 1956.
122
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 2233, August 1, 1956, WNRC, 60A2293, 9/53:55-2, 22.
123
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Operations,
serial 888, March 18, 1957, CHINFO files for 1957.
124
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Operations,






Letter, Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick to Rear Admiral C. C.
Hartman, July 29, 1958, WNRC, 62A2507, 19/60:39-7, 23.
127
Memorandum, Chief of Information to Secretary of the Navy,
serial 345, December 17, 1958, p. 1, CHINFO files for 1958.
1 op
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Information,
serial 01272P10, December 29, 1958, WNRC, 64A3750, 9/47:55-2, 1.
129
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Captain Lowell W. Williams,
January 12, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959. Hereafter cited as Ad Hoc
Panel-1959. This was the appointing letter for the Ad Hoc Panel-1959
which included: Captain W. C. Chambliss, Captain Frank L. Fullaway,
Captain Chandler W. Swanson, Captain Ashley J. Little, and Theodore R.














, pp. 4-5. The information office representatives on the
panel were unable to convince other members to consider the question
whether there should be an increased number of specialist billets. See
letter, Chief of Information to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (P&RF)
,










Memorandum, Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick to Vice Admiral
H. P. Smith, May 12, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
136










Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 1059P10, April 10, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
141
Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet, serial 10773P10, May 3, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
1/9
Anon., "History of Navy Public Information," undated, p. 4,
CHINFO files for 1960.
143
Memorandum, Administrative Officer, Office of Information to
Chief of Information, February 24, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
144
Memorandum, Op-10 to Chief of Information, serial 1130P10,
undated, CHINFO files for 1959. From the material in this memorandum,
and file location, it probably was prepared sometime during 1959.
Ibid .
146
Letter, Chief of Information to Lieutenant R. M. McCool, serial




Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Information,




Memorandum, Director, Administrative Division to Chief of
Information, October 31, 1955, CHINFO files for 1955. The following
officers had advanced training: Armed Forces Staff College: Cdr.
A. A. Allen, Lt. Cmdr. H. J. Gimpel, Lt. Cmdr. H. K. Griffin, Cmdr.
H. H. Holton, Cmdr. F. M. Lloyd, III, Lt . Cmdr. R. H. Mereness, and
Cmdr. S. H. P. Read, Jr.; Naval War College: Cmdr. A. H. Ashton, Lt.
Cmdr. W. J. Ellis, and Cmdr. P. Lumpkin; Boston University: Lt. E. L.
Castillo, and Lt. Cmdr. R. M. McCool, Jr.; University of Missouri:
Lt. W. Thompson; Harvard University (Neiman associate): Capt. W. J.
Lederer; and General Line School: Lt. W. Thompson.
Memorandum, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
March 6, 1956, WNRC, 60A2293, 9/53:55-2, 22.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 8, January 2, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
152
Letter, Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Information,
serial A12/30, January 27, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
153
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,
serial 752, March 9, 1959, CHINFO files for 1959.
154
Notice, Bureau of Naval Personnel 5420, January 5, 1956, WNRC,
60A2293, 9/53:55-2, 20.
Letter, Chief of Information to Chief of Naval Personnel,








YEARS OF GROWTH: 1960-1964
There is a greater need in times of peace than in war
for an efficient, aggressive program of public and
internal public information for the Navy. Histor-
ically, the role of the Navy has not been understood
by the American public. In times of war, the contri-
butions of the Navy speak for themselves. In times
of peace, it is incumbent upon the Navy to speak for
itself.
—Commander James S. Dowdell, USN
Continued international tension, changing national defense
policies, Navy personnel management policies and a naval disaster
influenced the Navy's public information specialty during the early
1960s. The crises forced further Navy reliance on public information
specialists and helped create awareness of the value of the full-time
practitioner. The struggle to increase the size of the specialty
continued. The specialists received additional support from the
Combs Board, a new group which studied 37,000 specialist and subspe-
2
cialist billets in the Navy. The board was important because it
formally identified 155 billets, some new, requiring a public informa-
tion specialist. Additionally, graduate public relations education
was reinstated for specialists.
Crises, Changing Policy and Public Information
Continuing international tension, election of a new United States
President, modernization of the Navy, participation of specialists in
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advanced phases of development programs, operations and exercises, and
inauguration of a policy of assigning 1650 officers as deputy chiefs
of information were important elements in the growth of the public
information specialty. In 1960, the Navy continued replacing its
World War II vintage ships and built a strategic deterrent force of
Polaris submarines. The crisis over Russian installation of missiles
in Cuba, various training exercises, and the loss of the submarine USS
Thresher forced public information further into naval planning. Finally,
the specialists realized a long-time objective, assignment of a spe-
cialist, on a permanent basis, at the top-level of the Navy's informa-
tion program as the deputy chief of information.
During the early part of the decade, international tension remained
high and U. S. involvement in the Vietnam war increased. In late 1961,
the Berlin crisis caused retention of Navy men for six months, as well
as the recall of reserves to active duty. The Berlin problem barely
subsided when the nation was faced with the Cuban crisis in October,
1962. The Cuban problem eventually evolved into a naval quarantine;
during the earliest days of the crisis, public information specialists
were consulted. For example, at Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk,
the information office was brought into the operational planning a full
48 hours before President Kennedy made his memorable address to the
American public. American involvement in Vietnam gained momentum with
3
the USS Maddox incident in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964; the




The 1960 Presidential election had resulted in changed defense
policies. John F. Kennedy quickly moved from Eisenhower's policy of
"massive retaliation" toward a "flexible response." This meant
4increased military spending and a higher defense budget. President
Kennedy's election also brought changes in handling public information.
With the appointment of Robert McNamara as secretary of defense and
Arthur Sylvester as head of defense department public affairs, an era
of centralized control in defense information began. Captain E. L.
Castillo, later assigned to the defense information office, believed
that during the early 1960s, centralized control resulted in a more
realistic Navy public information policy. Castillo asserted:
Centralized policy control in the defense department
very quickly makes the unrestricted line officer
aware that public information can cause him a great
deal of trouble if he is a little careless with it.
Thus, there was increasing reliance and trust in the
opinions of the specialist.-*
Building a "new" Navy, begun in the late 1950s, was continued in
the early 1960s with emphasis on aircraft carriers and guided missile
weapons systems. Four large Forrestal-class aircraft carriers were
already in the active fleet; three additional carriers, including the
nuclear-powered USS Enterprise , were being constructed. The shipbuild-
ing program envisioned surface-to-air missiles as the primary source
of air defense on almost all new ships in the destroyer and frigate
classes. Besides surface ship construction, the Polaris-armed nuclear
submarine force was expanded. The first Polaris missile was success-
fully launched January, 1960; by the end of 1964, a new 2,500 mile
missile was operational. President Kennedy authorized increasing the
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fleet ballistic missile submarine force to 29 ships. From the begin-
ning, the Polaris program had been assigned a public information spe-
cialist, Commander, later Captain K. W. Wade. For coordinating the
public information aspects of this program, Wade was awarded the
Curtis H. Wright award by the Aviation Space Writers Association.
Public information specialists were active in other phases of
naval operations, and they won two Silver Anvils > symbolic of outstand-
ing public relations, from the Public Relations Society of America.
Public information was an integral part of the 1965 around-the-world
cruise by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise
,
guided
missile cruiser Long Beach , and guided missile frigate Bainbridge. The
two Silver Anvils were awarded for information programs in connection
with a NATO exercise Teamwork and a joint U. S. -Spanish amphibious
exercise called Operation Steel Pike in October, 1964.
Disaster occurred with the loss of the nuclear submarine, USS
Thresher
,
in August, 1963. Captain James S. Dowdell noted:
One indicator of the success of the public information
specialty might be how willing the line officers are
to turn over crisis situations like Thresher , Pueblo ,
and other mishaps to the specialist.
°
In Norfolk, Virginia, at U. S. Atlantic Fleet headquarters, the public
information office was notified of the submarine's loss within minutes
after the submarine was reported missing. In Washington, D. C, the
chief of naval operations relied heavily on the advice of his assigned
information specialist and the information office. Throughout the




There was one other major development in Navy public information
in 1963 when the job of deputy chief of information was permanently
designated as a 1650 billet. Captain F. M. Lloyd, then the acting
deputy chief of information recalled the circumstances.
We [the specialists] kept arguing that the deputy should
be a specialist, but over the years we didn't have
anyone really qualified for the job. One day in 1963,
Admiral McCain asked me what I thought of a line officer
who was going to be ordered in as deputy. I told the
Admiral that the proposed deputy was a fine officer,
but if a 1650 can't hold the deputy job, he has nothing
to hope and shoot for. As a result, McCain conferred
with the Chief of Naval Operations, and came back
and asked me who in the group of myself, [J. S.]
Dowdell, and [Pickett] Lumpkin was senior. I said
Dowdell, and Dowdell was immediately ordered to Wash-
ington to become the Deputy Chief of Information. *•"
Lloyd observed that having a specialist as deputy increased the likeli-
hood of public recognition for Navy accomplishments because a full-
time practitioner should recognize news values. Commander C. R.
Wilhide stated that with a 1650 deputy, the specialists exert more
12influence and play a greater role in shaping public information policy.
Captain Wade asserted that having a specialist deputy helped ensure the
availability of professional public relations advice at the top-level
13
of the Navy.
Allowance, Billets and Ceiling
The period 1960-1964, was a time of frustration, concern and
success as the public information specialty battled for increases in
billets and the specialty ceiling. Initial efforts were directed toward
obtaining an increase in overall ceiling to 109, as well as gaining
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authorization for more specialists to offset losses caused by externally
established information specialist billets. The specialists were frus-
trated by the threat of Keith Board recommendations to reduce the size
of the specialty, although the move was ultimately unsuccessful. The
struggle over the specialty ceiling was resolved by the under secretary
of the navy's authorized increase to 100 specialists; the under secre-
tary moreover implied that 155 specialists would be a more adequate
number.
As the 1960s began, new specialists were selected and efforts made
to increase the specialty size. In early 1960, 24 officers, lieutenant
and below, applied to have their designators changed to 1650; two were
selected. ^ Selection criteria for regular Navy public information
specialists stabilized to include a baccalaureate degree in mass com-
munications, three years commissioned service, at least one year of sea
duty or three years of Navy public information experience if approved
by the chiefs of information and naval personnel. Graduates of the U. S.
Naval Academy had no communications degree requirement. Meanwhile,
Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick tried to find means to increase the spe-
cialty's ceiling over the 80-man limitation. A special committee of
five specialists researched material for the chiefs of naval operations
and personnel, but despite an impressive array of data, the information
, • r i 1 . • -1 . 16
chief was unable to gam a ceiling increase.
The chief of naval operations ordered implementation of the Keith
Board recommendations in mid-1960; the public information specialty
responded by requesting more specialists. Implementation would have
meant gradually establishing an eventual ceiling of 67 for the public
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information specialty. ' The phased plan for reducing 165x billets,
as proposed by the bureau of naval personnel, is shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9
18








In May, 1961, the chief of information protested the proposed reduction
to the secretary of the navy and recommended an increase in specialist
19
billets to an overall ceiling of 109.
In early 1962, an ultimately unsuccessful effort was made to gain
additional public information specialist billets and the requirement
for commands to give up a line officer billet in exchange for establish-
ing a specialist billet, a new factor, was interjected in the struggle
for billet increases. In March, the Chief of Information, Rear Admiral
D. F. Sirfith, Jr., again requested an increase in specialist billets.
He noted that in the previous eight months, four additional billets
had been created by non-CHINFO authority, including one in Vietnam by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Smith asserted that unless the
ceiling was increased by four 1650 officers, it would be impossible to
fill all then authorized public information specialist billets with a
165x. He reminded the chief of naval operations that the four new
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billets were in addition to the 109 previously requested. ° The
personnel planners in the office of the chief of naval operations
replied that requests for increases in specialist ceiling from all
categories exceeded the authorized number of SDOs. The ceiling in
each category was necessarily a compromise, and the controlling factor
was "priority of requirements." The personnel planners noted that
efforts had been made to train additional public information sub-
specialists, and that 1961 reductions in overall officer strength had
been absorbed by other special duty only categories, not by public
information. The personnel planners further asserted that although
the Navy had increased from 630,000 to 666,000 personnel in 1962, the
demand for officers had grown even more. The request for four addi-
21
tional 1650 billets was rejected. Although efforts to increase the
specialty ceiling continued, it became necessary for commands to give
up an unrestricted line billet in order to create a specialty billet.
Many commands wanted a public information specialist, but most were
22
unwilling to make the required exchange.
The information specialist personnel planning board became inactive,
but Captain Dowdell's return to CHINFO in 1963 resulted in re-establish-
ing the board with increased authority. The new board's powers were
more explicitly defined. Under Dowdell's leadership, the board was
responsible for information specialist career planning and was directed
23
to recommend changes in assignments for public information specialists.
Despite earlier CHINFO attempts to increase the specialist ceiling,
the Keith Board recommendations for a decreased number of specialists
were applied to public information. In May, 1963, CNO personnel planners
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advised the office of information that Keith Board recommendations for
24
the public information specialty were to be implemented. Captain
Robert S. Jones recalled
that the bureau of naval personnel sent a letter to
CHINFO saying the phase-down of public information
specialists was beginning. What had been missed,
since they were only working with the public infor-
mation appendix to the Keith Board report, was the
prefatory statement in the basic board report which
said the board had not had time to develop a grade
pyramid to support the number of billets that had




As a consequence of the bureau's action, the 1650 ceiling for fiscal
year 1964 was established at 73. Captain Dowdell, deputy chief of
information, advised Chief of Information Rear Admiral John S. McCain,
Jr., that unless the secretary of the navy intervened, the information
specialty would lose seven officers. Dowdell recommended that the
secretary of the navy direct the bureau of naval personnel to exempt
the information specialty from the forced reduction and that a board
be convened to determine specialist requirements for 10 years. Dowdell
reminded the information chief that the Keith Board specifically stated
that specialties should not be reduced until subspecialists were trained
to fill specialty billets. It was apparent to the office of information,
Dowdell said, that this prerequisite was violated in the case of public
information. There were only 36 trained subspecialists. Captain
Dowdell requested Rear Admiral McCain to ensure that the secretary of
the navy was aware of the facts and to recommend that Keith Board recom-
28
mendations "be either cancelled or fully implemented."
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In the ensuing struggle, the specialists were successful in not
only defeating the reduction, but in increasing the public information
specialty ceiling. Rear Admiral McCain presented the public informa-
tion specialty's case to Under Secretary of the Navy Paul B. Fay, Jr.,
in October, 1963. McCain discussed the dearth of qualified subspe-
cialists and specialists and the need to increase the specialty to 155
to support Keith Board recommendations for 67 senior public information
29
specialists in proper grade pyramid. Vice Admiral W. R. Smedberg, III,
the personnel chief, agreed with the reasons that justified an increase
rather than a decrease to comply with Keith Board recommendations, but
Smedberg proposed a compromise. He asked that the specialty not be
increased immediately to 155 and that increases be implemented by recall-
ing inactive reserve public information specialists with no restriction
30
on grade or length of time out of service. Consequently, the under
secretary directed the deputy chief of naval operations for personnel
and reserves to hold regular Navy information specialist strength at 80.
However, the under secretary stated that, in view of the shortage of
subspecialists , 20 reserve public information specialists could be
recalled to active duty. Further, the under secretary stated that until
363 qualified subspecialists were obtained, the public information
ceiling was to remain at 100. When the 363 subspecialists were obtained,
the PIO ceiling would be reduced to 80 regular Navy public information
31
specialists. Captain Jones observed:
As a result of this decision, eight inactive duty
reserve public information specialists were selected
from among 31 applicants; standards were kept very,
very high. However, more importantly, CHINFO now
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had 20 extra information billets authorized, and
was able to tell various Navy commands, that if
they needed a public information specialist, they
could write and request that a specialist billet
be established. 32
The 20-man expansion, the largest ever at any one time, in the
authorized ceiling for the public information specialty was an important
development during the first half of the 1960s. The increase was the
direct result of Keith Board recommendations, specialist perseverance,
and compromise by the specialty, the chief of naval personnel and the
under secretary of the navy. Growing naval understanding of the impor-
tance of public information did not appear to have been a factor,
although recognition of the shortage of qualified public information
officers by top-level Navy military and civilian officials was an
important aspect in winning an increase in the specialty ceiling. The
requirement for commands to give up an unrestricted line officer billet
when requesting an information billet increased the difficulty of
establishing specialist billets in commands needing a full-time practi-
tioner. The ceiling increase to 100 specialists was a major victory
for the specialty and helped establish a 1650 grade pyramid. The wide
base of junior officers resulted from a continual input of lieutenants
and below. This was important because the future competence and
increased stature of the public information specialty needed strong
junior officers to develop senior specialists.
The Combs Board
There was one final study of specialization and the information
specialty as the first 20 years of the information corps drew to a
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close: Rear Admiral Walter V. Combs was appointed to head a board to
study billet requirements and grade distribution in nine specialty
34
areas and 15 subspecialty categories; public information fit in both.
The Combs Board was an outgrowth of several earlier boards considering
specialization and postgraduate education and further defined Navy
needs in both areas. The board's recommendations provided a documented
and justified basis for the size, grade structure and educational re-
quirements for Navy public information and further recognized the
importance of the public information specialty to some Navy line officers,
On August 17, 1964, the Combs Board began deliberating on seven
distinct problems.
1. Identification of billets requiring a specialist, and if pos-
sible, minimizing the number of such billets. (A specialist was "an
officer having technical knowledge and experience not normally possessed
35
by an unrestricted line officer," performing a full-time job.)
2. Determination of billets requiring a postgraduate education.
3. Formulation of the optimum size and grade structure for each
specialist group.
4. Identification of unrestricted line officer billets requiring
baccalaureate or graduate education in a particular specialized field.
5. Determination of the number of line officers needed to fill
billets requiring education in a particular field.
6. Specification of the number of officers, specialist and subspe-
cialist, requiring graduate education.
7. Recommendation for doctoral education.
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As the Keith Board, the Combs Board, was divided into panels, one for
each specialty. When the panel met, the board was briefed by repre-
sentatives from each specialty on the existing situation, future needs
37
and unusual or significant problems.
The Combs Board also introduced the use of two terms in planning
billet allocations under the subspecialty concept: P-Code and S-Code.
A P-Coded billet required specialist or subspecialist , with graduate
38
education, or equivalent, in the area of specialization. An S-Coded
billet was reserved for a subspecialist with an undergraduate education,
39
or experience in his area of specialization. The basis for determin-
ing whether
a specific billet should be designated for a Public
Information specialist, P-coded subspecialist or S-
coded subspecialist, [included] . . . the size of
the command, its public information responsibilities,
the geographic area of the command, the civilian
media population, the availability of other Public
Information Officer (PIO) support, and the size of
the command's public information organization.
^
u
As the board began investigating the various specialties, several
findings were made regarding specialty size, grade structure and post-
graduate education. Although the Navy had grown 14 per cent during five
years, the restricted line essentially remained the same size. However,
the specialty corps did total 10,067 officers. Public information
needed the largest proportionate increase. One hundred fifty-five
public information specialists were necessary to fill billets specified
by the Combs Board; only 103 specialists were authorized under 1964
41
ceiling. The board noted that past billet authorization practices
resulted in "distorted grade structure," with too few junior officers
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in the specialties. This finding particularly benefited the public
information specialty, plagued for years with a top-heavy grade
structure. The problem was solved by re-examining and modifying
billet rank requirements; and in borderline cases, by assigning a
specialist or subspecialist , whichever would help develop the best
42grade structure. The Combs Board also found that 20 per cent, or
23 public information specialist billets, required a postgraduate
43
education. Of the 23 billets, 16 were for commanders, seven for
44lieutenant commanders. A similar number of billets were P-Coded
45
for subspecialists ; 129, S-Coded.
During the course of its investigation, the Combs Board reviewed
developments in the public information specialty and noted that increas-
ing demands for a limited number of specialists resulted in little
action to increase the number despite many recommendations. Earlier,
an ad hoc board, including members from the naval operations and infor-
mation offices, and the personnel bureau had unanimously agreed that
55 more billets were needed, an increase to 135. Since that time, intra-
Navy requests and defense department demands raised the required number.
The assistant secretary of defense for public affairs suggested to the
secretary of the navy that the service enlarge its public information
organization to the size of other services, necessitating more special-
46ists. The Navy information organization historically has been about
47
half the size of the Army and Air Force. The lack of public informa-
tion specialists resulted in under-staffing the information office plans
and evaluation section and offices in New York and Los Angeles. Further-
more, the board's investigation revealed that during the previous 18
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months, unanticipated demands for specialists included the USS Enter-
prise 's cruise around the world, the NATO multi-national manning
experiment in the USS Claude V. Ricketts
,
joint operations with South
American navies
.
In promotions, the Combs Board found that public information
specialists were faring better than their line counterparts, a change
from the promotion situation of the mid-1950s. The specialist had
more opportunity for promotion than the unrestricted line officer,
because there were only a few PIO officers in each selection zone.
. . . For example, if three officers are in the zone
for selection for promotion to captain, and the
selection opportunity is 44 per cent, there must be
the opportunity for two to be selected, or 67 per
cent. This is because the law specifies that SDO
officers must receive equal or greater promotional
AQ n r
opportunity. H ^
Similarly, there was little attrition in the information specialty area
until the commander level because "only career motivated officers are
selected for designation as I65x designator officers," another change
from the early 1950s.
The Combs Board also announced that there should not be a relation-
ship between the size of the public information specialty and the size
of the Navy. The board stated that the public information specialty
exists to serve as a command function, with no ratio between number of
specialists and total Navy personnel. Changes in the number of Navy
personnel should not have an effect on the number of information spe-
cialists required.
The need for a flag officer in the public information specialty
also was considered by the board; its recommendation paralleled those
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of earlier boards. The Combs Board noted that since
. . . the other services do not have PIO specialists,
per se, a flag officer PIO specialist in the Navy
would be the only such specialist flag officer in
the Armed Services. ->2
The Navy had no public information specialist flag officer, and the board's
report questioned whether the Navy could afford the luxury of two flag
officers in the information office, however, the board said that
. . . when an exceptionally well qualified Public
Information (165x) specialist is eligible for flag
grade, he should fill either the CHINFO or Deputy
CHINFO billet and have flag rank "while so serving.". . .
The board also suggested that, "... when there is no Public Informa-
tion Specialist flag officer, the Deputy CHINFO billet should be filled
54by a Public Information (1650) specialist captain."
The Combs Board recommended changes in the size, number of billets
and grade distribution, shown in Tables 10 through 12, as well as
annual quotas for information specialist postgraduate education.
Table 10 indicates the number of existing, established public informa-
tion billets to be filled by a specialist.
TABLE 10












Table 11 shows additional public information specialist billets to be
established to fulfill requirements.
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Table 12 shows the Combs Board recommendation of size and grade distri-
bution of the public information specialty during fiscal years 1966
through 1970, including an allowance for Transient Patient and Prisoner
(TP&P) billets.
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The board also recommended that three public information specialists be
selected annually for postgraduate education in public relations. Lieu-
tenant was specified as the best rank for selection of officers in the
graduate program because the majority of P-Coded billets required lieu-
tenant commanders
.
The Combs Board recommendations were approved, with an important
proviso on the availability on personnel. On October 30, 1965, Vice
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Horacio Rivero, approved recommenda-
tions for "planning and implementation." He noted that although
authorized numbers were approved, there were no additional people.
Admiral Rivero stated that, "with the approval of this report, the
subspecialty concept can be implemented. Full implementation of the
subspecialist program must be evolutionary." The admiral recognized
a program was needed to educate Navy officers regarding this new per-
sonnel management concept.
The recommendations of the Combs Board affirmed comments of earlier
boards regarding the size of the public information specialty. The
total of 155 public information specialists was the highest number of
165x officers recommended by any board. By establishing billets at the
lieutenant rank, the board provided the basis for a viable grade struc-
ture for the specialty. Approval of the Combs' recommendations by the
chief of naval operations, however, was a hollow victory, because the
specialty could be expanded to 155 only as more officers became available.
Nevertheless, the new ceiling represented a substantial increase and
meant that over the 20-year period since the specialty was established,




The postgraduate education program for public information
specialists, which ended in 1958, resumed in 1962. The brief flirta-
tion with a tuition-aid program proved unsatisfactory and did not
meet Navy needs. The evolving concept of subspecialization created
problems; and during 1964, the Navy reconsidered its choice of a
university to train specialists and subspecialists.
The 1959 tuition-aid program failed its objective, and the Navy
re-established a graduate program for specialists and non-specialists.
Experience showed that specialists lacked time and nearby college
facilities to take advantage of the "expanded" educational opportu-
59
nities. The move to re-establish a graduate program began in 1960,
when the new Chief of Information Rear Admiral D. F. Smith, Jr.,
visited Boston, Massachusetts. He found that the Army and Air Force
were sending public information officers to Boston University for
postgraduate education and recommended that the Navy reinstitute its
public relations graduate program. In February, 1961, Rear Admiral
Smith wrote the chief of naval personnel that postgraduate education
for 1650s was needed if the Navy expected to have an experienced,
competent corps of public information specialists. He recommended a
one-year postgraduate program in public relations, with an annual
minimum quota of two officers, at least one a public information spe-
61
cialist. The decision was made to reinstitute the public relations
graduate program, beginning in fiscal year 1963. The personnel bureau
anticipated that the course would be of one-year duration, beginning
in summer or fall, 1962.
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A university was selected for the postgraduate program and
students assigned; but by 1964, the new subspecialization program
created problems. In January, 1962, Boston University was re-selected
as the school for Navy public relations graduate training. Students
were expected to begin in the fall semester, complete course work and
64theses, and graduate the following summer session. However, imple-
menting Keith Board recommendations in 1963, the Navy sent several non-
specialists to Boston. According to Captain Jones, the postgraduate
program project officer at the time, the Boston public relations course
was aimed primarily at the junior public relations executive level.
While the 1650 officers had the necessary journalistic background, non-
specialists did not. As a result, non-specialists were gaining sub-
6S
specialist qualification without developing basic communication skills.
Therefore, in May, 1964, the office of information began searching for
another university to educate public information specialists and pro-
fit
spective subspecialists and to teach basic journalism skill courses.
Jones recalled that was necessitated by the Navy's desire that all
public relations graduate students attend the same school so non-
specialists would have the advantage of sharing ideas with their more
experienced counterparts. However, due to a late start in searching
for a replacement program, Boston University was utilized again for
1964-1965. 68
The graduate public relations education program was re-established
in the Navy because specialists were unable to take advantage of the
tuition-aid program, and increasing emphasis was given to the needs of
prospective subspecialists. Additionally, the program's reinstatement
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was accelerated when the information chief realized other services
were sending public information officers to graduate school. Although
Boston University was an acceptable choice to the office of information
for graduate 1650 education, its inability to provide non-specialists
with basic journalism skills caused the Navy to consider shifting the
public relations sequence to some other university, eventually the
University of Wisconsin.
Conclusions
The most important development by the end of 1964 was the growth
of the public information specialty to a ceiling of 100, with formal
approval of 155 billets. Both resulted from the action of Navy boards:
implementation of the 1959 Keith Board recommendations and 1964 approval
of Combs Board recommendations. The latter reform was tempered by a
lack of personnel for newly authorized billets. In terms of special-
ist influence, permanent designation of a specialist as deputy chief
of information ensured continued professional public affairs repre-
sentation in top-level Navy policy discussions. The deputy decision
was spontaneous and unplanned like many developments in the public
information program. Reinstitution of graduate education resulted
partially from the information chief's realization that other services
were sending information officers to graduate school. The decision did
not result from high-level Navy desire to increase professionalism of
information specialists, although the bureau of naval personnel promptly
approved a request for a public relations curriculum.
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The evidence suggests that opportunities provided by interna-
tional events, the dictates of a new Presidential administration, as
well as Navy programs and policies, and vigorous activity by the
public information specialists themselves, added further impetus to
eventual service-wide recognition of the importance of the public
information specialist. The specialty, by the end of 1964, was well
established and demonstrated that the skilled practitioner was as
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Lloyd interview. Captain W. C. Chambliss, served as deputy chief
of information from June, 1958, to February, 1960, but according to
Lloyd, this was because Chambliss had experience, not because the billet
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Never have so few done so much for so many who
thought they knew how to do it better.
—Captain F. M. Lloyd, III
After a study of Navy public relations, conclusions can be derived
in six major areas: reflection of Navy attitudes toward the public
information function as revealed by the 20-year struggle over the
service's public information specialty, including exploration of rea-
sons for establishing and maintaining a cadre of skilled practitioners;
determination of proper balance between full and part-time information
specialists; the role of various boards and studies; opportunities for
higher education for specialists; and evaluation of the Navy public
information specialist approach to public relations. Although some
Navy attitude change toward public relations has been evident, the
change has not been pervasive. Overall, the service has adopted a
specific policy regarding the number of specialists needed for its
public information program, indicating an eventual move to part-time
practitioners. The conduct of service public relations by a small
group of public affairs professionals has benefited the Navy. However,
the service has increased and decreased the size of the specialty over
the years for a variety of reasons, none of which indicates overwhelm-
ing acceptance of the public information specialist. Still, there is
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some evidence that the Navy has developed a greater understanding of
the need for public information.
The evidence also indicates a need to draw conclusions about the
numerous boards and studies which have investigated the specialty, as
well as about the apparent Navy position toward advanced education and
training for specialists. Studies of the specialty have made both
positive and negative contributions toward a viable specialization
program; overall they have had a salutory effect. Opportunity for
education at civilian institutions has expanded over the years, but
with a corresponding reduction in service-oriented education.
Additionally, the research has uncovered several areas worthy of
general observation and of suggestions for improvement of the special-
ist program. The observations generally reflect intuitive perceptions
about the management of the public information specialist program. The
suggestions flow from the evidence and from the author's personal
experience in the public information specialist corps.
A final evaluation of the Navy's public information specialty indi-
cates some acceptance of the function and the specialty, particularly
at senior military and civilian levels. There is no evidence of over-
whelming understanding of problems peculiar to the practitioner. The
evidence also indicates a need for the specialty to manage its own




Navy Attitude Toward The Specialty
There has been a positive Navy attitude change toward public
information and the specialist, but this is not widespread through the
service. There also is a greater awareness of the importance of public
information and increased acceptance of the role of the specialist in
communicating service policies to the public. Establishing the specialty
resulted from top-level recognition of the need for a small cadre of
highly skilled information specialists. Many senior military and
civilian officials recognized the need, but only viewed the information
specialist as a valuable asset in the fight against unification, rather
than as a continuing means of communicating with the public. During
the initial years of the specialty, the specialists as a group did not
perform competently, either militarily or professionally, particu-
larly at the senior officer level. Much of this incompetence can be
attributed to Navy failure to abide by selection criteria, including
the requirement that a specialist's naval duty be broad enough to
provide a firm foundation for promotion and future professional develop-
ment. Navy attitude toward public information was revealed in the 1950
internal survey which showed lack of appreciation for the public rela-
tions role.
The qualifications of the public information specialists have
been a predominant concern in the specialty history. The tendency has
been for the Navy line to judge all public information specialists by
observing the performance primarily of senior information officers.
In many cases, specialists as a group were judged after observations
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of one unqualified or untrained man. The 1953 Low Board, which recom-
mended abolishing the specialty, resulted from a dissatisfaction with
the public information specialists, partly because of poor performance
and partly because of misunderstanding the public information role.
It is significant that retention of the specialty included a recommenda-
tion that both Navy and public relations experience are essential
requirements for specialist selection. In later years, the Keith and
Combs Boards also specified that officer specialists have fleet
experience as well as specialist expertise. Specialists demonstrated
competence through preparing morning news briefings for senior Navy
officers and through expert handling of mass media during significant
news events, the Cuban missile crisis and the loss of the USS Thresher
,
and gradually won the trust and confidence of senior military and
civilian officials. This increased respect was evidenced in 1963 when
the deputy chief of information billet was assigned permanently to a
public information specialist. Admiral Zumwalt's recent directive
requiring close liaison of Navy offices with the information office
shows the extent of line officer acceptance of the specialist's profes-
sional expertise, a marked contrast from the days of the B36-aircraft
carrier controversy of 1948-1949.
Specialty or Subspecialty
The struggle to preserve a cadre of public information specialists
exposes divergent views on whether public information requires a full-
time practitioner (a specialist) or a part-time practitioner (a subspe-
cialist) . At the end of World War II, the Navy's public information
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program was almost entirely staffed with full-time practitioners.
Reduction in naval personnel strength after the war and the transfer
of many reserve officers to inactive duty resulted in more unrestricted
line officers—often untrained in public information—being assigned
to public information positions, with specialists receiving a decreas-
ing percentage of total public information billets.
This trend was modified after the 1950s. In 1959, the Franke
Committee recommended that public information specialists be eliminated,
and that, through graduate education, line officers be given the pro-
fessional background needed to supplant the specialist. The 1959
Keith Board and the 1964 Combs Board identified billets requiring full
and part-time practitioners. Considering the total number of Navy
information billets requiring a full-time officer, there is a ratio
of three subspecialists to each specialist. Although the plan was
that subspecialists eventually replace all public information special-
ists, the small number of unrestricted line officers exposed to graduate
education in mass communications indicates the Navy tacitly has accepted
the long-range need for the full-time practitioner.
Usefulness of Boards and Studies
The various boards, studies and investigations of the specialty
over the 20-year period have both hindered and aided the growth of the
specialty. Several factors motivated the studies. A major one was
line and specialist dissatisfaction with specialist performance.
Another was the need to ensure a proper specialist ratio to Navy needs
in order to keep abreast of technology.
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The various investigations hindered the specialization program
by affecting morale and promotion opportunities, eventually requiring
intervention by two secretaries of the navy. The 1953 Low Board and
the 1959 Franke Committee—both recommended eliminating the specialty
—
were temporary stumbling blocks. Studies by Shipman in 1952-1954 con-
tained references to poor morale in the specialist corps after the
Low Board recommendations and to beliefs of "persecution" of the spe-
cialty by the bureau of naval personnel. Promotions likely were
affected when selection boards anticipated the specialty's demise and
advanced officers with more line officer qualifications. The Franke
Committee recommendation to eliminate the specialty was directed at
specialists in general, rather than at public information. The com-
mittee, in fact, noted that having trained and qualified public infor-
mation practitioners was important. Despite this comment, the board's
recommendation did not put the specialists at ease. During a five-year
period in the middle 1950s, the specialty was studied "to death," with
no fewer than eight boards or studies. Despite these roadblocks, two
Navy secretaries—Anderson and Gates—succeeded in alerting the Navy
to the importance of the public information practitioner.
On the other hand, boards and studies exerted an affirmative
influence. Shipman 's 1954 study helped change administrative procedures
governing officer selection for promotion in all specialist categories
and helped insure future selection in accordance with the Officer Per-
sonnel Act of 1947. This change was significant in helping establish
an on-going public information specialty. The long-range 1954 Shipman
recommendations were effected during the following 10 years. The
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Franke Committee's recommendation to eliminate the public information
specialty led to the Keith Board, which in turn led to an expansion
of the specialty to a ceiling of 100 in 1963. The Keith Board stated
that its members, initially dubious about the need for specialists,
finally recognized that specialists were essential. The 1964 Combs
Board recognized additional information billets, specified billets
requiring postgraduate education and established a ceiling of 155 public
information specialist billets. The board also stated that public
information specialty size should not depend on the size of the Navy
because public information is a command function. Navy-wide recognition
of this principle would contribute to stabilizing the specialty. More-
over, the Combs Board specifically recommended that the deputy chief of
information be a specialist and recommended an additional 21 billets
with full-time practitioners. Despite the anguish, all the boards and
studies generally served to promote or strengthen the concept of main-
taining a small cadre of skilled practitioners.
Education
Education of specialists has been the subject of inadequate and
vacillating Navy planning. When a predominant part of the specialist
corps needed either postgraduate education in public relations or
advanced naval training, neither was available. This factor undoubtedly
contributed to poor professional performance of many specialists. There
is some indication that the junior specialists were forced to educate
themselves in the beginning. The information office proposed profes-
sional reading, mostly military-oriented material. Later, when many
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specialists received both civilian and military educations, assignment
to Navy and all-service schools and colleges was severely reduced and
graduate education, temporarily halted. The bureau of naval personnel
said public information officers were displacing line officers in
service schools and were receiving advanced education in dispropor-
tionate numbers. Later re-institution of graduate education at Boston
University was compromised when the Navy educated specialists and non-
specialists at the same institution. In general, the Navy failed to
recognize the public information specialist as a key adviser requiring
civilian and military advanced education. Nevertheless, the Navy has
strongly supported postgraduate education in mass communications for
information specialists because such education enables these officers
to better serve as advisers of major staffs and to gain increased pro-
fessional expertise.
Evaluation
The evaluation of the public information specialty is closely
allied to the battle over increases and decreases in its size. The
specialty has been a success because it has survived, increased in size
and remained viable, despite attempts to abolish it, and has earned a
fair measure of support and respect from top-level Navy management. In
many instances, the increases and decreases in the size of the specialty
resulted from changing Navy attitudes toward public information, but
more often from reductions in overall service strength. Most initial
Navy information billets were continuations of the World War II public
information billet structure, primarily in shore-based commands. The
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1945 Dyer Board recommended selection of 49 public information special-
ists; the group was expected to total 145 officers. Nevertheless,
initial selection was followed by continuing decreases in number and
little new input. Early efforts by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
to add information billets to fleet staffs were largely unsuccessful.
The outbreak of the Korean War, however, indicated to many Navy commands
the need for public information specialists on fleet staffs. The spe-
cialty ceiling increased to 100, but with a subsequent planned reduction
to 77. By 1954, Navy strength was reduced; and the public information
ceiling decreased, along with other specialties. Because other spe-
cialties had larger increases during the Korean War than public informa-
tion, the overall effect of the reductions was more severe on public
information. In late 1954, the chief of naval operations personally
intervened and ordered an increase to 82 specialists.
Survival of the specialty was determined in the 1950s; later
actions, compromises and adjustments confirmed this. The turning point
of the specialty was in 1957 when Navy-wide demand for specialists
exceeded the number available. The middle and late 1950s were dominated
by compromise when line officers reduced the specialty below effective
levels. Navy commands abolished public information billets during
periods of personnel reduction, providing some evidence of the limited
support for public information (commands decide which billets will be
dis-established) . Nevertheless, the increase in requests for public
information specialists demonstrated to middle-echelon planners that
more specialists were needed. The 1959 Keith Board recommended 67 infor-
mation specialists; by not identifying the number of junior officers
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needed to support the senior billets, the board affirmed the need for
155 specialists. Later, the 1964 Combs Board confirmed this number by
identifying the 155 specialist billets. Thus, the upper-middle and
upper levels of the Navy have accepted the need for the skilled practi-
tioner; although in time of personnel reduction, public information
will continue to take a proportionate cut in strength.
General Observations
Several observations also seem important, particularly regarding
the establishment of a specialist career pattern, selection criteria,
and special attention to its own public, the line officers of the Navy.
Besides Captain A. H. Ashton's attempt to establish a career pattern,
there was little Navy or specialty effort to establish a career pattern
for all public information specialists. Specialist assignments through-
out most of the period were unplanned, except when the career planning
board was in session. Thus, the development of the well-rounded spe-
cialist was often left to fate. Unless the individual officer takes
an active role in formulating his own career pattern, it is possible
that at senior level, he will not have experience in all phases of
public information. This is in direct contrast to the line officer
for whom a formalized career pattern has been developed and promulgated.
Officer selection as public information specialists seldom was
based on established selection criteria. Stereotypes of information
officers as a group are formed by line officers through personal contact
with a single officer. Unless strict selection standards are estab-
lished and followed for every applicant requesting designation as a
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public information specialist, the specialty's reputation will suffer.
This problem is particularly acute in the information specialty because
of the pervasive belief among line officers that no special talent is
required to practice public relations effectively.
One further observation is that public information specialists,
as a group, have not been concerned about the Navy's total public
information program or the specialty's own program. If there has been
concern, there has been no formal articulation of proposed action.
This study reports that the specialty has the confidence of individual
Navy commanders, but not the respect of the Navy. After 20 years,
this indicates a lack of communication between the specialist and the
line officer, perhaps like the 1899 situation when Navy specialization
was abolished, and in 1959, when the Franke Committee recommended that
most specialist categories be abolished. Rear Admiral Kirkpatrick's
admonition that public information be a part of the Navy, rather than
apart from the Navy, remains valid.
Suggestions
An in-depth study should illuminate areas for improvement. Some
suggestions can be offered with a firm base of evidence, others are
intuitive. Six such suggestions are most important.
1. Selection of qualified personnel as public information special-
ists is urgent for a strong, respected public information specialty.
Historically, the specialty has not had the luxury of selecting only
those officers it wanted, but instead was forced to take what the
specialty could obtain. Almost invariably, the specialty has relied on
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the opinions of non-specialists to establish standards. At this point
in time, the specialty is relatively firmly established and can afford
the luxury of selecting only fully qualified officers. As minimum
qualifications, it is suggested that any officer, with the exception
of Naval Academy graduates, meet the following criteria: qualification
as an officer of the deck, underway or as a naval aviator or navigator;
a degree (undergraduate or graduate) in mass communications, public
relations or journalism, or significant full-time civilian experience
in mass communications (e.g., two years or more); at least two years
experience in a full-time public information billet; and strong motiva-
tion for wanting a change in designator to public information, to be
ascertained by interview before a board composed of career Navy public
information specialists.
2. A career development plan should be formed and promulgated
to all public information specialists, and followed in detailing
information specialists. There are always exceptions. However, there
are few officers whose career pattern could not be established firmly
through the rank of lieutenant commander. Formulating such a pattern
would benefit the Navy and the specialty. Captain Ashton's 1954 pro-
posal is considered a valid starting point.
3. Public information specialists require more than advanced
education in mass communications; public information officer attendance
at service schools and colleges should be re-instituted. The reasons
given in 1956 for discontinuing specialist participation are not valid
in light of the role of the specialist as key adviser. Specifically,
at least one specialist a year should attend the Armed Forces Staff

210
College, and at least one specialist a year should attend both the
senior and junior courses at the Naval War College. Additionally,
and in view of the scarcity of opportunities for public information
specialists to serve with the operating Navy, one specialist a year,
in the rank of commander, should attend a course of instruction or
have the opportunity to gain experience to develop an up-to-date
appreciation of fleet developments in all areas of naval warfare.
Further, public information specialists regularly should attend short
training courses in such areas as anti-submarine warfare, anti-air
defense and amphibious warfare; such attendance should not be restricted
to those occasions when the instruction coincides with assignment.
4. A permanent committee with broad representation should be
established to recommend changes in public information specialist
billet assignment. Public information is a command function. In
many cases, this determines information specialist billet distribution.
However, new programs of value to the Navy's future often develop, and
it would be in the service's best interest to assign specialist support
even if billet compensation is not available.
5. Advanced education for specialists has accelerated in recent
years, but often the officer is forced to purchase personally the basic
reference materials needed, as well as those necessary to insure his
continued professional and naval development. The unrestricted line
officer, in many cases, uses reference material furnished by the Navy.
It is appropriate that the Navy provide each specialist with a personal
basic reference library of public relations and military history publi-
cations when the officer is designated as a public information specialist.
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Basic texts suggested by the Public Relations Society of America for
study by civilian practitioners before taking the accreditation exami-
nation would be minimal. It is further suggested that the office of
information issue each specialist a copy of the Navy public information
manual and additional material as it becomes available after estab-
lishing the basic personal library.
6. The results of public relations-oriented graduate research
with Navy application should be reproduced and distributed to all spe-
cialists. The majority of theses written by specialist graduate
students have related directly to the conduct or history of Navy public
information. These theses have ranged from the performance of public
information during a disaster, the Navy League of the United States,
and internal information, to a history of Navy public information.
This research could be utilized if each Navy-related thesis was repro-
duced for all public information specialists.
The proposed suggestions would result in an improved Navy public
information program. Explicit selection standards and a formal
career pattern would improve the specialty at the most important junc-
ture: input and basic experience. Recognition that specialists are
key advisers, needing broad naval backgrounds and familiarity with
current developments, would enable the specialist to provide competent
advice and increase the respect and trust of his line counterparts.
Continual re-evaluation of billet allocation would enable the Navy to
assign its limited number of specialists to those areas requiring
emphasis, further maximizing the use of limited resources. By provid-
ing each specialist with a basic public relations and military library,
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as well as the benefit of graduate research, the Navy would insure
continued professional development and availability of basic material.
Proposed Studies
Three areas lend themselves to further study: motivation, role
of the chief of information, and inter-play of personalities. Each
individual information officer is motivated by similar and dissimilar
factors. Research should be undertaken to determine what motivates an
officer to become a public information specialist and which factors
sustain and drive an officer throughout his career. A thorough study
would provide insight into selection criteria, as well as help each
individual specialist perform to his maximum potential. This study of
the history of the Navy public information specialty has revealed
little about the role of the chief of information in the development
of the specialty or the conduct of Navy public information. Because
the chief of information is the head of the Navy's program, it appears
valuable to investigate the extent of his involvement in the conduct
of Navy public information, his selection qualifications for this key
level of contact with the American public, and the character of the
interface between public information specialists and the chief of infor-
mation. Finally, it appears that the personalities of the secretaries
of the navy, chiefs of naval operations, line officers, public informa-
tion specialists and civilians have exerted an influence on the
development of the Navy public information specialty, as well as the
conduct of Navy public information. Further exploration could provide
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insight into the problems and obstacles and assistance provided
public relations practitioners.
In conclusion, the 20-year history of the public information
specialty reveals that the pathway to legitimacy for the specialty
has not been easy. The struggle has reflected the extent of the
Navy's commitment to a strong public information program. Staying
alive during periods when abolishment would have been an easy course
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